Reassessing J. S. Mill's liberalism: The influence of Auguste Comte, Jeremy Bentham, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. by Kumar, Sujith Shashi
Reassessing J. S. Mill’s Liberalism:
The influence of Auguste Comte, Jeremy Bentham, 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt
Sujith Shashi Kumar
London School of Economics and Political Science
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
June 2006
1
UMI Number: U220209
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U220209
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
'THes^S
f
115*0
I5L1 1+11 tj.
Declaration
I declare the contents of this thesis to be entirely original work of my own production.
Sujith Shashi Kumar 
14 June, 2006
2
Abstract
The thesis starts by considering the controversial claim made by Joseph Hamburger that 
couched within the arguments for freedom in On Liberty are calls for high levels o f social 
control, which threaten the conventional reading of Mill as a paradigmatic liberal thinker. 
The thesis tests this argument against the claims o f the revisionary secondary literature, 
which attempts to reconcile Mill’s utilitarian and liberal writings. Examining Hamburger’s 
main line of argumentation, the thesis shows how Mill’s thought is more influenced by the 
thought of August Comte than Mill or the secondary literature acknowledge, while still 
retaining some crucial differences. The thesis next considers another influence argued to be 
outside of the liberal tradition, Jeremy Bentham. Even though Mill admittedly inherits 
utilitarianism from Bentham, he expands the psychological notion of pleasure in 
fundamental ways, even at the cost of internal consistency. Moreover, the thesis argues that 
Bentham utilises particular forms of social control in a similar manner as Comte, which is 
ultimately what Mill rejects in both of their doctrines. However at the same time, it is 
Comte’s positivist philosophy of history that enables Mill to reconcile his utilitarian 
foundation with his liberal prescriptions. Next, the thesis argues that it is ultimately the 
influence the Wilhelm von Humboldt that maintains Mill’s thought as recognizably liberal. 
Von Humboldt introduces the notion of individuality to Mill, whose expression is the 
highest source of pleasure, and is the concept that prevents Mill’s moral and political 
system from collapsing back into a more Comtean and Benthamite formulation. Finally, 
synthesizing these influences, the thesis uses a hierarchical conception of the self, as 
articulated by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin, to reconcile the high levels of social 
control correctly perceived by Hamburger with Mill’s unambiguous protection and 
valuation of negative liberty. This socially embedded and highly normative conception of 
autonomy underpins Mill’s progressive doctrine, and preserves his inclusion in the liberal 
tradition.
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1. Introduction:
Why Mill; Why Now
John Stuart Mill may have articulated his moral and political doctrine over 150 
years ago, but the issues he addresses are very much alive, making his relevance to politics 
today manifest. Whether its delineating the limits of free speech, or assessing harm to 
others in public spaces, the only thing unusual about Mill’s participation in these current 
debates is how well-argued his position would be, compared to the media pundits and 
politicians who are now the principle exponents. Applying Mill’s ideas to contemporary 
problems is not only appropriate, but in may cases illuminating. His applicability to our 
time is not just because of the ubiquity of some key political and social problems, but also 
due to his ability to cut through the superficial and temporal trappings of a problem, and 
address its heart.
Mill’s relevance to contemporary political debates reflects his larger relevance to 
political philosophy in general. He is, o f course, a key figure in the history of political 
thought, as one of the first exponents of a modem liberal doctrine. Mill also contributes to 
continuing academic debates that will be going on well into the future. There are some 
conflicts in political philosophy that are irresolvable, or rather, can only be resolved 
temporarily with reference to local conceptions of the justice. The tension between the 
rights of the individual and the demands of the community is one such problem. There is no 
a priori balancing of these demands which endure over time, only temporary solutions that 
reflect shifting concerns. This reassessment highlights Mill’s formative influences on his 
political thought, the upshot being to yield a new interpretation o f his moral and political 
thought. This interpretation offers a new solution to balancing the demands o f society and 
the individual, and so is a contribution to normative debates about how to arrange society.
What is perhaps the most salient reason to reassess Mill’s thought is given by Mill 
himself. Chapter II of On Liberty offers three independent arguments for the freedom of 
thought and discussion, and they are epistemological in nature. There may be a broad 
consensus amongst Mill scholars regarding how he is best understood, but the periodic 
reassessment of his thought is always required, because:
“However unwilling a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility
that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that
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however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it 
will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”1
I am not claiming that the received interpretation of Mill is false, and that this thesis argues 
for the correct one. My aim is to keep the debate alive as to the best way to understand Mill 
by contributing a new perspective on the old issues, as Mill would have wanted.
The thesis, in a way, begins where Joseph Hamburger’s thesis ends. In his John 
Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, Hamburger argues that couched within his arguments 
for freedom in On Liberty were intimations o f the high levels of control individuals would 
experience. Hamburger argues that On Liberty was nothing more than the means to 
breaking down antiquated Victorian and Christian social norms and beliefs, so that a new, 
secular, Religion of Humanity could be introduced.2 The upshot of Hamburger’s thesis is to 
highlight the high levels of social control individuals are to experience under Mill’s system. 
In this way, Hamburger’s argument supersedes Gertrude Himmelfarb’s “Two Mills” 
theory. Himmelfarb argues that throughout Mill’s writings, two incompatible pictures 
emerge. The one of On Liberty arguing for a morally relativistic freedom, and another from 
the majority of Mill’s other writings arguing for a more consolidated and conservative 
version of liberalism.4 Similarly, Hamburger’s claim is superior to Maurice Cowling 
scathing indictment of Mill because of the one-sided nature of his interpretation. Cowling 
argues that Mill intended to replace the dominant Christian moral outlook with one that 
revered a cultural elite. According to Cowling, Mill was preoccupied with protecting this 
elite from the democratic and homogenising mediocrity he saw on the rise.5 Not only does 
Cowling understate the role of liberty in his interpretation, he also fails to recognise the 
instrumental role elites play in the facilitation of individual self-development of all 
members of society mature in their faculties.6 These are minority readings of Mill, however 
I feel that the enthusiasm and reverence many scholars have for Mill obscure some of the 
elements of his thought. My thesis aims to resist this tendency by using Hamburger’s 
argument to initiate a reassessment of Mill’s moral and political thought.
1 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, in C ollected Works XVIII, John Robson and Alexander Brady eds., 
(Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 242.
2 Joseph Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999).
3 Hamburger, p. 212.
4 Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974), p. xi-xxiii.
5 Maurice Cowling, M ill and Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 104.
6 Cowling does touch on a point that will be explored in Chapter Five o f  the thesis. Reading Chapter III o f  
On Liberty alone yields the same conclusion the Cowling comes to. Reading Chapter IV alone com e leads 
to the opposite conclusion. My aim is to offer an interpretation o f  M ill’s thought that can accommodate 
both.
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Mill is acknowledged as one of the “Fathers” of modem liberalism, and this is a 
claim about his influence and reception, rather than about some Platonic ideal of liberalism
n
emanating from his thought. There were versions of liberalism before Mill, and there have 
been different versions of liberalism after him. His relationship to this recognisable lineage 
will be discussed briefly at the conclusion of this thesis. In any event, I am not challenging 
his inclusion in this family of doctrines, but it is not as straight-forward as is commonly 
thought. Mill is an eclectic thinker; and his contribution to liberalism is combining 
disparate strands o f contemporary European thought to form his own doctrine. This fact is 
acknowledged by the secondary literature, but the specifics of these influences have not 
been fully mapped out. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by highlighting the 
influences of Auguste Comte, Jeremy Bentham, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. These, I 
argue, are the biggest influences on his moral and political thought, because despite what 
Mill and his commentators have discussed, many elements o f their thought permeate his 
liberal-utilitarian doctrine. What is interesting about this particular grouping o f thinkers, is 
that most of them are considered outside o f the liberal tradition, which itself warrants a 
reassessment of his liberalism.
Mill has a Romantic conception of human nature. As such, he sees its expression as 
the best and deepest source o f utility, or pleasure ( I will use the two interchangeably). In 
order to maintain this dubiously empirical claim in the face of illiberal policies and 
preferences in politics, Mill maintains a forward looking and progressive dimension to his 
conception o f human flourishing. It is this narrow and socially embedded conception of 
human flourishing that proves to be the biggest challenge to Mill’s inclusion in the lineage 
of liberalism. Underpinning Mill’s notion of individuality is a highly normative conception 
of autonomy. Like Immanuel Kant’s ideal of freedom, Mill’s ideal o f individuality is 
perhaps too demanding, but is necessary to maintain the richness and diversity of the liberal 
tradition.
Structure o f the Thesis
The dominant debate surrounding Mill’s moral and political thought has been over 
the success of his derivation of liberal principles from a fundamental utilitarian framework. 
Therefore, Chapter Two begins the thesis by surveying this debate as a means to arguing 
that the fullest articulation of Mill’s moral and political thought is found in the 
simultaneous consideration of On Liberty and Utilitarianism. This debate was initiated by a
7 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts o f  Liberty”, in The Proper Study o f  Mankind, Henry Hardy and Roger 
Hausheer eds., (London: Pimlico, 1998), p. 232.
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lecture given by Isaiah Berlin 1956 entitled, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life”, where 
he argues that Mill fails in his attempt to ground liberal principles in more general 
utilitarian ones.8 Berlin argues that the freedom of thought and diversity argued for in 
Chapter II o f On Liberty may comprise only the necessary, but not sufficient conditions for 
the growth o f knowledge. It may empirically be the case that the growth of knowledge is 
best facilitated by high levels of centralised coordination or even wholly illiberal strategies. 
If the growth of knowledge is the goal - which is even itself only contingently compatible 
with utilitarianism - then Mill must be open to the best possible strategy, which may not 
turn out to consist o f the liberal principles he advocates. Rather than deriving a liberal, 
morality from a prior commitment to utility, Berlin charges that Mill values both 
irreducibly, and pluralistically. However, since this seminal lecture, many writers have 
sought to reconcile the tension between Mill’s liberal and utilitarian commitments. Alan 
Ryan utilises the distinction between the three departments or spheres o f life that Mill 
makes in Book X of System o f Logic. He argues that the Principle of Liberty only applies to 
the moral sphere, leaving the prudential and aesthetic spheres to be governed directly by the 
Principle of Utility. This effort goes some distance to mitigate the potential competition 
between the Principle of Utility and the Principle of Liberty, but not without some 
problems o f its own. John Gray builds on Ryan’s distinction, but highlights what he 
perceives as an implied Principle of Expediency. Whereas the Principle of Utility is 
axiological, the Principle of Expediency is action-guiding. Again, whereas this 
interpretation goes some distance to alleviate the conflict between the two principles, the 
Principle o f Utility remains the ultimate standard -  however indirectly -  which makes the 
liberal principles argued for in On Liberty unsatisfactorily empirically contingent.
Chapter Two also introduces the controversial thesis of Joseph Hamburger. 
Whereas the revisionary debate surrounds Mill’s attempt to derive liberal principles from a 
utilitarian foundation, Hamburger argues that throughout his writings Mill subtly argued for 
the abandonment o f outmoded Victorian social norms and beliefs, and advocated the 
adoption of a secular Religion of Humanity.9 The liberal principles argued for in On Liberty 
are nothing more than a strategy to break down the oppressive ways that these antiquated 
principles still have over public sentiments, and to be themselves superseded once the next 
organic stage o f history is reached. In fact, couched within arguments for liberty, are 
intimations of the ways in which society would control individuals. Hamburger seeks to
8 Berlin, Isaiah, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends o f  Life”, in J.S. M ill on Liberty in Focus, John Gray and 
G.W. Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996).
9 Joseph Hamburger, John Stuart M ill On Liberty and Control, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999).
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recover Mill’s actual intentions, however if we use his depiction of Mill as another 
interpretation, we see that it is superior to both Ryan and Gray’s attempts to reconcile the 
tensions in Mill’s thought. In Hamburger’s thesis, the liberal principles are a necessary, but 
not a permanent, feature o f society as it progresses through various stages of history.
This philosophy of history is one of several elements that Mill takes from Auguste 
Comte, despite heavily criticising him. Chapter Three examines the extent of this influence 
on Mill’ thought. In various writings beyond On Liberty and Utilitarianism, it is clear that 
Mill shares with Comte much of the same histoico-sociological outlook. The way 
knowledge grows and is diffused, and the power of education and religion, are both 
examples of the their shared belief in the importance o f authority. Most importantly for 
Mill’s moral and political thought, he accepts elements of Comte’s particular philosophy of 
history and theory of social progress. But despite these commonalities in their thought, 
crucial differences remain, so much so that the fully illiberal reading that Hamburger makes 
is unsustainable. Nonetheless, the progressive dimension to Mill’s moral and political 
thought can be traced back to the Comte’s positivism that Mill was so engaged with in the 
earlier part of his life.
Another self-evident force in the grounding o f Mill’s liberal prescriptions is Jeremy 
Bentham.10 Chapter Four looks at Mill’s inherited utilitarian framework, and the extensive 
ways in which Mill alters it. Like Comte, Bentham is best understood to be outside o f the 
liberal tradition. Despite the efforts o f some writers to interpret liberal principles in his 
writings, both liberty and equality are purely instrumental and formal in his system. 
Moreover, Bentham makes clear that these staples of liberalism are at any point eligible to 
be subordinated in the interest of security, the first condition for the pursuit of pleasure. In 
fact, the implicit social control that Bentham’s system employs is in some ways a return to 
the method of Comte. And just as Mill rejects those strategies in Comte’s system, so too 
does he reject them in Bentham’s. Mill also expands the notion of pleasure to accommodate 
the manifold and richly diverse ways in which humans pursue happiness. The distinction 
between lower and higher pleasures captures better the manner in which pleasure is 
experienced, but the radical incommensurability that Mill insists exists between the two 
proves challenging to reconcile with ethical hedonism. Despite altering much of Bentham’s 
system, Mill attempts to remain within a utilitarian framework with his liberal 
prescriptions. In fact, it is specifically the addition of Comte’s progressive thinking that 
enables Mill to defend against the liberal critiques that are levelled against Bentham.
10 John Stuart Mill, “Autobiography”, in C ollected Works /, John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger eds., 
(Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) pp. 67-73.
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One of the challenges with identifying and discussing the influence of Comte and 
Bentham on Mill’s moral and political thought is to account for the liberal principles which 
he ultimately creates. Chapter Five examines the third central influence on Mill’s project, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, and argues that it is here where the distinctly Romantic flavour of 
Mill’s thought can be traced.11 Humboldt is the only thinker praised repeatedly in On 
Liberty, and his influence is manifest in the essay. In particular, the Romantic notion of 
individuality comprises not only the highest source of pleasure for individuals, but also the 
engine of social progress, as individuals constantly conduct experiments in living. To 
demonstrate the centrality of individuality to Mill’s expanded liberal-utilitarianism, I 
conclude the chapter by describing how On Liberty would look without the advocacy of 
individuality. What we see is that even though the arguments for freedom remain, it 
becomes merely formal as the drive to find the activity that yields the most utility causes 
individuals to converge on a ever shrinking range of activities. In a sense, it is a reversion 
to the Benthamite style o f implicit control and harmony o f interests.
Despite Mill’s attempt to craft a unified liberal utilitarianism combining disparate 
strands of contemporary thought, tensions persist. Therefore, Chapter Six puts forth a new 
interpretation of On Liberty that accounts for the high levels of social control correctly 
identified by Hamburger, and reconciles it with Mill’s unambiguous valuation of negative 
liberty. Individuals are susceptible to “very severe penalties at the hands o f others, for 
faults which directly concern himself’.121 use a hierarchical conception of the self to show 
how the Harm Principle applies only to first-order activity, or character, while society, 
elites in particular, exercise influence over individuals’ second-order reasoning and 
reflection. The aim is to marginalise self-regarding character flaws like “rashness, 
obstinacy”13, and “miserable individuality”14, and induce the character ideals of “pagan 
self-assertion”, tempered with “Christian self-denial”.15 Evidence of this character ideal is a 
desire for the higher pleasures, and an understanding of why these pleasures are higher. For 
Mill, the reasons one has for holding a belief or desire are at least as important as the belief 
and desire themselves. Exercising of the deliberative faculties is a crucial source o f utility, 
and the way by which we maintain ‘living truths’. I argue that this deliberation occurs at a 
second-order level of reasoning, and is susceptible to the influence of society. The Harm 
Principle protects the first-order activity of acting on desires from moral and physical
11 Mill, “Autobiography”, pp. 260 -  261, and “On Liberty”, in C ollected Works XVIII, John M Robson 
and Alexander Brady eds., (Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 261.
12 Mill, “On Liberty”, CW XVII, p. 278.
13 Ibid.
14 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in C ollected Works X, John M. Robson ed. (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1969), p. 214.
15 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 266.
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coercion. The chapter goes on to clarify the scope of its applicability: an act must meet 
three criteria before it warrants interference. It must be harmful, other regarding, and (most 
crucially) wrongful. This clarification enables us to make sense of some of the examples 
Mill uses in the Essay.
Highlighting the manner in which control is influenced over the individual begs the 
question as to whether Mill’s inclusion in a liberal lineage is appropriate. Therefore, the 
final chapter describes the highly normative conception of autonomy implicit in Mill’s 
advocacy of individuality, and concludes that it does warrant his inclusion. Mill’s 
conception of autonomy is in part procedural, in that individuals must ascend to a second- 
level of reasoning in order to fully understand their first-order manifestations o f character, 
and in part substantive, in that the deliberative process must result in the first-order desire 
for a higher pleasure that best conforms to one’s individuality. Though Mill by no means 
was the first thinker to advocate liberal principles, he was the first to introduce the 
Romantic notion of individuality to a recognisable lineage of liberalism. This notion, and 
the subsequent tension between its demands and those o f society’s, is replicated in the 
movement of New Liberals who emerge during the later years o f Mill’s life. Individuality, 
and especially the normativity of it in Mill’s thought, can also be found in the liberal 
perfectionist theory of Joseph Raz. His notion o f well-being, as defined as the achievement 
of socially established goals, and the reasons for holding them, parallels the logic o f Mill’s 
highly normative conception of human flourishing, but lacks the empirical grounding that 
sets Mill apart.
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2. A Liberty upon Utility:
The Literature
Utilitarianism, widely considered to be one o f Mill’s great writings, is a 
beautifully written, compelling introduction to Mill’s amended utilitarian inheritance. 
Published in three sequential issues of Fraiser’s Magazine in 1861, it presents the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, or Principle of Utility, and then systematically sets out to 
prove the principle, describe its binding force or authority, and then discusses its 
connection with justice. Though the essay is very clear and concise, like any great 
doctrine, it is not without its set of contentious issues, including its apparent disharmony 
with On Liberty. Nonetheless, Utilitarianism remains one of the great expositions of 
utilitarian ethics ever written, and still warrants our close attention. When we consider 
the two together, we begin to see Mill’s larger project of forging a new political 
morality. The next section of this chapter will assess some the tensions that are 
generated by the simultaneous consideration of the two works by surveying some the 
literature that has been generated since Isaiah Berlin’s lecture entitled “John Staurt Mill 
and the Ends of Life” in 1956. Finally, to conclude my argument that both books must 
be considered simultaneously, I will put forth an interpretation of Mill’s project, based 
on the controversal intellectual history of Joseph Hamburger’s book, John Stuart Mill 
on Liberty and Control, one that, I will argue, goes much further than other 
interpretations in the revisionary literature to reconciling the two books.
The Texts
i. Utilitarianism
Throughout the essay, Mill stresses the non-controversy of his doctrine. He 
frequently attempts to pre-empt criticisms by pointing out that most attacks on 
utilitarianism are equally applicable to other systems of moralities. The introductory 
chapter, “General Remarks” sets this tone by addressing the epistemological 
underpinnings o f any discipline attempting to describe natural and social phenomena. 
The particular theories and evidences that comprise a discipline are not dependent on 
first principles. First principles, Mill indicts, cannot be proven, “...and their relation to 
the science[s] is not that of a foundation to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which 
perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to
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light.”1 The art of morality, or legislation, like all arts, must choose its end first, such as 
utility, health, justice, or godliness, and then set out to attain such an end. The validity 
of the chosen ends can never be “proven” in any strict sense, and so must be self- 
evident. Mill takes the opportunity to lob some pot-shots at intuitive and inductive 
schools o f ethics, whose subjective and obscure first principles have only gained 
widespread acceptance because o f a “tacit influence of a standard not recognized.”2
Mill argues that even if denying its authority, or explicitly rejecting its official 
consideration, all systems of ethics take into account the happiness, or utility o f its 
adherents, Kant’s Metaphysics o f  Ethics being a prime example. The first principle of 
doing only that which one would assent to being a universal law derives its binding 
force from the fact that no society could function with maxims that permitted the pursuit 
of one’s goals at the expense o f everyone else’s. It is implicitly a utilitarian standard 
that is being appealed to because any rational being will only act in such a way that if 
everyone acted in a similar way would promote the well-being of the entire society. It is 
now clear how Mill will introduce the standard of happiness as the self-evident first 
principle o f utilitarianism. The essay seeks to present considerations for the reader’s 
intellect to give or withhold assent. It is in this way alone that Mill sets out to “prove” 
the legitimacy o f his system of morality.
The chapter, “What Utility Is,” and the whole essay for that matter, is simply a 
vehicle for presenting the Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP). Once stated, the rest of 
the essay simply offers clarifications, addresses some criticisms, and then gives some 
applications. This foundation for morality “holds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness.”3 This principle is based on Mill’s theory of life which states that “pleasure, 
and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable 
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable 
either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of 
pleasure and the prevention of pain.”4 Utilitarians were not the first to place pleasure at 
the heart o f their doctrine. Epicureans did as well, and their critics, objecting to the 
positing o f nothing nobler than pleasure as the sole end, charged them with peddling a 
doctrine worthy only of swine. The Epicureans replied that it was their critics who 
denigrated human nature by supposing that humans could enjoy no other pleasure than
1 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in C ollected Works X , John M. Robson ed. (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), p 205.
2 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p 207.
3 Ibid., p. 210.
4 Ibid.
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that of pigs. Like everything in the world, quantity and quality need to be assessed. The 
Epicureans held the pleasures of the intellect to be superior to those of mere sensation, 
and Mill does as well. It is here that Mill introduces his controversial typology of 
pleasure that will be looked at in greater detail in Chapter four. Quantity aside, what 
makes a pleasure qualitatively different, or higher, than another is the informed 
judgement of all those who have had experience o f both. Of the two, the one that all 
prefer irrespective of the costs, including pain, and moral obligation, can be deemed to 
be higher. It is the pleasure that none would resign for any amount o f the other pleasure. 
Of course, in order to appreciate the higher pleasures, one must first have the capacity. 
Anyone with the properly cultivated mind and habits will always prefer the higher, 
except for those who suffer from “infirmity of character.” And even though the capacity 
for higher pleasures is “a very tender plant” easily atrophied by neglect, Mill does think 
that it is a generic human ability. The addition of this new dimension was a reaction to 
Bentham’s cruder felicific calculus, which takes into account only the duration, 
intensity, propinquity, certanty, purity, and fecundity of a pleasure and pain, but not 
type. Mill found this too simplistic, and not representative of the multifarious ways in 
which happiness can be experienced. This added distinction brings to Mill’s doctrine 
some complications that will be addressed shortly. For example, what is it, other than 
pleasure, that makes a pleasure ‘higher’? Does Mill conceive that some activities are 
‘higher’ or ‘better’ than others, and these alone yield higher pleasures, or can the higher 
pleasures spring from any activity that the judges deem to be higher? Whereas the 
former suggests an evidential distinction, one where humans can be in error, the latter is 
a criterial distinction whereby the judgement itself is the only criterion for the higher 
status, and thus merely a subjective judgement. Mill does not discuss this important 
distinction, but he does pre-emptively address some criticisms of what utilitarianism is 
all about, which does clarify the doctrine as a result.
Firstly, the critic charges that happiness is unattainable. Mill concedes that if it 
were so, happiness could not rationally be the end that all aim for. But utilitarianism is 
also concerned with the alleviation pain, and if happiness does not exist this element of 
utilitarianism would be even more important. Secondly, the critic asks what right does 
anyone have to be happy. This criticism actually questions the ultimate end, happiness, 
which Mill has conceded cannot be ‘proven.’ He does respond that the natural and 
social intellectual endowments are very modest to be able to experience happiness, 
certainly no more than the endowment necessary to live a solitary life focused on one’s 
own misery. Finally, the critic points out that many people have sacrificed happiness,
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and are better off for it. Mill does grant that some people do live without happiness (that 
is, his conception of happiness), in fact, according to Mill’s calculations, 19 out of 20 of 
the world’s population live without it.5 As for the people that wilfully resign their 
happiness, they usually do it so that others need not, and so are still acting to maximize 
the aggregate happiness of society. This criticism raises the issue of virtue, and if it is 
compatible with the utilitarian framework. Maximizing virtue as a means to one’s own 
happiness would not really seem like virtue at all. Mill claims that virtue can be 
habituated to become a part of happiness, so much so that its absence would be painful, 
and so is compatible with Mill’s theory of life and the Greatest Happiness Principle 
while remaining virtues, as such.
Mill’s next chapter in Utilitarianism addresses the binding force o f utilitarianism. 
Mill begins by explaining how every morality has both external and internal sanctions 
to provide its authority. Religious moralities derive their external sanctions from god’s 
word, or fear of god’s wrath. For utilitarians, the external sanction comes from the 
social bonds that already exist in society. The solidarity and sympathy for the well­
being of everyone concerned compels the individual to act only in utility-maximizing 
ways. The internal sanction to utilitarianism, and every other ethic, is simply the 
individual’s own conscience. The proper upbringing and education can instil in anyone 
a selfless concern for the greater good, however that may be defined.
The following chapter examines the sort of proofs the principle of utility is 
susceptible to. Mill reiterates that first principles cannot be proven, but as matters of 
fact are susceptible to our senses and intellect. The ‘proof that happiness is desirable is 
simply that people desire it. In a similar, though an oft criticised parallel, the proof that 
sound is audible is that people hear it. Not only is happiness desirable, it is also the only 
thing desired for itself. Everything else is simply a means to happiness. Power, money, 
and fame are all means to happiness that through habituation become constituent parts 
of happiness. They are all completely compatible with the utilitarian scheme until their 
maximization begins to adversely affect others. Virtue too, was originally desired as a 
means to happiness, but then also through habituation becomes a part of happiness. But 
virtue is never injurous and often promotes utility and so can and should be maximized 
in the utilitarian framework. This short chapter does not seem to further Mill’s cause 
very much, but provides a recap of his case to that point. The following chapter proves 
far more illuminating by addressing the not-so-obvious connection between utility and 
justice.
5 Ibid., p 217.
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The final chapter of Utilitarianism is the longest chapter, and is considered by 
many to be the most involved. Mill begins by suggesting that justice is a natural 
sentiment that we all experience. His point is that there is no necessary connection 
between a sentiment’s origin and its binding force. Moreover, like all sentiments, it 
needs to be controlled and enlightened. Justice has its roots in two instincts that all 
animals posses, self-defence and sympathy. The difference between animals and 
humans is that humans can extend sympathy to a wide range of creatures, and combine 
it with variety of other sentiments, as a result of pre-reflective intelligence. Therefore, 
humans can conceive of a community of interests and mobilize the instinct o f self- 
defence when other people’s interests are at risk. Origins aside, in order to determine 
what justice is, Mill examines all actions classified as just or unjust and determines 
there to be six. First, there are moral rights, which are prior to law. Then there are legal 
rights, conferred by law, like property and freedom, which must be respected. Desert is 
another form of justice, and is its most basic form. Breaking faith with an expectation 
justly produced is an injustice. Partiality is not an injustice itself, but is usually a means 
to other injustices. Justice demands impartiality in the courts, although one would 
rightly expect partiality to a friend or demonstrate partiality when choosing friends. 
Equality is very closely connected to impartiality, but also varies the most between 
different conceptions of justice. With these six examples of justice, Mill then turns to 
the etymology of the word. He concludes that starting with the Hebrews and up to the 
Romans, the meaning of the word moved from the following of actual [divine] laws, to 
the following of precepts that should be laws. His point is that some laws are unjust and 
so there is, regrettably, no complete overlap between justice and law. If justice as a 
branch of morality is not always congruent with law, what is the difference? Whereas 
feelings of retaliation are aroused at any moral infraction, penal action is warranted only 
by non-compliance with a law. The difference between morality and mere expediency is 
that morality invokes duty, to be exacted like a debt. Morality can be divided into both 
perfect and imperfect obligations. Perfect moral obligation generate a corollary right of 
another individual or individuals. I have a perfect moral obligation not to steal because 
it would violate my victim’s right to be secure in his or her property. I also have an 
imperfect moral obligation to be charitable, but to no specific person. Mill says that this 
type of obligation grants scope for the use of discretion.
Like the Greatest Happiness Principle, Mill is attempting to ground justice in 
nature so as to minimize metaphysical claims. The naturalism that Mill employs can be 
used to support any conception of justice. In fact, he gives several incompatible models
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and concludes that utility is the only external standard by which to choose between 
them. Even after the model is chosen, there will be competing conceptions of 
punishment that also need to be arbitrated. Again, the aggregate welfare of the 
community is the only standard by which to judge. The laws that prevent individuals 
from hurting each other or interfering with their liberty are essential to any society’s 
well-being. Even when an injustice is committed to uphold higher moral concerns, like 
stealing to feed the starving, it is in the end, a larger conception of justice that is being 
maintained. Though Mill’s first principles cannot be proven, he makes a compelling 
case for the explicit adoption of the utilitarian system of morality. He begins with a 
seemingly self-evident truth and develops an ideology that places the community’s 
welfare at the centre, and its simplicity and elegance warrants consideration, especially 
in the light o f another very compelling essay, On Liberty.
ii. On Liberty
Mill claimed to be a consistent utilitarian all o f his life, and Utilitarianism is 
strong evidence of the truth of this claim. When one examines other writings by Mill, 
the strength o f this assertion becomes strained, though not necessarily falsified. On 
Liberty, in particular tests this claim, despite Mill’s own preface that it is entirely based 
on the utilitarian foundation. Before examining this claim, a brief summary of the book 
will be helpful. Only then can we explore some o f the debates and controversies 
manifest in the Millian literature, all as part of a larger argument that both must be 
considered in order to understand Mill’s larger project of crafting a political morality.
Before exerting his ‘one very simple principle’ for which he claims the entire 
essay is but a vehicle for, Mill takes a moment to describe the history o f political 
struggle up to the present state that On Liberty addresses. Originally, or rather, for most 
of recorded history, the struggle for control was between the rulers and their subjects. A 
hereditary class of oligarchs and/or monarchs maintained power, while the peasantry, 
set opposite, struggled to utilize as much liberty as possible. Gradually, the demand for 
popular self-determination made it expedient for power to be handed down to the 
people. This arrangement pit parties and factions against each other for legislative 
control. Eventually, a majority, or at least the most active minority, ascended to the a 
level of unchecked power -  tyranny of the majority. But this tyranny was not confined 
to just the political arena. Public opinion had an equally as powerful grip over the 
customs and social norms of the community. And as Mill points out, this tacit abuse of
19
power was more formidable because it offered “fewer means of escape.”6 ‘Ordinary 
man’ only had his own subjective standards and tastes and expected all to follow suit. 
There was no objective standard of right, or rationally constructed norm to compel 
others. This justificatory omission enabled religion -  the source of the most intolerance 
- to take hold and entrench itself in the citizen’s psyche. This state of oppressive dogma 
of conformity and deference is what Mill is attacking with the exertion of his one very 
simple principle, the Harm Principle: “that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number, is self-protection.” Despite its simplicity, Mill famously qualifies this 
principle by denying its applicability to individuals not in the ‘maturity of their 
faculties’ or whole races that can be ‘considered in their nonage.’ The principle, not 
derived from any right independent of utility spawns both positive and negative 
demands. The former refers to the duty of every individual to help bear the cost of 
maintaining society, i.e. conscription, taxation, and legal testimony. The latter applies to 
a sphere of self-regarding activity that enjoys absolute immunity from interference and 
is even beyond moral appraisal altogether. And where society lacks the means to 
enforce such protection, it is the duty of everyone’s conscience to step in and play the 
role of the constable.
The first and most primary liberty to be defended is that of thought and 
expression. Though Mill is comfortable that freedom of the press is secure, he feels 
strongly that the individual is still at risk o f being censored by government, or worse yet, 
by society. “If all of mankind minus one, were o f one opinion, and only one person 
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one 
person, than he, if  he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.” Truth is 
not the product of consensus, so the suppression of any opinion stands as a ‘peculiar 
evil.’ To illustrate this point, Mill outlines the three hypothetical situations in which 
suppressed opinions fall into, one concerning the falliblism of human knowledge, one 
regarding the consolidation of truth, and the final separating the truth from falsehood.
Firstly, the suppressed opinion might be true, in which case the suppressor is 
denying society and its posterity the opportunity to judge for themselves the truth of an 
opinion. The suppressor, in deciding for others what the truth is, is presuming his or her 
own infallibility. Mill’s charge is that no government or person has the authority to
6 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, in C ollected Works XVIII, John Robson and Alexander Brady eds., 
(Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 220.
7 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 220.
8 Ibid., p. 229.
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censor an opinion on the grounds that it is false, simply because it may be found to be 
true at some later point. No one can claim absolute certainty when suppressing error 
because of the inherent falliblism of all humans. But Mill is not saying that individuals 
or governments should never act on their best judgement. Preventing the propagation of 
error is presuming no more infallibility than the levying o f taxes or the waging of war. 
Despite the uncertainties involved in the reasons that lead to these decisions, no one 
would question the legitimacy of levying taxes or waging war. Mill concludes this 
argument by clarifying the difference between holding an opinion as true because at 
every challenge it endures, and suppressing other opinions as a means to maintaining 
the truth of an opinion. “Complete liberty of contradiction and disproving our opinion, 
is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of 
action...”9 But the intended defence of truth is not the only motive for censorship. 
“There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well-being, 
that it is as much the duty o f governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any 
other interest of society.” 10 Here, Mill is suggesting that there may be utilitarian 
arguments for the suppression of certain opinions, independent of truth. An opinion 
might be suppressed not because of falsity but because o f its danger to the ‘useful 
opinion.’ Mill then quickly dismisses this possibility by pointing out that any judgement 
of the utility, or usefulness, of a opinion would require the same presumptuous 
infallibility as of the truth of an opinion. Moreover, it would be a very strange position 
to defend a opinion while conceding its falsity.
The second situation Mill considers is when the suppressed opinion is false. 
Some think it harmless to suppress an opinion or position that is appropriately 
understood as wrong or mistaken. But the suppression o f false statements and opinions 
denies people of the only test of their own “correct” opinions. People who uncritically 
receive their opinions and perspectives from authority fail to understand the grounds of 
their position. “Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging 
to the words which enunciate them.”11 It is not enough simply to defend one’s positions, 
one must also be able to refute counter-positions, and to do so requires their full liberty 
of expression. Anyone who merely holds opinions, but doesn’t grasp the arguments 
underpinning that position, or the counter-position, possesses nothing more than ‘dead 
dogma.’ People who passively receive their thoughts and ideas not only fail to 
understand their foundations, but also will begin to lose the meaning of the ideas. “The
9 Ibid., p. 231.
10 Ibid., p. 233.
11 Ibid., p. 244.
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fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the truth are forgotten in the absence of 
discussion, but too often the meaning o f the opinion itself.” It is clear that Mill is 
concerned not only with the holding o f correct opinions, but also in the construction of 
the correct opinions. Intellectual development is both a means and an end as well, and 
this has wide implications for the nature of the freedom and control that the individual is 
to experience.
To conclude his argument for complete liberty of discussion, Mill states that 
there is a third situation in which the majority discussants find themselves. Rather than 
one party holding the truth, while the other arguing from error, most opinions contain 
only part of the truth while the contrary opinion supplies the difference. Therefore, as 
the first two arguments apply, suppressing an opinion in order to advance another 
denies both the opportunity for others to judge themselves, and the mechanisms to test 
the truth. In order to illustrate this point, Mill points to a system of morality widely 
believed to be a doctrine containing the entire truth -  Christianity. His argument is that 
Christian morality, as enumerated by the New Testament, not only makes reference to 
and incorporates elements of earlier doctrines, such as Greek, Roman and Paganism, but 
also has changed and evolved itself, specifically at the hands o f early Catholics o f the 
first five centuries. To consider the Gospel to be the entire articulation o f the Christian 
ethic is to ignore a substantial portion of the Christian doctrine as it is expoused today. 
Mill’s argument for the complete liberty of expression fits into his larger advocacy of 
intellectual development. It is not simply that the stimulation of open and free 
discussion will discover and update our truth, it will also cultivate our minds and make 
us the rational, open minded citizens he endorses.
Despite the great lengths he goes to demonstrate the need for absolute freedom 
of thought and discussion, Mill recognizes the limits o f freedom of expression. Whereas 
the former falls within the negative sphere of activity that enjoys complete immunity 
from interference, the latter can rightfully be curtailed once the limits of the Harm 
Principle are crossed. As Mill illustrates, to hold the opinion that com dealers are 
starvers of the poor is completely legitimate when circulated in the press, but when 
addressing an excited mob outside of a com dealers house, the expression runs a very 
high risk of transgressing the bounds of the Harm Principle. Mill is well aware that 
actions cannot be as free as thought and discussion because o f the possible effects on 
other people, but he makes clear that the logic underpinning the liberty is the same:
12 Ibid., p. 247.
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“That mankind are not infallible: that their truths, for the most part, are only half 
truths: that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fiillest and freest 
comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a 
good, until mankind are much more capable than at present o f recognizing all 
sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men’s modes of action, not less 
their opinions.”13
Mill is not just arguing for the liberty of expression as an extension o f the liberty of 
thought and discussion, but as the name of this chapter implies, he is arguing that 
unfettered individuality is a necessary component o f well-being. Most people bow to 
custom, and accept the lot designated for them by circumstance and contingency. 
Custom and tradition do well to educate and transmit the accumulated wisdom of past 
generations. But to confine oneself to the narrow parameters demarcated by what has 
been done in the past is not to utilize those capacities that are distinctly human. “He 
who lets the world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of 
any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.” 14 Mill is arguing that strong 
impulses and spontaneity need to be properly balanced with restraint and belief. There 
were times in the past, when impulse and will far outweighed the rules and constraints 
of society. Men were exerting themselves in to the detriment of others and the 
community. “But society has now fairly got the better o f individuality; and the danger 
which threatens human nature is not excess, but deficiency, of personal impulses and 
preferences.”15 He is advocating experiments in living in order to discover a suitable life 
-  within the confines of the Harm Principle -  while building on and understanding the 
previous experiments and their outcomes have brought to society. Mill is not just 
suggesting that one should egoistically pursue one’s welfare so that the aggregate 
maximizes society’s welfare, Mill is arguing that new perspectives, ideas and solutions 
that are the products of individualistic exploration directly benefit all. A supplement to 
this utilitarian argument is his claim that people have different tastes and that this alone 
justifies the encouragement of different modes o f life. No one would argue that all 
plants flourish in the same climate, and so too is the human condition. Diversity o f life 
is not a luxury, but a necessity. Society ceases to progress when individuality is 
diminished. China, for example he notes, used to be a great civilization, but conformity 
and homogeneity have caused it to stagnate. Europe has avoided such individualistic 
atrophy because its different cultures in close proximity to each other. However Mill
13 Ibid., p. 260.
14 Ibid., p. 262.
15 Ibid., p. 264.
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warns that writers like de Tocqueville and von Humboldt already see that the diversity 
of situation and freedom needed to avoid China’s fate are being diminished in Europe.
The previous two chapters of On Liberty establish the logic o f Mill’s argument: 
freedom of thought and discussion are the central ingredients to the development and 
utility of society. Following from this, freedom of expression and diversity of lifestyle 
are the conditions of human flourishing. Mill now changes tack to discuss the legitimate 
use of coercion against individuals, and what forms such interference may take, a much 
neglected element of his thought. It is here that Mill begins to articulate the crucial 
distinction between self and other-regarding behaviour that he must maintain in order 
for his doctrine to remain intact. He begins by rejecting the model o f society as being 
based on a social contract from which to deduce duties and obligations. Rather, the 
simple fact that one enjoys the protection of society itself is reason to bear both negative 
and positive obligations. First, one should respect certain interests of others as if  they 
were rights, and second, one must contribute to the costs of defending society, 
presumably through conscription and taxation.16 The first o f these obligations does not 
demand a ‘selfish disinterest’ from the self-regarding affairs o f others, in fact far from it. 
Mill discusses an obligation to oneself that one must have to develop and habituate the 
right sort o f character. Though this obligation is to oneself, it is not exempt from the 
concern of others.
“Humans owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and 
encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be for 
ever stimulating each other to increased exercise o f their higher faculties, and 
increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, 
elevated instead of degrading, objects of contemplation.”17
For this, one is not accountable to society or one’s fellow citizen. When someone 
displays these human ideals this person should be praised and admired. When someone 
grossly lacks these characteristics, or who displays Towness or depravation of taste,’ 
this person should receive the opposite of admiration and praise, or be avoided as an 
expression of our own self-regarding individuality. Because the duties of self 
development and (proper) character formation are obligations to no one else but the self, 
their non-performance cannot bring about legal coercion or interference. Mill calls this 
type of ‘social encouragement’ a natural penalty and is the only punishment, or ‘harm’,
16 Mill does not specify here which interests it is acceptable to disrespect, but it is already understood that 
those non-utilitarian interests which harm others need not be protected.
17 Ibid., p. 277.
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one can incur as a result of a self-regarding action or non-action. It should be noted that 
this is no small consequence for a self-regarding flaw. Mill is clear in the Introduction 
that society “practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political 
oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer 
means o f escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving
10 f ^
the soul itself.” Moreover, Mill is not lamenting the unfortunate consequences of 
individuals pursuing their own unpopular conception of the good; he is making a 
normative judgement regarding their rightness, which begs the question of what the 
difference would be from the subject’s point of view between this form of coercion and 
the legal form (this point will be addressed in Chapter Six). For an action to remain self- 
regarding, it also must not run a high risk of affecting other people’s interest, or 
damaging property, though Mill does clarify that the damage that society can afford to 
incur can still be protected, for the greater good o f liberty. The distinction between self 
and other-regarding behaviour is one of the most contentious issues in Mill’s doctrine, 
although he does anticipate some of his critics, but not all.
Mill pre-emptively raises three issues one could have with his formulation of 
absolute liberty. Firstly, no one is completely isolated from society. A person who 
engages in activities that are harmful to no one but that person harm people who depend 
on that person for security, shelter, or support. For example, the mother who lays about 
drunk all day instead of caring for her children can rightly be charged with harming the 
interests o f others, namely her children. Mill concedes that such negligence falls into the 
category of other-regarding behaviour and is punishable by society. But the mother 
who’s children are all grown up and finds her idleness alleviated by the bottle may do 
so with nothing more than the disdain of the community. Secondly, the person who 
harms no one but themselves through some action may be setting a bad example for 
others, who in turn may follow suit. Mill responds that the bad example set by the 
habitual gambler will be followed by the bad consequences o f such risky behaviour, and 
so must be allowed in order to act as a deterrent to others. Finally, if  it is expedient to 
interfere with the self-regarding behaviour of children, or others not of their full 
faculties, why not do so with adults who suffer from “defective” characters? Mill 
considers this abstinence from paternalism to be the strongest argument for the 
complete freedom of self-regarding actions. The accumulated wisdom of past ages has 
condemned universally some actions and behaviours that people today enjoy. In 
particular, Mill points to some religious practices as embodying some truths that have
18Ibid., p. 220.
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since been discarded. To open up our behaviour to such scrutiny is to invite society to 
judge and alter all segments of our lives, including our tastes and preferences. 
Furthermore, in order to develop the proper character individuals need to wrestle with 
their own flaws in order to overcome them. Mill, o f course, raises these issues in a way 
that enables him to easily defend. Later on we will see how this particular distinction 
causes pervasive problems for his doctrine of liberty. However, we must first examine 
how Mill envisions his theory to be applied.
The final chapter of On Liberty deals with some specific applications o f the 
Principle of Liberty, and addresses some crucial ambiguities that linger from the 
previous chapter. Harm, as it turns out, is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for intervention. That is to say, Mill recognizes that that there are some other-regarding 
harms that are not taken into consideration when contemplating intervention. Mere 
offence as a consequence of some action places it in the other-regarding sphere, but 
does not (in some cases) justify societal intervention. The harm involved in any 
competition, be it athletic or professional, also fails to warrant interference to protect the 
“victim.”
“Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive 
examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which 
both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and 
their disappointment. But it is, but common admission, better for the general 
interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this 
sort of consequences.”19
This allowance may seem obvious at first, but as a self-described utilitarian, Mill is 
committed to factoring into his utilitarian calculus all of the consequences of some 
action. Another example he considers is drunkenness. As described in the above, it is 
completely protected by the Liberty Principle, except in the case of dependents, or if the 
drunkard is working at a job that precludes intoxication. Mill now turns his attention to 
the proprietors of drinking establishments.20 Do they enjoy the same protection as the 
consumer of such substances? The sellers/distributors of alcohol and the proprietors of 
drinking houses are not disinterested facilitators of the consumer expressing his self- 
regarding individuality, drunkenness. They have an interest in the consumer excessively 
drinking to their own detriment to maximize revenue. Mill states plainly that market 
interaction is always other-regarding, but “that both the cheapness and good quality of
19 Ibid, p. 292.
201 speak o f alcohol here, but Mill is clear the same applies to gambling and drugs.
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commodities are most effectually provide for by leaving the producers and sellers 
perfectly free...”21 Furthermore, if an activity is free to be done, legal consistency 
demands that it should be free to make a career out of doing it. Finally, distributors and 
sellers are required for the legitimate use of the abused substance. The compromise that 
Mill comes to is to allow such operations, but to prohibit advertisements and other 
enticements. He further recommends that the state regulate the sale of such substances 
with licenses. Mill is against heavy taxation because it amounts to proportional 
prohibition that ultimately disadvantages the poor. He does concede that some taxation 
is expedient for administrative costs, again, some harms are disregarded.
Mill now addresses paternalism as another application o f his Liberty Principle. 
One would think that there are many utilitarian reasons for interfering with people’s 
liberty to maximize their well-being, but Mill argues that there are powerful reasons 
against such interferences. Firstly, there is no one better equipped to deal with a 
person’s affairs than the person themselves. Legislators and civil servants lack the 
relevant familiarity with an individual’s affairs to effectively interfere with one’s 
business. Secondly, as described in the previous chapter, individuals need to exercise 
their own human capacities of free-choice and rational deliberation in order to
strengthen them. Finally, the most cogent reason for restricting the government’s ability
* 00 to interfere in people’s affairs is “the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power.”
A government charged with overseeing many aspects of the citizen’s life will require a
large bureaucratic machinery that would employ many people in many different fields.
Mill’s fear is that with so many people that “looked to the government for every rise in
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life” the nation would be free in name only. These prudential, perfectionist, and 
libertarin arguments against paternalism do not simply call for a minimal state. To 
conclude On Liberty, Mill briefly discusses what the ideal balance for his liberal 
government would be: “the greatest possible dissemination of power consistent with 
efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it 
from the centre.”24 Keeping this balance in mind I now turn to some of the contentious 
issues that arise specifically from trying to reconcile the disparate values endorsed by 
this essay, and its supposed origin, Utilitarianism. The next section will attempt to show 
that in order to understand Mill’s political morality, it will be necessary to consider at 
least both works simultaneously. Though each work can stand alone as a contributions
21 Ibid., p. 293.
22Ibid., p. 306.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 309.
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to political science and moral philosophy, together they reveal a fuller and more 
ambitious project than the sum of its constituent parts.
The Revision Debate: attempting to defend MilTs liberal-utilitarianism
The strengths and weaknesses o f Mill’s work lay in the disparate values he 
seemingly endorses in some of his works. Looking at On Liberty one finds an eloquent 
defence of liberal practices and a beautiful exposition on the value of human diversity. 
The book also discretely captures a major theme in liberal thought as to the grounds for 
legitimate intervention into the affairs of citizens’ affairs, namely, to prevent harm to 
others. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is an introduction to (or summary of) Mill’s 
variant o f utilitarianism he inherited from his father and Jeremy Bentham. It is an essay 
conveying the modest observation that happiness is the only end desired by humans for 
itself, everything else as a means to happiness. Resting on this sole ‘fact,’ Mill 
articulates the moral foundation underpinning all o f his thought, including his 
seemingly contradictory essay on liberty. Mill was a prolific writer. It might be the case 
that he never was able to reconcile his thoughts into a coherent whole, but produced 
many interesting and insightful essays, articles and books, based on different theories 
and philosophies Mill endorsed at different times, in his efforts to reform Victorian 
society. It might also be the case that clues to the proper understanding of the doctrine 
of Mill lay in various books, in need of a unifying lens needed to view his work through. 
This latter possibility is the one being explored by scholars who consider themselves to 
be amongst a revisionary tradition of Millian interpretation. Unsatisfied with the 
traditional criticisms and condemnations heaped upon Mill within the 100 years 
following the publication of On Liberty, They seek to re-examine the tensions between 
Mill’s utilitarian and liberal endorsements and possibly render them superficial. What 
emerges from these efforts is the fact that any full understanding of his political 
morality requires dual consideration of both On Liberty and Utilitarianism. Whether 
one concludes he is incoherent, or a subtler writer than initially thought, these two 
volumes are the clues to his larger doctrine.
A convenient place to begin this survey of the re visionary tradition, and one 
recognized by most of its numbers, is the lecture given by Isaiah Berlin for the Robert 
Waley Cohen Memorial Lecture series on tolerance. In this lecture, later published as 
part of Berlin’s Seminal book, Four Essays on Liberty, the tension between Mill’s
25 This is intended to be a loose category comprising those scholars that have written on M ill’s utilitarian 
and liberal commitments since Berlin’s essay.
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utilitarian commitments and his liberal inclinations are specifically articulated. He is 
indicted as endorsing a plurality of irreducible values, which under current jargon is 
called value pluralism. The first attempt to reconcile Mill’s plural commitments, was 
made by Alan Ryan. Invoking The Art of Life, the last book of System o f Logic, Ryan 
describes how Mill perceives three spheres of human conduct, each with its own end 
and logic. On this view, a distinction can begin to made between what is moral and 
what is utility-maximising. Even further along these lines is John Gray’s interpretation 
whereby Mill’s utilitarianism takes a split level form. This account further separates the 
sphere of morality from the sphere of utility, thereby enabling us to make non-action- 
guiding judgements and settle disputes between secondary principles. These revisionary 
interpretations go far to salvage Mill from the traditional critique levelled against him, 
but are also not without their own problems, some of them substantial. What will be 
demonstrated though, is that both books need to be considered simultaneously if we are 
to understand Mill’s morality either as liberal or as utilitarian, as he considered it 
throughout his entire life, or something different altogether.
Mill’s upbringing was deeply steeped in the classical utilitarian epistemology, 
whereby the un-alterable nature of things could be known. Truth and happiness were 
fixed, which is why the utilitarian framework can be maintained by psychological 
hedonism: the desire for pleasure stimulates the will to action, and of pleasure we can 
only talk of its intensity and duration. Berlin notes that on this model of human agency, 
Bentham and his father would not be opposed to the introduction of some pill if it could 
be shown to produce a sufficiently pleasurable state, like Soma, the pill dispensed freely 
in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. This of course we know, Mill would have found 
unacceptable. In fact, he fell into a deep depression at the young age of 20 when he 
realized how wrchappy he would be if the Benthamite ideal of happiness was attained. 
About a year later when he recovered, Mill endorsed a different conception of 
happiness: rationality and contentment were replaced by vitality, activity and diversity. 
Mill, as an avowed empiricist, denies that truths can be beyond questioning. Truths can 
merely be updated as more observations are made. This falliblism that Mill attributes to 
human knowledge is one of his arguments for full freedom of expression. Only through 
constant challenges by wrong and partially-wrong ideas can any semblance o f truth be 
maintained. But Berlin charges that even full freedom of expression will not guarantee 
the approach of truth:
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“Again, it may well be that without full freedom of discussion the truth cannot 
emerge. But this may be only a necessary, not a sufficient , condition of its 
discovery; the truth may, for all our efforts, remain at the bottom of a well, and in 
the meantime the worse cause may win, and do enormous damage to mankind.”26
The social costs of permitting the proliferation o f certain beliefs could be potentially 
quite great. Preaching sexist or racist polemics, even if not directly inciteful, may still 
have longer-term, more subtler, detrimental effects on society. Furthermore, Mill 
presupposes a truth that can be known and is fixed, namely human nature. Which
9 7principle would Mill invoke to protect people from challenging this ‘truth?’ If human 
nature is demonstrable, and need not be challenged, what other truths are also exempt 
from constant challenge? Berlin concludes that Mill is arguing for diversity for itself, a 
rather un-utilitarian argument to make.
Mill is essentially making a huge wager on what he believes to be the deepest 
interests of the human species and the conditions for its flourishing. What if he is 
wrong? Mill was more concerned with the oppressive nature o f Victorian society than 
with the arrangement o f political institutions. Public opinion, conformity and social 
hierarchy were suffocating individuals, he thought, and he endeavours to liberate them 
from this form of power which was more insidious and pervasive than any a 
government could wield. Despite his empiricism, he argues with the firm conviction of 
an a priori metaphysical grounding. If the prevention of harm is the only justifiable 
motive to coerce individuals, resisting this arrangement would cause tremendous harm.
Berlin’s essay had the affect of bringing the supposedly utilitarian arguments for 
liberty under rigorous scrutiny. He reminds us of Mill’s intended audience, and his 
stated motivation for pontificating on the value of diversity and freedom to explore 
existence. Berlin concludes that Mill fails to derive a principle of liberty protecting a 
sphere of absolute liberty of certain actions. But the fate of Mill’s legacy does not end 
there. Many writers have taken it upon themselves to re-evaluate Mill’s utilitarian 
framework to see if it can accommodate a liberal morality, and it is easy to see why: the 
status o f his project has enormous implications for both liberals and utilitarians. To see 
how a successful derivation might look, Alan Ryan’s contribution to this debate will be 
considered next. His contribution is to evaluate Mill’s project in light of another work 
entitled The System o f Logic. Though not without its own problems, it further cements 
the link between On Liberty and Utilitarianism.
26 Isaiah Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends o f  Life” in J.S. M ill on Liberty in Focus, John Gray and 
G.W. Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 144.
27 This point is examined in greater detail in Chapter Four o f this thesis, see p. 104.
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Ryan was the first to recruit System o f Logic to help construct the Millian lens 
with which to see how On Liberty fits within the larger utilitarian paradigm. In 1957, 
the Wolfenden Committee, formed by the Home Office in 1954 to re-evaluate 
Legislation oil homosexuality, concluded in its reports that there should be a sphere of 
private morality within which the law has no bearing. Ryan suggests that most people 
took this conclusion to be a restatement of Mill’s harm principle, whereby any action 
that only affects the consenting parties involved should be no matter for the law. 
Essentially, the report states that there should be a private sphere morality that the law 
need not bother to persecute. No matter how ‘wicked’ or ‘immoral’ an act may be, so 
long as it is not harmful other people, there are no grounds for legal coercion. Ryan 
argues that this logic, attributed to Mill, is wrong. To see why, and to see the 
relationship between morality and utility, we need to look at Ryan’s incorporation of the 
last book of System o f Logic called ‘The Art of Life.’28
Life is an art. As such it has a logic and practice o f its own. Like all arts, it is 
based on a first, or major, premise not supplied by another art or another practice, like 
science. To use the classic examples, the first premise of the medicinal arts is that health 
is good and should be desired. The first premise o f the building arts is that buildings are 
good, and so on. The first premise of life is that happiness is good, and “By happiness 
is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain.” After the first premise of an art is set, 
then the practice of science is employed to develop the means to the designated end. 
Science speaks in the indicative voice, describing what is and what will be, under what 
conditions, whereas art speaks in the imperative voice proclaiming what should be.
Together with the causal laws of science, this teleology is called the Doctrine of 
Ends. All of the practices, or arts, taken collectively for the art of life and can be broken 
down into three distinct spheres. Mill explains:
“These general premises, together with the principle conclusions which may be 
deduced from them, form (or rather might form) a body of doctrine, which is 
properly the Art of Life, in its three departments, Morality, Prudence or Policy, 
and Aeshtetics; the Right, the Expedient, and the Beautiful or Noble, in human 
conduct and works. To this art (which, in the main, is unfortunately still to be 
created) all other arts are subordinate; since its principles are those which must 
determine whether the special aim of any particlar art is worthy and desirable, 
and what is its place in the scale of desirable things.”30
28 Mill calls it ‘O f the Logic o f  Practice, o f Art; Including Morality and Policy’.
29 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 210.
30 John Stuart Mill, System o f Logic, in Collected Works VI, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routlegde 
and Kegan Paul, 1974) p. 949.
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In each o f the three departments, the principle of utility dictates that happiness should 
be promoted, but in different ways. Ryan clarifies, “Morality is concerned with social 
relations, with dealings with other people. It is concerned largely with rules directing us
i
to abstain from conduct calculated to harm others...” So then, it is here and only here 
that the harm principle is applicable. Only actions that potentially affect other people 
rightly fall under the scrutiny of the moral appraisal. And those that actually produce 
harm are therefore subject to moral condemnation, in the form of self-conscious 
contempt, or guilt, public disapproval, or legal sanction. The logic of all three reactions 
is the same, with the latter option only being employed after a utilitarian cost-benefit 
analysis.
Ryan’s interpretation rejects the Wolfenden’s suggestion that there exits a 
‘private sphere of morality,’ within which the government has no duty to police. On this 
view, any action that is private, or purely self-regarding, is not moral at all, and 
therefore not subject to this sort of appraisal. The moral sphere actually proves to be 
quite small, and is intended more to secure the boundaries for the flourishing of the 
prudential and aesthetic spheres. The activity that the Wolfenden Committee addresses, 
homosexual relations between consenting adults, as an entirely self-regarding activity, 
is therefore not an issue of ‘private morality,’ rather it is not a moral issue at all.
This categorisation does not preclude us from saying anything about the action 
in question. One could still argue that homosexual behaviour, or drug taking, or 
gambling, or riding a bicycle without a helmet was inexpedient, or silly. We could 
criticise on prudential grounds claiming that such behaviour does not promote private 
(as opposed to public) goods, or on aesthetic grounds claiming that such behaviour was 
ignoble, or ugly, but we absolutely could not claim that such behaviour was wicked, or 
evil. This distinction is crucial because Mill’s conception of justice is rooted in the 
utility of punishment. In other words, we consider only those actions which warrant 
punishment, i.e. ‘self-conscious contempt, or guilt, public disapproval, or legal 
sanction,’ as immoral. Any other type o f condemnation we may levy does not give us 
grounds for any of the above forms of coercion.
The upshot of Ryan’s interpretation is to clarify the relationship between utility 
and morality. It is not simply that a failure to maximize utility is immoral, immoral 
action covers a much smaller sphere. Only actions that harm other, non-consenting, 
individuals can rightly be considered wrong, or evil. The Art of Life allows us to
31 Alan Ryan, “John Stuart M ill’s Art o f  Living” in J.S. M ill on Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G.W. 
Smith eds. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 164.
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consider non-utility maximising reasons when deciding between actions. In other words, 
we needn’t be obliged to maximize utility at all opportunities. There may be other 
relevant reasons that outweigh any demand to maximize general utility. There may be 
prudential reasons at times to forgo considerations of the wider public in order to pursue 
some private goal. This interpretation enables us to understand how when faced with 
two activities, one considered a ‘higher’ pleasure, the other a Tower,’ we are not 
necessarily obliged to choose the higher, more utility-maximising option. An initial 
reading o f Utilitarianism suggests that someone with the proper upbringing would never 
choose the lower over the higher, unless suffering from ‘infirmity of character.’ Ryan’s 
interpretation enables us to see the different types o f considerations that ultimately go 
into such a decision, only one of which is moral, and therefore make sense of someone 
choosing a lower pleasure. This topic will be addressed in more detail later in this thesis. 
Here, we only need understand that the Art of Life enables us to separate morality from 
utility because maximising utility does not always place a moral demand on us, and 
failing to do so does not always warrant moral condemnation.
Ryan’s interpretation does not seal off Mill from all of the traditional critiques. 
We can see now how the Principle of Liberty can be maintained even at the cost of  
some utility, but the introduction of the three spheres is still susceptible to James 
Fitzjames Stephens original critique that the distinction between purely self and other- 
regarding spheres is completely fictitious.32 If society’s legitimacy o f coercion hinges 
on this distinction then it is not one to be taken lightly. But before seeing exactly what 
problems still remain for Mill today, we must first look at another formulation o f Mill’s 
utilitarianism. John Gray interprets Mill as an indirect utilitarian, but again this view 
resolves some issues while introducing others.
Gray builds on the distinction borrowed from the Art of Life, but employs the 
principle of utility in a slightly different manner. Responding to the traditionalist 
critique that the principle of utility places too high a demand on maximising utility, 
Gray describes how Mill implies two principles when referring to the principle o f utility, 
one axiological, the other action-guiding. This deconstruction enables us to make utility 
judgements distinct from action, without violating Mill’s theory of life that states that 
pleasure is the only desirable end. Gray’s attribution of this indirect utilitarianism 
further clarifies the conceptual linkage between On Liberty and Utilitarianism and 
introduces the larger topic of Mill’s conception of happiness which I will look at next.
32 James Firzjames Stpehens, Equality, Fraternity, and Liberty, R. J. White ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), pp. 138 -  178.
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The Art of Life maintains that the practitioners o f art and science play distinctly 
different roles in the pursuit o f ends and must never confuse their responsibilities. Art is 
critical and evaluative o f ends (imperative mood), whereas science reasons the causal 
factors and circumstances that result in that particular end (indicative mood). Mill 
stresses:
“Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if  so, in what 
cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business as a cultivator of 
science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him for the decision. In 
purely physical science, there is not much temptation to assume this ulterior 
office; but those who treat of human nature and society, invariably claim it; they 
always undertake to say, not merely what is, but what ought to be.”33
Mill is going to great lengths to differentiate between the modes o f art and science, 
especially when there is temptation to overstep the boundries. Art is critical and 
evaluative with regards to the ends of whatever endeavour (even that of life), whereas 
science employs strictly means-ends reasoning to understand and bring about the 
conditions that expedite the production of the chosen end. If Life is understood as an art, 
with all its modal trappings, and if “...according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of 
human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality...”34, then Gray is reasonable 
in attributing to Mill a form of indirect utilitarianism. The principle of utility, we 
know, is the Philosophia Prima to which all first principles of art, including life, are 
subordinate to. The principle then, is intended to cover all aspects of human life:
“In Mill this principle ranges over all areas o f practice, not only moral practice, 
and, indeed functions as a principle of evaluation for things apart from human 
practices and action. Since moral appraisal is only one sort of appraisal of 
conduct, and morality is only one area of practice or art, the Principle o f Utility 
cannot be treated as if  its place in Mill’s theory was simply that of a moral 
principle. Since the Principle of Utility in Mill is a principle for the assessment 
of all branches of conduct, and since it specifies what is of intrinsic value but 
does not itself enjoin any particular line o f conduct, those writers of the 
traditional school in Mill criticism are in error who suppose that the utility 
principle must impose a moral duty of utility-maximisation on agents.”36
As a standard of evaluation, then, it cannot be specifically action-guiding. Rather it is a 
standard that we use to judge the inherent quality, i.e. utility, of any situation or
33 Mill, “System o f  Logic”, p. 950.
34 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 214.
35 See John Gray, M ill on Liberty: A Defence, (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 38. Gray thanks Williams 
and Smart for introducing him to this species o f  utilitarianism.
36 Gray, M ill on Liberty: A Defense, p. 21.
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arrangement, even ones that humans play no part in. In Gray’s interpretation, Mill’s 
utilitarianism stems from two distinct features. The first is reading a second, implied, 
principle. “This principle, often invoked by Mill under the name expediency but 
nowhere named by him, which (following several recent interpreters, like D.G. 
Brown’s) I will call the Principle of Expediency.” This implied, though logically 
different and independent, principle enables us to judge the utility maximising 
dimensions of an action, i.e. its expediency. It therefore is the principle that we use to 
judge science, the means to some end, and so therefore can be action guiding. The 
Principle of Utility on the other hand, we can use to judge ends, or rather the inherent 
utility in some end, because we know that only happiness is desired for itself. The 
category of moral actions then becomes rather small and is not a direct product of a 
utility calculus. To illustrate, it will be helpful to look at what the criteria is for right and 
wrong action.
In light of the Art of Life, we know that all actions that fail to maximise utility 
are not necessarily wrong. This begs the question then o f what more is required to 
differentiate between right and wrong. Mill plainly states:
“We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to 
be punished in some way or the other for doing it; if  not by law, by opinion of 
his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. 
This seems the real turning point between morality and simple expediency.”38
The punitive element forms part of the criteria of right and wrong but it cannot be all 
because Mill recognises that there are many non/actions that we would want to punish 
people for, but would have no legitimate grounds for. If this was all that was required, 
Mill would have made no advances over the intuitionists he scoffs at. Gray interprets 
the implied Principle of Expediency as playing a larger role than Mill explicitly voices:
“The rightness of an act is not given by its maximal expediency alone, or even 
by its maximal expediency together with the maximal expediency of instituting 
moral or legal rule requiring that it be done, but only by its maximal expediency 
together with the maximal expediency of making non-compliance punishable by 
the whole corpus of moral convention and sentiment.”39
The tendency then to promote utility alone does not a right action make, as the 
traditionalists have criticised. Promoting utility, or being expedient, is a necessary but
37 Ibid., p. 22 .
38 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 246.
39 Gray, M ill on Liberty: A Defense, p. 30.
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not a sufficient condition for moral rightness. The added punishability criterion provides 
the rest o f the standard. Whether intended or not, this is an increasingly smaller category 
of actions. This view helps defend Mill from the charge that at every choice in life, there 
is a moral obligation to maximise utility. We may dislike or lament a failure to 
maximise utility, but we cannot morally condemn it in all cases. A morally wrong 
action is only ‘immoral’ if  punishment is expedient.
“It is necessary and sufficient for the moral wrongness o f an act that its 
disfavouring by public sentiment, the inculcation of a disposition to avoid it and 
of a tendency to feel remorse in respect to its performance, be maximally 
expedient.”40
A morally wrong act must meet the punishability criterion. Utility has no direct bearing 
on an act’s rightness or wrongness. This is how we can maintain the principle o f liberty, 
one of the few moral principles in Mill’s doctrine, while remaining within utilitarian 
confines. There needn’t arise the ubiquitous conflict between liberty and utility because 
a failure to maximise utility does not in all cases constitute a wrong action. Self- 
regarding actions, no matter how detrimental to the individual can be protected despite 
the net loss in utility. Certain other-regarding actions as well, like certain forms of 
expression, namely the contentious ones that unintentionally affect others, might also be 
protected, while maintaining within the utilitarian moral framework.
What Mill fails to address is that his two criteria of morality may conflict. An 
action that is maximally expedient may nonetheless arouse guilt or even social contempt. 
It is unclear how Mill would judge a person who sacrificed his or her own family for 
good of the larger community. A legislator who destroys a historic landmark for a much 
needed sewage treatment plant will definitely arouse the anger of citizenry, maybe even 
his own guilty conscience, even if failing to construct the plant would also arouse public 
(or psychological) disapproval. This potential conflict suggests that certain 
incommensurable moral options can be generated from Mill’s criteria, for which no 
rational solutions may exist. Subsequently, we must see what challenges to both Ryan 
and Gray’s revisionary treatments still retain their force.
The crucial addition that Ryan brings to the revisionary interpretation is the 
separation o f spheres and the different reasoning that is appropriate for each. The effect 
is to reduce the applicability of moral evaluation, thereby alleviating some of the 
demands of utility-maximisation. If on this view (but not on Gray’s), we are obligated
40 Ibid., p. 31.
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to maximise utility when concerned with ‘interpersonal goods,’ but not when we are 
concerned with Prudence or Aesthetics, then the categorical differences between these 
spheres is of crucial importance. Prudence and Morality are consequentialist in nature, 
whereas Aesthetics is more about a form of perception.41 Morality and Aesthetics take 
into consideration other people, while Prudence is purely concerned with the self. 
Finally, morality is the only sphere where the punishablity criterion is coupled to the 
principle of utility to. generate condemnation and supererogation, whereas with 
Aesthetics and Prudence only subjective preferences can operate.
Problems arise when the distinction between the spheres blur, because it 
confuses the ends of the spheres, or practices, thereby confusing the means, or reasoning. 
The problematic distinction between purely self and other-regarding actions is one 
example of this potential breakdown. Even when other regarding behaviour is limited to 
harm to others’ interests, as J.C. Rees posits, both the notions of interest and harm are 
not easily utilized to seal off one sphere from the other.42 As Joel Feinberg shows, the 
notion of harm is more complex and problematic than most realize 43 He describes it as 
a setting back of interests by the self or others, but any definition of harm must be at 
least sensitive to moral wrongs, i.e. setbacks to immaterial interests. Any 
conceptualisation of interests will be at least partly normative, and slips easily into a 
mild “ideal-regarding formulation”, as described by Brian Barry.44 This point will 
become more salient when we consider Mill’s taxonomy of pleasure in Chapter Four. 
Gray observes, “In according special weight to the higher pleasures, the utility principle 
in Mill may seem to have an ideal-regarding aspect...”45 The risk here is slipping even 
further into full-on paternalism. If Mill’s ‘moral authoritarianism’ is as prevalent as 
Cowling argues46 then such a transgression of the harm principle may not be as such if 
we interpretively equate harm with failure-to-prevent-harm, as Feinberg does.47 A 
failure-to-prevent-harm might range from neglecting to educate a child, to failing to 
develop a child’s palate to appreciate fine wine. If the philosphia prima, the Principle of 
Utility, is directly appealed to in all three spheres, but only in the moral sphere do we
41 Ryan, “John Stuart M ill’s Art o f  Living”, p. 164.
42 J. C. Rees., “A Re-Reading o f  Mill on Liberty”, in J.S. M ill on Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G.W. 
Smith eds., (London: Routlegde, 1996), p. 174.
43 Joel Feinberg, The M oral Limits o f  the Law: Vol. 1, Harm to Others, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984).
44 Brian Barry, Political Argument, (Hemel Hampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 40. In fact, 
Barry attributes this interpretation to Mill.
45 Gray, M ill on Liberty: A defense, p. 46.
46 Maurice Cowling, M ill and Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), especially 
Chapter 6.
47 Feinberg, The M oral Limits o f  the Law: Vol. 1 Harm to Others, Chapter 4.
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employ the sentiment o f punishment, then the blurring of the distinction between the 
moral sphere and the other two is a highly problematic grey area of confused reasoning. 
Since the legitimacy of punishment is at stake -  as minor as berating someone for 
breaking a promise, or as great as incarcerating someone for murder -  a breakdown of 
the distinction between the three spheres can be a crippling possibility. The recent 
literature seems to have marginalized the issue somewhat, but there are still other 
challenges that need to be addressed when we consider the revisionary treatment of  
Mill’s political morality.
John Gray’s interpretation goes some distance to alleviate some of the 
controversy over the role of the principle of utility. The indirect utilitarianism attributed 
to Mill does reduce the utility-maximisation demands, the ubiquitous bane of classical 
utilitarianism, and shrink the domain of moral reasoning, but still does not protect the 
moral sphere from being infected with highly illiberal, though yet still expedient, 
legislative content. The classic critique that Mill’s project breaks down into a 
competition between liberty and utility, and that utilitarians are yet coherently to put 
forward arguments for liberty re-emerges even in Gray’s indirect formulation. On an 
“ideal-regarding” utilitarianism formulation, it would be easy for Mill to posit that 
maintaining liberty should be, or ideally, would be in one’s interest, but Mill 
specifically rejects the paternalism that would be required to maintain the Principle of 
Liberty on this interpretation. If we confine ourselves to a more “want regarding” 
formulation of utilitarianism, then we must consider how to deal with non-liberal 
preferences.
Returning to Gray’s formulation of right and wrong action, we are limited to 
only other-regarding action. Gray claims that direct appeals to utility are only to be 
made in “...those cases of extremity where the maxims of the various departments [of 
the Art o f Life] conflict with one another...” because the principle o f utility is not 
merely a moral principle. It is not until the Principle of Utility is taken with the 
implied principle of expediency that action-guidance is bom, as described above. But 
even with punishability attached to the criterion of moral wrongness, there is no 
privileged place for liberal principles, like the Harm Principle. If the expediency of 
punishing an action is what constitutes its moral wrongness, then it seems to me that 
utility is still the ultimate standard, albeit indirectly. Without any reference to a 
distributive theory of justice, or some Kantian concern for the human being completely 
independent of utility, it seems implausible to guarantee protection of the individual
48 Gray, M ill on Liberty: A Defense, p. 27.
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from becoming an instrument for some other end. Even the practical, ‘side- 
constraining,’ Principle of Liberty holds no privileged place if expediency is its only 
justification.
On this interpretation, the need for such constraints rests on empirical facts that 
through continued observation may fade. Gray stresses that it is because of a unique 
failure of humans, direct appeals to the principle of utility are self-defeating:
“Mill’s argument, rather, is that principles for the appraisal of policies adopted 
such as his Principle of Liberty are public and practical principles for the 
appraisal of policies adopted by men aware that their continuing partiality to 
their own interests subverts any direct appeal to Utility as a principle capable of 
sustaining a stable social union.”49
Gray’s attention to Mill’s concern for the shortcomings of human nature is I think well 
founded. Ruthlessly maximising general utility might involve the betrayal of friends, 
families, and other social institutions. This strategy of maximisation would be very 
destabilising, and most definitely self-defeating. Moreover, the epistemological 
demands of the consequentialism involved in direct appeals to the Principle o f Utility 
are too great for an effective calculus. But this fact of human nature, our ‘continuing 
partiality,’ seems no more fixed than the facts of those societies, “in which the race 
itself may be considered in its nonage.” Whatever those facts that require that, 
“Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the 
end be their improvement,” presumably will fade when “mankind have become capable 
of being improved by free equal discussion.” 50 This developmental - almost 
perfectionist -  model of human progress has been reflected in some of the revisionary 
treatments of Mill, like Richard Wollheim’s complex utilitarianism.51 Mill recognises 
the progressive and developmental nature of humans, and clearly feels that the practical 
Principle of Liberty is only appropriate at a certain stage of development. It is totally 
feasible that there may come a time when humans outgrow, the principle of liberty for 
some other principle, or none at all, and defer directly to the Principle of Utility. 
Historical contingencies that qualify a society for the Principle of Liberty may someday 
disqualify it. It is only because of the particular failure o f human reasoning that the
49 Ib id , p 66.
50Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 224.
51 Richard Wollheim interprets Mill to be articulating a three stage ‘complex utilitarianism.’ The first 
stage o f  this formulation is where utility is monistic, the second utility is pluralistic and hierarchical, 
finally, utility is pluralistic and un-hierarchical. Wollheim calls it a two stage shift, which is a bit 
misleading because he actually envisages two shifts, which yields then three stages. See W ollheim, 
Richard, ‘John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin,’ in John Stuart Mill On Liberty in Focus, John Gray and 
G.W. Smith eds. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 275.
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Principle of Liberty is expedient to mitigate the effects of each individual’s egoistic 
orientation. As unlikely as this sounds, humans may one day be able to balance private 
interests with public interests, thereby no longer needing to be constrained by the 
Principle of Liberty because transgressions of it will be expedient for everyone. If 
within Mill’s utilitarian framework we read certain action-guiding secondary principles 
that he designs to suit human nature, then we must be open to the possibility o f that 
nature changing, and thus necessitating different principles, or non at all, i.e. direct 
appeals to the Principle of Utility. Without grounding these principles on something 
other than utility (or expediency, rather) they are only contingently expedient, and not to 
be followed for themselves, as they would have to be on any liberal formulation. This 
calculation is a problem for anyone who attempts to derive liberal principles from a 
prior commitment to utilitarianism, but as will be shown in Chapter Four, is one that can 
be made with a liberal outcome.
This reading of Gray is only critical because it suggests that Mill might be 
willing to sacrifice the liberties he argues so forcefully for some larger end, like utility. 
Such a conclusion would make it very difficult for us to consider Mill the paragon of 
liberalism that he is commonly received as. All of the revisionary interpretations o f Mill 
are burdened by the presupposition that Mill’s sole end was to justify liberal society. 
Even if his utilitarian beliefs share a confused primacy with liberty, there are few who 
would deny that for Mill free society is the last, best arrangement for human beings. 
One scholar who denies this is Joseph Hamburger.
In his book, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, Hamburger argues that the 
society argued for in On Liberty was one step in a larger project o f moving away from a 
society based on pesky liberties. Such an interpretation, I will argue, coheres better with 
Mill’s utilitarianism.
From Liberty to Control
As anyone who has read Mill will agree, he has the ability to be quite ambiguous 
at crucial moments in his arguments. Like Scripture, Mill’s writings have prompted 
scores of different interpretations. From Cowling, to Berlin, to Himmelfarb, to Ryan, we 
have four (at least) different portraits of Mill, based on four different readings of the 
same material. But all four, and most other interpretations, agree that whether 
confusedly, inconsistently, or even ironically, Mill held that something like liberal 
society was the best arrangement to accommodate the human condition. Joseph 
Hamburger, on the other hand, argues exactly the opposite. Based on an impressively
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thorough mining of Mill’s private letters and posthumously published articles now 
available thanks to the efforts of John Robson et al., Hamburger forcefully argues that 
Mill cannot be considered the liberal that is standard to the new revisionary orthodoxy, 
but rather should be understood to be more of an illiberal perfectionist. Hamburger 
never uses this word, but I think it the best characterisation of this Mill. He argues that 
Mill intended liberal society to be merely a means to a more intellectually refined and 
altruistic society where certain liberties would be obsolete. Hamburger maintains that 
despite heavily criticising French Positivism via Auguste Comte, he nonetheless was 
deeply influenced by its philosophy of history. Mill envisioned the “renovation” and
c*)
“regeneration” culminating in a new “Religion of Humanity.” This utopian ideal was 
the final stage for which a liberal society was only a means. Arguing that Mill was no 
lover of liberty, and considered it merely as an instrumental arrangement for 
overcoming Christian and Victorian social norms, is truly a controversial claim. But 
whereas Hamburger seeks to determine Mill’s actual intentions, I am simply positing 
this as yet another interpretation of Mill, one based largely on Hamburger’s historical 
efforts. This interpretation, I will argue, goes further than other revisionary 
interpretations in reconciling Mill’s liberal prescriptions in On Liberty with his 
utilitarianism. He is, on this account, not a liberal, but a type of perfectionist. The first 
step in this attempt will be to show how such an interpretation fits with what appear to 
be contradictory statements regarding freedom in On Liberty. To this end, I will briefly 
summarise some of the passages Hamburger cites in his attempt to determine Mill’s true 
project. Next, I will describe this project, based on the wider context of Mill’s other 
writings, to see what role liberty plays. Again, I am not attempting to defend 
Hamburger’s historical account of Mill’s intentions, but simply adding Hamburger’s 
interpretation to the revisionary debate in order to help understand the nature and 
potential of utilitarianism and liberalism. Although ultimately unsustainable, as I 
discuss in Chapter Six, I think we will find that this non-liberal perfectionist reading, 
coheres much better than with Mill’s supposed liberal-utilitarianism.
Most of the scepticism directed towards Hamburger is not be aimed at the 
comprehensiveness o f his scholarship, but at the simple fact that what he is arguing flies 
directly in the face of the conventional reception of Mill’s classic, On Liberty. 
Hamburger’s thesis is that On Liberty does call for an open, liberal society, but that this 
was never intended to be the last, best arrangement for human beings. It is
52 Joseph, Hamburger, John Stuart M ill On Liberty and Control, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999), p 167.
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uncontroversial to say that Mill was attempting to liberate individuals from oppressive, 
homogenising Victorian social norms. Hamburger goes further in saying that Mill was 
also attempting to liberate individuals from selfish Christian ethics, and intended to 
replace it with a more altruistic, enlightened, system of regenerated morality. 
Hamburger states flatly, “Regeneration was to be- preceded by destruction. Beliefs 
surviving from the past that were obstacles to the emergence of a new moral order were 
to be eliminated”, echoing Mill:
“The old opinions in religion, morals, and politics are so much discredited in the
more intellectual minds”; however, “they have still life enough in them to be a
powerful obstacle to the growing up of any better opinions on those subjects”53
On Liberty was to play this role of destroyer of old beliefs, but nothing more. Though 
Mill’s attack on Victorian society was not subtle, his attack on Christianity was. James 
Mill and Bentham, two thinkers who also viewed Christianity as a hindrance to moral 
progress, had to contend with blasphemy laws still enforced at the time. They, along 
with other noted atheists amongst Mill’s friends, like George Grote, understood the 
importance of public candour.54 Alexander Bain writes of Mill, “He did not publicly 
avow his dissent from the orthodoxy of the country; but it was well enough known in a 
very wide private circle.”55 These are some of the reasons why Hamburger ascribes to 
Mill a concealed anti-Christian dimension to his project.56 To overtly attack Christianity 
might have aroused the anger and suspicion of the general public, and therefore blind 
them to the merits of his arguments.
Mill similarly was not straightforward about the role of liberty in the evolution 
of human culture. An initial reading of On Liberty paints a very Romantic picture of the 
human spontaneously expressing his diverse talents and interests in a free and 
stimulating society. It is understandable that the reader take this to be the end, and not a 
means, as is argued. Hamburger points out though, that even in the text we find 
intimations of what the post-liberal society would consist of. The now well-known 
argument for freedom of expression is to determine the truth. In the same chapter he 
foreshadows the “consolidation of opinion.” he writes:
53 Ibid., p. 42.
54 Ibid., p 63
55 Ibid., p 62
56 For more on M ill’s hostility towards Christianity, see Linda C Raeder, John Stuart M ill and the 
Religion o f  Humanity, (Columbia, MI: University o f  Missouri Press, 2002).
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“As Mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or 
doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of Mankind may 
almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached 
the point of being uncontested.”57
Mill does go on to say that in the process we lose the means to an “intelligent and living 
apprehension of the truth,” i.e. the wrestling with false or semi-false truths, and so must 
invent counter arguments to the truth in order to retain its grounds.58 But inventing a 
devil’s advocate is not the same as freedom of expression. If the truth that freedom of 
thought and expression are the means for become established, then the absoluteness of 
this freedom begins to wane, especially when we consider the many utilitarian reasons 
against freedom of thought and expression. Perhaps a much more obvious reason why 
Mill was silent on his larger project of moral regeneration in On Liberty was that it is a 
polemic. As such, speculating about the next phase of social evolution only would have 
distracted readers from the arguments for liberty. Whether it was candour or 
concealment, as Chapter Four asks in Hamburger’s book, we needn’t ascertain here. 
Mill had plenty of reasons for not being explicit about his larger project, if  in fact this is 
the case. Our concern is that such an interpretation of Mill, as some type of perfectionist, 
is not prima facie implausible because of what’s written in On Liberty.
The overcoming of Victorian society, as called for in On Liberty, is premised by 
the observation that societies change, evolve, and develop. Mill famously qualifies the 
appropriateness of liberal society by limiting it only to those societies that have moved 
past their own ‘nonage.’ Underpinning Mill’s attempts to reform is a very particular 
theory o f history, which Hamburger attributes to the influence of French Positivism, in 
the forms of Auguste Comte, and St. Simon. Articulated in Spirit o f  the Age, Mill 
distinguishes between organic or natural, and critical or transitional states in history.59 
The organic state is characterised by stability, and harmony of opinion, whereas the 
critical state experiences disagreement, conflict, and restlessness for change. The 
background of On Liberty is that Mill considered himself to the be living during a 
critical period in history, and so sought to elevate society to the next organic state. The 
openness that Mill calls for is specifically to challenge and test the beliefs prevalent at 
the time so that their obsoleteness would be exposed. Specifically, he endeavoured to 
replace the selfishness he felt underpinned mass culture, and replace it with a more 
altruistic, secular religion of humanity, the next organic period of history. A common
57 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 250.
58 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 251.
59 Hamburger, John Stuart M ill On Liberty and Control, p. 109.
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belief amongst Mill’s intellectual circles was that despite being false, theologically- 
grounded religion served the utilitarian purpose of instilling a system of morality. Henry 
Sidgwick believed that the hope for salvation compelled Christians to behave in a moral 
way that they would not have attempted without such hope.60 Mill denied this claim, 
and held that morality was actually the product o f authority, education and public 
opinion, a position we will examine in the next chapter.61 The effect o f the theological 
grounding was to protect Christian ethics from criticism. Mill took particular issue with 
the selfishness he perceived underlying Christianity. A proper system of ethics would be 
based on an impartiality between one’s own interests and those of one’s neighbours. 
But:
“The religions which deal in promises and threats regarding a future life, do 
exactly the contrary: they fasten down the thoughts to the person’s own 
posthumous interests; they tempt him to regard the performance of his duties to 
others mainly as a means to his personal salvation; and are one of the most 
serious obstacles to the great purpose o f moral culture, the strengthening o f the 
unselfish and the weakening o f the selfish element in our nature.” (Emphasis 
added).62
Selfishness had proved self-defeating according to Mill and so needed to be replaced. 
Only in a free and open society where experimenting with different modes o f life was 
possible could this failure be realised by the people. During this critical period of 
history, enough challenges to the once established norms of Christian and Victorian 
society would eventually lead to the rejection of them. Mill, a priest in the new Religion 
of Humanity, was leading the revolutionary charge with On Liberty.
Up to this point in our depiction of Mill, nothing runs terribly counter to the 
traditional understanding of Mill as the paragon of the late modem, Western European 
liberalism. Hamburger’s claim, and the one I want to argue that makes for a more 
coherent reading of Mill, is that destroying the oppressive cultural norms o f the time 
was only half of the challenge. He was not simply ‘liberating’ the individual; he was 
trying to replace the old system of morality for a new one, one where social control 
would have prominence over the liberties that characterised the previous critical periods. 
Denying the pedagogical monopoly on morality that it was commonly held religion 
possessed, Mill charges educational institutions with the task of regenerating morality. 
The education required was not only aimed at the intellect, but at the feelings as well. It
60 Ibid., p 52.
61 Ibid., p. 53.
62 Mill, in Hamburger, p. 43.
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wasn’t the case that one should simply understand virtue, one must desire virtue.63 This 
orientation is consistent with Mill’s well known psychological associationism 
underscoring his utilitarianism, whereby anything paired enough times with a 
pleasurable stimulus would eventually become pleasurable itself. Altruism lies at the 
centre of Mill’s new religion, and meant replacing the “deep-rooted selfishness which 
the whole course of existing institutions tends to generate.”64 This condemnation of 
institutional arrangements was only o f current ones. He realized that earlier organic 
periods were characterized by the same sort of altruistic feelings and harmony o f social 
outlook he was arguing for, like ancient Greece.65 It also represents one of the core 
departures from the classical utilitarian framework of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham held 
that individuals were rational, pleasure-seeking animals whose social institutions make 
sure that one’s pleasure-seeking does not impair someone else’s pleasure seeking. Only 
the individual knows what is best for itself, and so the element of choice is crucial 
feature of utility.66 Choice plays a key role on Mill’s account because of the distinction 
he introduces between types of pleasures. It isn’t merely choosing thoughtfully, one 
must also choose correctly. The higher pleasures, which Mill had a clear preference for, 
yielded more utility, and were categorically higher, so much so that one “would not 
resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of.”67 
Michael Oakeshott claims that the introduction of this categorical hierarchy of pleasures 
led to the recognition that some people are more valuable than others.68 It wasn’t simply 
that any rational agent should opt for the higher pleasures, the preference itself was 
evidence of one who possessed refined capacities and regenerated morals:
“Whereas the person who sought the higher pleasures was capable of 
subordinating selfish desires and cultivating a “fellow-felling with the collective 
interests of mankind,” his opposite was characterised by selfishness, which was 
the principle cause of an unsatisfactory life. Such a person was “a selfish egoist, 
devoid of every feeling or care but those which centre in his own miserable 
individuality.”69
63 Hamburger, p. 137.
64 Mill, in Hamburger, p. 132.
65 Hamburger, p. 133.
66 Michael Oakeshott, M orality and Politics in Europe, Shirley Robin Letwin ed., (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), p. 74.
67 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 210.
68Oakeshott, M orality and Politics in Europe, p. 81. Oakeshott has an even simpler interpretation that 
Mill is not as interested in liberty as is commonly thought.
69 Mill, in Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control, p. 133.
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Elements of this elitism can be found in several of Mill’s writings, and suggest a 
particular teleology that he perceives individuals, and collectively society, moving 
through. Because these advanced individuals are the harbingers of the next organic 
period, Mill saw in them a source of morality. In Utilitarianism, Mill makes reference to 
“experienced judges,” people whose authority is such that “From the verdict of the only
7 0competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal.” In Chapter III of On Liberty, 
as Mill is romantically painting a picture of free and creative individuals spontaneously 
exerting their individuality, he implicitly distinguishes between them and people who 
unreflectively bow to the yoke of custom, and makes his contempt for the latter explicit. 
The role of elites were to play a key role in the transformation of society. Because of 
their elevated tastes and cultivated intellects, these elites have a moral responsibility to
♦ 71educate their languishing compatriots resigned to their low and “pig-like” preferences. 
Their influence would seem to challenge the conventional understanding of the scope 
and longevity o f the Harm Principle, for “a person may suffer very severe penalties at
77the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only him self’. This emphasis on 
the authority o f elites as the vanguard of the next organic period is yet another example 
of Comte’s influence on Mill. Though he and Comte disagreed as to the extent o f their 
responsibilities and duties, the unequal authority Mill attached to those people he 
considered to be more refined, runs counter to those readings of Mill that place 
autonomy as a central feature of his thought.
What’s so compelling about Hamburger’s attempt to determine Mill’s actual 
intentions is that it coheres much better with Mill’s professed utilitarian grounding. 
Hamburger does not explore this coherence, but inserting this Mill into the revisionary 
debate yields a much more consistent reading of his doctrine. Mill’s anticipation of the 
next organic period of history is based on particular positivistic philosophy of history, a 
dimension to Mill’s thought scantly examined by the revisionary debate, but one I will 
examine in detail in the next chapter. We needn’t look further than the introduction to 
On Liberty where Mill reminds us that his principle of liberty, like all ethical principles, 
is based on “utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being”73 This progressive orientation introduces a transience to the principle 
of liberty implicitly recognised by writers such as Gray and Wollheim. Gray’s 
contention that the Principle of Liberty is consistent with the utilitarian framework is
70 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 213.
71 Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control, p. 191.
72 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 278.
73 Ibid., p. 224.
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based on a unique ‘failure’ or condition of human beings, one that makes direct appeals 
to the principle of utility, even in the largest possible sense, self-defeating. The 
implication, though maybe not intentional, is that there may come a time when it is 
rather expedient to appeal directly to the principle of utility i.e. the next organic period 
of regenerated morality. In other words, appealing to the practical action-guiding 
principle o f liberty is most expedient during this turbulent, critical period of history 
constituted by the decline of hegemonic Victorian (and Christian) social norms and the 
beginning of the next organic period in history characterised by the Religion of 
Humanity. Richard Wollheim’s interprets Mill’s utilitarianism to move from a 
hierarchical to a non-hierarchical, plural conception of the good which mirrors nicely 
the historical oscillations between different periods o f history. The critical period is 
when mankind “have outgrown old institutions and old doctrines, and have not yet 
acquired new ones.”74 It makes sense then to allow for a plurality o f goods and beliefs, 
i.e. experiments in living, in order to determine the best ones to replace the old. What 
Wollheim does not consider is a return to a hierarchical form of utilitarianism. Mill was 
primarily concerned with instilling in individuals the correct desires and proper moral 
beliefs, and arguing for liberty was only a means to this end. Hamburger points out that 
Mill envisions liberty to be curbed in two substantial ways, which clearly have 
utilitarian and teleological grounding.75 Firstly, He advocates extensive application of 
the Harm Principle without ever defining harm. Any definition o f harm entails 
normative prescriptions as to some baseline level of normality. Mill does not explicitly 
articulate such a baseline, but in Chapter IV o f On Liberty, he indicates his willingness
76to punish harmful acts and the “anti-social” dispositions that lead up to them. 
Secondly, Mill acknowledges and even endorses social pressure to curb “lowness or 
deprivation of taste.” 77 Even though the government cannot interfere with certain 
actions that fall within the problematic self-regarding sphere, public opinion:
“Practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political 
oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves 
fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details o f life,
70
and enslaves the soul itself.”
74Mill, in Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control, p. 109.
75 Hamburger, John Stuart M ill On Liberty and Control, p. 166.
76 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 279
77 Ibid., p. 278.
78 Ibid., p. 220.
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If Mill was more concerned about liberty as an absolutely fundamental value rather than 
the proper role of government, he would have at least spoken against this informal, yet 
highly pervasive, form of social coercion. Instead, it appears Mill intends a specific role 
for public opinion to play in the regeneration of morality. An individual displaying 
“ rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit -  who cannot live within moderate means -  who 
cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences -  who pursues the animal pleasures at 
the expense of those of feeling and intellect” is eligible for “very severe penalties.”79 
Such penalties are “natural” and are “the spontaneous consequences o f the faults
O A
themselves”. Mill elaborates, “The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of 
liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people.”81 Though the 
government may not concern itself with these prudential and aesthetic spheres o f 
conduct, refined individuals, the vanguard of the next period of history, may exercise 
their social influence to help reform the crude individual. Keeping in mind that Mill has 
“utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive 
being” in mind, we can make sense of Hamburger’s claim that this struggle o f the 
refined over the crude is no less than a moral one.82 As mankind progressed, the 
liberties once required to fully discredit older forms of life would shrink:
“Through this principle the domain of moral duty, in an improving society, is 
always widening. When what was once uncommon virtue becomes common 
virtue, it comes to be numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding 
what has grown common, remains simply meritorious.”83
It is clear that Mill has a very particular conception of human flourishing. He grants 
disproportionate authority to “experienced judges” in Utilitarianism, and we can now 
make sense of this rather elitist element. The experienced judges are those refined 
individuals charged with helping the rest of society transform themselves and embrace 
Mill’s Religion of Humanity. Much more needs to be said about this religion, and this is 
the topic of the next chapter of this thesis. If we consider On Liberty as Hamburger 
argues, as a polemical tool to liberate society from the oppressive and discredited 
Victorian/Christian ethic, then we needn’t try to explain away those illiberal elements of 
Mill’s writings. Though Mill is ambiguous about some of the more pivotal moments of 
his arguments, he is very clear and un-ambiguous about utilitarianism lying at the heart
78 Ibid., p. 278.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., p. 272.
82 Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control, p. 191.
83 Ibid., p. 192.
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of this thinking. If we consider man as a progressive being, and take seriously the 
positivist philosophy of history, then I think it reasonable to question the absolute status 
of liberty that it is commonly thought to posses in Mill’s thought, in favour of “utility in 
the widest sense.”
Conclusion
During the last fifty years, our understanding of the nature and potential of 
utilitarianism and liberalism has been forwarded by interpretative research conducted 
on Mill. Trying to reconcile Mill’s disparate commitments has revealed a lot about the 
logic of these philosophical doctrines, specifically as manifested in his thought. On 
Liberty and Utilitarianism, each eloquently representing a conflicting strain of his 
thought, have proved problematic when attempting to harmonise. The liberal values 
espoused in the former seem not to be supported by the framework of the latter, as is the 
claim. Though separately each forcefully argues its case, considered simultaneously, 
one must yield to the other. Either crucial liberties are protected even at a net utility loss, 
or liberty is merely instrumental for the promotion of utility. Revisionary scholars have 
put forth some very compelling interpretations that salvage Mill’s project, culminating 
in works such as Alan Ryan and John Gray. But even on Gray’s account of Mill’s 
indirect utilitarianism, whereby the implied principle of expediency is action-guiding, 
the principle of liberty is only contingently expedient, and in this sense not absolute.
However, this outcome is only problematic for those who wish to read Mill as 
the paragon of modem liberal thought. Joseph Hamburger, on the other hand, claims to 
have discovered a larger project of which On Liberty is merely the first part. 
Hamburger’s claim is that Mill intended to replace outdated Victorian and Christian 
social norms and moral beliefs with a new regenerated system of morality, one with 
altruism at its heart. To this end, Hamburger argues that On liberty was simply a tool to 
help overcome the homogenising affects o f the prevailing social order. There are hints 
of Mill’s perfectionist leanings in On Liberty and Utilitarianism, the same hints that 
have plagued the revisionary scholars, and Hamburger combines them with scores of 
post-humously published writings and private letters to paint a very different, and rather 
illiberal picture o f Mill. Whereas Hamburger seeks to uncover Mill’s actual intentions, I 
simply put forth his version of Mill -  whether intended or not - as an interpretation 
cohering better with Mill’s own claims about his utilitarian commitments than other 
revisionary interpretations. Now, this possibly illiberal depiction of Mill’s moral and 
political thought needs to be fully scrutinized. Hamburger is right to highlight and
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discuss the high levels of social control correctly identified in Mill’s thought. The issue 
at stake is to what extent this control constitutes a violation o f the liberal principles 
normally attributed to Mill. This judgement largely turns on how one cashes out the 
concept o f liberty. Before making this judgment, I will examine some o f the self-evident 
influences on Mill’s social and political thought, starting with one who was 
unambiguously critical o f liberalism, Auguste Comte. Hamburger makes much of the 
influence of his positivism, and so ascertaining the extent of the commonality of their 
thought will help understand its nature. Here, a case has been made that in order fully to 
understand Mill’s political morality, it is necessary to simultaneously consider On 
Liberty and Utilitarianism. Only by considering these texts simultaneously will it be 
possible to fully understand the relationship between the individual and society.
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3. The Comte of Mill’s Thought:
On Progress
There are few people Mill Mentions in On Liberty, and only one he explicitly 
criticises. Auguste Comte, widely considered to be the creator of modem sociology, was 
a strange fellow. Receiving equal measure admiration and contempt, he attempted to 
create a post-theological religion based the principles o f science. His social thought and 
philosophy of science achieved a high measure of success during his lifetime, even 
impressing himself upon Mill. In fact, they maintained a seven year correspondence. 
And even though it ended bitterly - Mill thinking Comte had gone too far in his 
maniacal application of the ‘religion’, and Comte thinking he was owed money - they 
had a fruitful exchange of ideas. Mill expressly praises several of Comte’s ideas, ands 
even takes several on board. He also, not surprisingly, is very critical of some of 
Comte’s other, more controversial ideas, even to the point o f writing an essay attacking 
Comte’s person, no less than his work. Despite what Mill explicitly accepts and rejects 
of Comte’s writings, other similarities persist, while crucial differences remain. This 
chapter firstly surveys Comte’s social and political thought, isolating what I deem to be 
the three fundamental ideas that animate his philosophy of progress, and then describes 
their relation to his religious conversion. This exposition will be in part biographical 
because much of his thought is directly related to actual occurrences in his life. It 
secondly compares his theory with Mill’s, going beyond what Mill himself credits 
Comte with contributing. Not being a work of intellectual history, this chapter does not 
attempt to ascribe causality to the correlations of their thought, as the influence is self- 
evident. Mill himself acknowledges many debts to Comte and this chapter attempts to 
clarify that influence. What will be shown is that more o f Comte’s thought can be found 
in Mill’s thinking than Mill acknowledges, which is especially interesting in light of 
Comte’s infamous hostility towards liberal democracy. However, the wholly illiberal 
reading that Hamburger makes and attributes to Comte influence cannot be sustained.
Isidore Auguste Marie Frangois Xavier Comte
Auguste Comte was bom in 1798 to a Catholic, Royalist family in Montpellier, 
southern France. He began his studies at the local lycee at the age of nine, where despite 
his small size, vulnerability to many illnesses and rebelliousness, he maintained a strong 
commitment to his work. Arguably, it was during this time that the seeds of Comte’s 
thought were first germinated, because it was here where he started studying
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mathematics and gave up his faith, albeit to embrace temporarily a “fervent republican 
faith in liberty”.1 In 1814, Comte moved to Paris to enter the highly competitive Ecole 
Polytechnique, but only studied there for two years. More significantly, it was 1817 
when Comte was first introduced to his positivist master, Henri Saint-Simon.
Count Claude Henri de Rouvroy de Saint-Simon was an eccentric, retired 
nobleman, and the director of the periodical, Industrie. Comte began as his irregularly 
paid secretary, however Comte quickly became a disciple, eventually collaborating on 
may articles and papers. The combination of the elder’s ambitious thought with the 
disciple’s ability to systematise at first seemed like a perfect complement, but the 
alliance would prove to be a fleeting one, ultimately dissolving in a bitter dispute in
9 * •1824. It’s doubtful whether Saint-Simon can be labelled a social reformer, because he 
was interested in nothing short of the total reorganisation of society. He was one of the 
first writers to describe the current industrialisation of European economies, and
y
comment on its effects on society. Saint-Simon called for a new science of society, one 
organised along the lines of modem natural science. This new science would enable an 
elite group of scientists, with the backing wealthy industrialists to re-organise society 
along more cooperative lines.4
It is difficult to ascertain exactly who influenced who during their seven year 
collaboration because their writings were published under the Master’s name, however 
one can note that during this time Comte dropped his egalitarian underpinning for a 
more elitist approach that would remain with him throughout his subsequent thought.5 
Nonetheless, over the years as their collaborative efforts persisted, the disciple grew 
tired of being treated like a subordinate. He began to feel like he had fully matured as a 
thinker, and was now being held back by the narrow confines of the Master’s rigid 
supervision. Comte had been content to allow Saint-Simon to claim authorship of all of 
their writings, in part out of respect, and in part to hide from his parents his involvement 
in “subversive politics”. 6 By 1824, this tension came to a threshold over the 
accreditation of Comte’s Systeme de politique positive, which was supposed to be 
published as a part of Saint-Simon’s Catechisme des industriels. The Master ‘resolved’ 
the dispute by giving 100 copies of the Systeme to Comte under his own name, but
1 Lewis A. Coser, M asters in Sociological Thought, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace and Company, 
1977), p. 4.
2 Corser, M asters in Sociological Thought, p 16.
3 Gonfalo L. Fonseca, http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/saintsimon.htm. Although Saint-Simon was 
less concerned about the plight o f the labouring classes, unlike most socialist thinkers.
4 Ibid.
5 Coser, Masters in Sociological Thought, p 16.
6 Frank E. Manuel, The Prophets o f  Paris, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 253.
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turned around and published 1000 copies of the Catechisme not only with the Systeme, 
but also including an anonymous preface criticizing its author. The source of the 
intellectual tension between the two turned on the relationship between theory and
• 7 • ♦practice. Saint-Simon was eager to mobilize the bankers and industrialists to press for 
reform, guided by the scientists who trailed after them. Comte, on the other hand, found 
such calls to action far too premature. It was only after the full articulation of a new 
politics, based on positive science, and subsequently a positive philosophy, could action 
be taken. Once such a point was reached, the undeniable power o f scientific truth itself 
would compel individuals to act. Ironically, Comte also objected to the religious manner 
with which Saint-Simon began to articulate his thought. Despite their differences, much 
of their writings foreshadowed Comte’s later works, including what is widely 
considered his best work, Cours de philosophie positive.8
The six volumes of the Cours was written between 1830 and 1842, a time when 
Comte’s personal and academic life was frustrated. Having been disowned by his 
former Master six years ago, and therefore cut-off from the circle of Parisian 
intellectuals that were only just starting to appreciate his own identity as a thinker, 
Comte was relegated to the margins of academia.9 His attempts to secure a chair at his 
alma mater, the Ecole Poly technique, resulted only the peripheral position of repetiteur 
d ’analyse et de mecanique. Despite being wed to Caroline Massin in 1825, this period 
saw them separate many times until she finally left him shortly after the publication of 
the Cours. However depressed Comte was during this period, having only slightly 
recovered from a mental breakdown in 1826, this was a time of intense, isolated 
concentration. However, as volumes of the Cours were being published, Comte slowly 
began regain some of the notoriety he was on the verge of amassing when with Saint- 
Simon. In particular, in 1837, Comte caught the attention o f Mill, who was attracted to 
his methodology o f science.10
i. Three Fundamental Ideas
The Cours, despite being one of Comte’s highest regarded works, merely 
contributes to the larger system of his thought articulated in several of his key writings. 
At the heart of Comte’s system, three fundamental ideas can be identified that animate 
his positive philosophy: the concept of social statics and social dynamics, the Law of
7 Manual, The Prophets o f  Paris, p. 252.
8 Coser, M asters in Sociological Thought, p. 16. Andrew W emick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  
Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 28.
9 Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  H um anity, p. 17.
10 Manuel, The Prophets o f  Paris, p. 265.
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Three Stages, and the Hierarchy of Sciences. It is somewhat misleading to isolate these 
three ideas as discrete aspects of his thought because as will be shown, they are 
intricately interrelated.
Following on from the Saint-Simonian project, Comte acknowledged that all 
natural phenomena were governed by laws. What scientists and philosophers once 
thought were uncontrollably random events, or the whims o f divine intervention, now 
were recognized as ordered events caused by their natural antecedents. Therefore, it 
would be possible to construct a positive science - that is, one with all of the 
methodological and epistemological trappings of the natural sciences - whose object of 
study was society. Armed with this faith in the synthesising potentialities o f science, 
Comte set out to understand the evolution of society, and chart its future development.11 
In particular, Comte was interested in the conditions of stability, and those o f change, 
hence his twin approach of social statics, and social dynamics. This oscillating 
conception of social evolution is captured by the positivist’s motto “order and
17progress”. Stability is characterised by a consensus of opinion and mode o f thinking. It 
wasn’t simply unanimity of values and belief, it was also o f the origin and sanction of 
such values, as will be discussed below. This period o f history is called “organic”, and 
eventually evolves into the next “critical” period. Here, we find a lack of the social 
and intellectual equilibrium that characterises the organic state, and this tumultuous 
disharmony reigns until a new system of values (and their origins) ascends to a new 
consensus, and society enters the next organic period. Though crucial to his project of 
positivising all thought, it should be noted that Saint-Simon was prior to Comte in 
conceiving history in such stages.14
The second fundamental idea to Comte’s system is exactly what these organic 
periods consist of, and is called the Law of Three Stages, or the Law of Human Progress. 
All human knowledge passes through three stages: theological, metaphysical and finally 
positive.15 Each stage describes the way in which humans connect facts to each other, 
and subsequently is a milestone of human progress. Each stage does not pass neatly 
from one to the next, but is interspersed with critical periods where the beliefs and
11 Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, p. 3.
12 The Brazilian flag has written on it “Ordem and Progresso” which is a tribute to the nation’s 
positivitstic roots.
13 Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, p. 8.
14 Thomas Whittaker, Comte and Mill, (London: Archiblad Constable & CO Ltd, 1908), p. 11.
15 Auguste Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, in Early 
Writings, H.S. Jones (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 81.
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scientific explanations conflict with one another until a new consensus is reached at the 
next organic stage.
In the first stage, the small number of observed facts are ‘explained’ by 
reference to supernatural forces, and hence are a priori. This first stage is characterised 
by the dominance of imagination over observation. With regards to politics, this stage 
was defined by the Doctrine of Kings, which established the divine right of kings to rule 
without Earthly accountability.16
1 7The second stage is very similar to the first stage, but varies only in nuance. It 
is also characterized by the dominance of imagination over observation, but substitutes 
reference to a supernatural entity for “personified abstraction”.18 Politics is preceded by 
the presumption of a social contract guaranteeing natural rights to all men equally. 
Whereas this belief was once critical, and a reaction to the theological mode of 
reasoning, it became organic, commanding the full consent of modem Europe. Comte 
cites Rousseau as the principle exponent of this belief.19
The third and final stage of progress is achieved when enough challenges to the 
metaphysical outlook demand its abandonment. At this positive stage of history, facts 
are related and explained only in terms of general laws which are themselves the 
products of, and verified by the facts. Politics itself then conforms to this positive 
methodology, and rather than regulating the pursuit of temporal or material power,
70coordinates itself for the pursuit of the common good. Comte, recognising himself to 
be a harbinger during this critical stage at the end of the metaphysical period o f history,
• • • 71states the positivisation of politics and the reorganisation of society as his explicit aim.
Positive politics, like human knowledge itself, differs from theological and 
metaphysical belief in that it discovers laws, rather than invents them. Methodologically, 
it is characterised by the dominance of observation over imagination. What this entails 
is the recognition that “the course of civilisation to be subject to an invariable law 
founded on the nature o f things”, and subsequently that the specific organisation of
77society is determined by the state of civilisation.
There is a correlate to the Law of Three Stages as it applies to human knowledge. 
Specifically, the maturation of the individual human mind parallels the evolution of
16 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, p. 83.
17 Ibid., p. 86.
18 Ibid., p. 81.
19 Ibid., p. 83.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 49, 82.
22 Ibid., p. 90.
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human knowledge through the three stages. A child uncritically believes in the 
supernatural causes of things, whereas an adolescent seeks metaphysical explanations 
for the relationship between facts. It is not until adulthood that an individual employs 
scientific reasoning to explain the natural world.
The third fundamental idea of Comte’s system is that the sciences also pass 
through the same three stages as human knowledge, ultimately becoming positive. 
Moreover, the sciences themselves are placed in a hierarchy based on the level of 
specificity each is capable of. Starting with astronomy, the most general science, the 
ascending order is physics, chemistry, and biology.24 In the Cours, Comte approaches 
each science historically describing a “process of cumulative development”, out of 
which he distils an underlining conception of scientificity, or positivite. The key 
elements of this conception are methodological. In addition to observation, 
experimentation, and comparison, Comte adds historical analysis. In order to 
understand human progress and order, it is crucial to understand the influence of one 
generation on the next. He then uses this conception to create the last science, the one 
employing and relying on all o f the previous sciences, which he calls “social physics”, 
or sociology. Like biology, sociology is concerned with organic wholes, whereas 
chemistry, physics and the other basic sciences abstract natural phenomenon from the 
whole as their object of study. Finally, sociology is used as the theoretical basis for its 
corresponding practice, politics.26 With these three fundamental ideas, as developed 
between 1822 and 1842, we can now turn to the crisis that necessitated the Religion of 
Humanity. Like many of Comte’s ideas, it is amusing, if not helpful to understand the 
historical and personal developments surrounding the genesis of his thought.
ii. Love and Religion
Comte may have enjoyed a modicum of recognition with the publication of the 
Cours, but the years he spent writing them were not happy ones. Comte’s finances were 
not secure, his relationship with his wife was growing more erratic, and despite the 
acquisition of disciples such as Mill, he was still relegated to the margins of the French 
intelligentsia. Mdme Massin eventually left Comte for good shortly after publication of 
the Cours, and in 1844 he lost his appointment at the Ecole Polytechnique. As his most
23 Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, p. 7.
24 Ibid., p. 9. Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 27.
25 Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, p. 6.
26 Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 27.
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9 7  ♦legitimising role in life, this was a “public humiliation”. However this was also the 
year when Comte met the greatest love of his life, the person who would change the 
face of his system, Clothilde de Vaux. Their ‘romance’ may have only lasted a year, but 
upon her death Comte devoted the rest of his life to worshipping her image. The 
preface to Politique Positive is an emotional dedication to his lost love, and an
9Qindication of Comte’s full religious conversion.
However, it wasn’t simply Comte’s troubled personal life that caused the 
reformulation of the “crisis of industrialisation” into an explicitly religious one. By 
1847, Post-Revolutionary France had seen a “dizzying parade of republican, 
monarchical, and dictatorial regimes” in power. Comte viewed this is as symptomatic of 
the spiritual and epistemological turmoil resulting from the conflict between theological
O A
and metaphysical ontologies. Comte frequently described humanity as an organic 
whole, and hence such critical periods of history were likened to physical ailments of an 
organism. The difference however was that whereas organisms were confined to the 
boundaries of their skin or cellular walls, humanity was formless and limitless. It 
required something else to maintain its temporal and spatial integrity. Language was the 
first requirement for a stable social order. Language allows accumulated knowledge and 
wisdom to be passed down to subsequent generations, thereby ensuring continuity. Also 
like an organism, humanity needs a division of labour. This not only allowed 
individuals and groups to specialise and develop expertises, but also instilled in 
everyone a sense of dependency. However, beyond language and organisation, 
something more was needed. Something needed to steer individuals away from their 
own egoistic concerns, and orient them towards the good of the whole species. Comte’s 
historical analysis of the Medieval Catholic Church revealed that only religion could
91inform human sentiments consistently with positive politics.
The Law of Three Stages states that the transition from one stage to another was 
not discrete, but gradual and therefore of great intellectual turmoil. The problem of 
conceiving history in grand stages that in turn dictate the organising principles of 
society is that it relativises morality.32 As society moves from the metaphysical to the 
positive stage of history, one without a God, it is difficult to see how one derives the 
normative force of any morality. Moreover, despite the Law of Three Stages implying
27 Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, p. 19.
28 Manuel, Prophets o f  Paris, p.265.
29 W emick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 99.
30 Ibid., p. 86-88.
31 Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, p. 11.
32 W emick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p.59.
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the inevitability of the progress, Comte is clear that the speed at which humanity 
develops could be altered.33 In fact most regimes have arranged their politics to 
maintain a certain concentration of temporal power, thereby temporarily halting 
progress altogether.34 Without religion, the crisis o f industrialism was likely to persist.
Comte’s historical analysis o f Catholicism revealed that it played a crucial role 
for the development of western civilization. The Romans had created a vast empire, but 
required an “internal bond of unity to consolidate their conquests”. Civic virtues were 
on the decline, as idleness, corruption, and religious hypocrisy were rising.35 This 
critical period stimulated the need for a new universal morality which Catholicism
' I f *  •satisfied. Not only was it egalitarian, whose ethics were equally binding on the poor as 
well as the elites, but it was also the first time that temporal or political power was 
separated from spiritual power. The Cours describes this as one of the greatest 
achievements o f the species, and a huge step towards the positivisation of politics. 
Catholicism may not have specifically demanded altruism, but the worshipping o f saints 
certainly encouraged it. Moreover, the idea of the son of God being mortal brought a 
clear “dignity” to the human race in a way that previous theologies did not.37 Yet, 
despite these achievements, Medieval Catholicism was still a flawed system of social 
organisation that would eventually be superseded.
Like all theologies, Catholicism would need to be discarded once it outlived its 
appropriateness. In fact, the critique of Catholicism was a central theme of Comte’s 
writings spanning from the Cours (1830-1842) through to the Systeme de Philosophie 
Positive. The church may have celebrated saints as objects of admiration, but it also 
instilled in believers a distinct selfishness.38 The individual concern for salvation and 
immortality focused each on their future lot, which instilled an individualistic and
• • e * -5Q
antisocial incentive for the Christian ethic. Moreover, while celebrating saints, the 
church ignored other great contributors to society, like scientists, artists, and 
statesmen.40 Worst of all, Catholicism went so far as to suppress certain scientific 
discoveries and innovations that might erode its own authority. As will be discussed,
33 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, p. 97.
34 Ibid., p. 122. Comte says this is “pardonable” because there were no positive means o f  verifying the 
disharmony between the organisation o f  society with the state o f  civilisation.
35 T.R. Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 26.
36 Although this period o f  history remains with the theological state o f  knowledge. It is critical because 
society moves from a polytheistic to a monotheistic theology, a subdivision o f  the first period.
37 Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, p. 27.
38 Ibid., p. 27.
39 Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity , p. 111.
40 Ibid., p. 112.
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Comte does retain and modify many elements o f Catholicism, but ultimately rejects it 
for the more rational and positive Religion of Humanity.
Having moved beyond theological and metaphysical stages o f knowledge, it was 
no longer possible to derive a unifying force from the fictive being of God, and this was 
the first and most important function the Religion was supposed to play.41 Therefore, it 
was necessary to turn to a ‘God’ that was more consistent with the state o f human 
knowledge. Comte placed at the centre of his system of social organisation, adoration, 
and inspiration, the most positively-verifiable unit of moral significance: not the 
individual, not the nation, but the “Great Being”, Humanity. 42
The religion devoted to Humanity was created to guide the sentiments and 
inform action. It was to have a unifying affect on the social and political body.43 The 
central ethic of this unification was the suppression of egoism, and the encouragement 
of altruism, both innate affections.44 The education o f the sentiments and affections 
begins in the family, the first community the child experiences. Upon puberty, the child 
participates in systematic lectures on the positive sciences thereby repeating the 
evolution o f the human species, moving from theological to positive states o f  
knowledge.45 From childhood onwards, in addition to the rigorous moral and academic 
education demanded by the system, public opinion would reinforce, and guarantee the 
positive morality. Every individual was to live openly thereby ensuring the scrutiny of  
every action.46 Such publicity, of course, would preclude any distinction between a 
public or private sphere altogether. The Religion was a systematic totality, permeating 
every facet of the individual’s life. Everything was to be regulated, including daily 
prayers.
The movement to a fully fledged religion, with all its ritualistic trappings was a 
shift in emphasis from progress to order.47 As the last stage of human knowledge, the 
move to positivism in some ways signified the end o f the epistemological evolution. 
This attainment alleviated the need for a “full freedom of conscience”, which would
AQ
only stand in the way of establishing a new system. Liberty would become “anarchic”
41 Ibid., p. 103.
42 Ibid., p. 188.
43 Ibid., p. 103.
44 Ibid., p. 31. Wemick, p. 60. Whittaker, p. 53. In fact, Comte identified ten “affective motors” in the 
brain that “activate feelings when passive. They are, from least to most altruistic, preservation, sexual, 
maternal, destructive, constructive, pride, vanity, attachment, veneration, benevolence, or universal love. 
See Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, p. 33.
45 Ibid., p. 3 1 ,36 .
46 Ibid., p. 30.
47 Manuel, Prophets o f  Paris, p. 268.
48 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, p. 55.
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if  not superimposed with the positive spirit to guide it, and prevent it from being abused 
by the ever-present egoistic tendencies.49 Liberty itself only possesses instrumental 
value, to be utilised during critical periods to challenge the established theological and 
metaphysical beliefs.50 During organic periods, a rigid hierarchy of political power 
would be maintained. At the top would be industrialists, then merchants, followed by 
manufacturers and agriculturalists.51 However, like Medieval Catholicism, there would 
be a strict separation of powers. Industrialists and the like were to be responsible for 
providing for the material needs of society, and so would have control over the 
production and distribution of goods. The planning, sanctioning, and general direction 
of society however, was strictly in the hands o f a group o f scientist-priests.52 Their 
spiritual guidance was to be the highest sovereign, because left unchecked the spirit of 
the industrialists would lead to a “despotism of the wealthy”.53 Only the priests, with 
their encyclopaedic knowledge and training could be trusted to maintain positivist order.
Comte’s Religion of Humanity is an incredibly detailed and fascinating utopian 
vision. It offers a particular interpretation of history, which in turn provides an 
explanation and justification of the present crisis. Comte prophesizes about the next and 
final stage in history, therefore making his the penultimate epoch. It is for this reason 
that Wemick identifies Comte to be in the same utopian tradition stretching as far back 
as the Old Testament, one which he labels “penultamist”.54 Despite what Comte may or 
may not have taught us about the current crisis o f industrialism, and about the 
conditions o f human progress, there is little doubt surrounding his contribution to 
French thought and as one of the founders of the modem science of sociology.55 
However, such achievements need to be understood in the context of, and separated 
from, the ritualistic demands of his Religion. Because despite rendering the totality of 
his system complete and thoroughly consistent, it also soured the admiration of his most 
loyal followers, “Mill, Lewis, Carlyle & Co.”.56 Comte paid a heavy price for the 
casting of his utopian vision in religious terms, despite viewing the establishment of a
cn
Church as the natural culmination of his earlier work. It is therefore important to 
understand the extent of ritual involved in his doctrine.
49 Wemick, p. 95.
50 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society” , p. 55.
51 Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, p. 29.
52 Whittaker, p. 29.
53 Wright, p. 29.
54 Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 117.
55 Ibid., p. 1.
56 Manual, The Prophets o f  Pahs, p. 266.
57 Ibid., p. 265.
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Individual prayer was to be made an hour upon waking, upon sleeping, and a 15 
minutes at noon.58 This was in addition to the many holidays of the new positivist 
calendar, to be celebrated in rituals of the “public cult”.59 Furthermore, each individual 
would also celebrate the Sacraments of the Life-course, which took place at seven year 
intervals. Presentation was at birth where the child is given two patron [positivist] 
saints. Initiation, at 14, was when the child leaves the home and begins his or her 
positivist education at the hands of the scientist-priests. Admission, at 21, was when the 
individual officially becomes a servant of humanity, which was followed by Destination 
at 28, when the choice of career was made. Marriage, at 28 for women, 35 for men, was 
required by all, and binding for life, thereby denying the possibility o f divorce and 
remarriage. Maturity took place at 42, and Retirement at 63. The final duty was 
Transformation, when the individual chooses a successor to continue his or her lifelong 
work. Most significantly, seven years after the individual’s death, the Sacrament o f  
Incorporation took place, when the public would determine the worthiness o f the 
individual to buried in the sacred cemetery at the Temple of Humanity, thereby attaining 
subjective immortality.60
The most striking thing is the similarity between the Religion and Comte’s own 
personal experiences dealing with the death of Clothilde de Vaux. Women came to 
represent humanity, and so became objects o f worship and adoration. By doing so, 
individuals (men) strengthened the three sympathetic instincts: Attachment between 
equals (man and wife), veneration of superiors (mother), and kindness to inferiors 
(daughter). Finally, as if  a textbook example of Freudian psycho-dynamics, Comte 
institutionalised his frustrated sexual ambitions with Clothilde into the un-sullied, pure, 
worship of the symbolic woman.61 Frank P. Manuel nicely sums up the complete mania 
that consumed Comte’s life after the death of Colthilde:
“There is something pathetic if not ridiculous about a forty six year old man on 
his knees before an empty red plush chair -  his altar -  holding a medallion in 
which a lock of hair was preserved, a relic which awakened in him what he 
named the primitive fetishistic emotion. When a middle aged philosopher calls 
his beloved an angel and protests in volume after volume the purity of their 
relationship, despite his numerous unsuccessful attempts to render their union 
physical, it is difficult to restrain a smirk”62
58 Wright, The Religion o f  H um anity, p. 36.
59 Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 146.
60 Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity , p. 37.
61 See Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, especially Chapter 5 for a discussion o f  
Comte’s sexual sublmiation.
62 Manuel, The Prophets o f  Paris, p. 289,
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The ritual indicated the extent to which the religion was an all-encompassing, life 
systematising affair. It also unsurprisingly was a lightening rod for criticism and ridicule 
amongst Comte’s contemporaries. Nonetheless, his contribution to the discourse of the 
social sciences is underestimated. Moreover, Comte seems to have impressed himself 
onto to the thinking of Mill in ways not always acknowledged. True, Comte is the only 
thinker Mill criticises in On Liberty, and his essay on positivism seems no less directed 
at Comte’s personality than at his system, but nonetheless some striking similarities 
persist in their writings. Comte was explicitly employing his twin methodologies of 
statics and dynamics to describe and chart the evolution of human society. It will be 
illuminating to examine what elements of Comte’s system precede Mill’s implicit 
theory of progress, and how they differ.
The Commonalities between Mill and Comte
Mill credits Comte with putting forward some very novel ideas about the 
philosophy of science, and about the general moral reform of society that he openly 
takes on board. However, Mill’s Auguste Comte and Positivism is an attempt to distance 
himself from the French positivist, and highlight exactly where he thinks Comte’s 
efforts have failed. Beyond Mill’s discussion of their philosophical relationship, other 
similarities remain, along with some crucial differences. With regards to Mill’s implicit 
theory o f human progress, some key elements are prefigured in Comte’s works. This 
section isolates three such elements, and attempts to analyse their common features, 
while delineating their disparities. First, the common elements of their religions of 
humanity are assessed. Such a philosophy is important because it explains the current 
state that their society, which in turn is justified by the future state(s). Next, the trade­
off between freedom and societal controls is explored. Volumes have been written 
dissecting Mill’s thought as a liberal, and only a small minority question whether he can 
be thought of as such, at least in the classical sense. Moreover, Comte is infamous for 
his antipathy towards liberalism, and so it will be interesting to see how social freedoms 
fit into his theory of human progress. Finally, their philosophies of history are examined. 
Comte went to great lengths to codify every ritualistic minutia of his system, whereas 
Mill merely sought to uncouple morality from its theological roots and create the 
conditions under which individuals could develop their generic capacities. Comte
63 Most notably, Joseph Hamburger, John Stuart M ill On Liberty and Control, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999).
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precedes large portions of Mill’s thought with respect to progress. This section attempts 
to show that more of Mill’s thought can be traced back to Comte than he otherwise 
acknowledges, which is particularly noteworthy in light of Comte’s hostility towards 
liberal democracy.
i. The Religions o f Humanity
Perhaps the most interesting commonality between Comte and Mill is that both 
of them recognise the importance o f religion for the functioning o f society, and both 
create their own versions to fill the intellectual vacuum that Christianity left. Religion, 
and particular Medieval Catholicism, served a crucial function guiding individual 
sentiments, even though it became “intellectually unsustainable”.64 It should be noted 
though that Comte uses a very inclusive conception of religion. In addition to referring 
to a set of beliefs regarding a theological entity, it also includes philosophy. In fact, all 
belief structures ranging from theological to positive states of knowledge are included 
in Comte’s conception of religion, which meant the attainment of positivism did not 
render religion obsolete. Religion was everything that bound a community, 
intellectually or spiritually.65 Mill also recognises religion’s unifying power. Religion 
could turn individual sentiments away from egoistic concerns, and towards the greater 
good of humanity or utility.
“To call these sentiments by the name morality, exclusively of any other title, is 
claiming too little for them. They are a real religion; of which, as o f other 
religions, outward good works (the utmost meaning usually suggested by the 
word morality) are only a part, and are indeed rather the fruits of the religion 
than the religion itself. The essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction 
of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognized as o f the highest 
excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of desire. This 
condition is fulfilled by the Religion of Humanity in as eminent a degree, and in 
as high a sense, as by the supernatural religions even in their best manifestations, 
and far more so than in any of their others.”66
Both Comte and Mill endorse religion because it is the strongest internal sanction 
against the selfish pursuit of lowly desires, not conducive to the greater good. However, 
they both also recognise the need for external sanctions as well.
In addition to the weight of public opinion reinforcing sentiments, individuals 
were to defer to those more knowledgeable than themselves, namely, authority. In
64 Mill, “Utility o f  Religion”, p. 405.
65 W emick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 101.
66 Mill, “Utility o f  Religion”, p. 422.
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Comte’s next organic stage, it would be the scientist-priests who wielded supreme 
discretion with regards to all matters spiritual, moral, and theoretical. Only scientists 
possess the necessary expertise to deduce the proper course for society.
“They alone exercise the an uncontested authority in such matters of theory. 
Thus, independently alone from the fact that they are alone competent to form 
the new organic doctrine, they are exclusively invested with the necessary moral 
force to secure its acceptance.”67
Comte thus reduces all matters of politics to scientific phenomena, deducible from the 
laws produced by the historical methodology of statics and dynamics. Not only were 
scientists the only ones capable of discovering the laws, they also possess the moral 
authority to secure assent to the new organic doctrine. Come is not saying that we 
should defer to scientists as much as we already do defer to them, and so should merely 
formalise that hierarchy. Mill, at his most Comtean in Spirit o f the Age, also stresses the 
importance of relying on the knowledge of those who have chosen its pursuit as their 
primary occupation of their time, because “As long as the day consists of twenty four 
hours...the great majority of mankind will need the far greater part of their time and 
exertions for procuring bread.” Mill continues,
“It is, therefore, one of the necessary conditions of humanity, that the majority 
must either have wrong opinions, or no fixed opinions, or must place the degree 
of reliance warranted by reason, in the authority of those who have made moral
£ Q
and social philosophy their peculiar study.”
In this way, individuals remain largely concerned with the affairs of their own lives and 
so would be best served by relying on the “more cultivated minds” for guidance on how 
best to live.69 This is a strategy confirmed in Utilitarianism where Mill advocates 
deference to the knowledge of “experienced judges” to determine which of two 
pleasures is the higher one. It also forms part of Mill’s overall theory o f individual 
progress, to submit to the second-order influence of society in order to acculturate to the 
higher forms o f life that Mill’s Religion consists of. Both Mill and Comte view progress 
as a natural linear, and rational process that would quite obviously be spear-headed by 
learned elites. They subsequently place great deal o f reliance in them for the direction 
and content of social evolution.
67 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, p. 77.
68 Mill, “Spirit o f  the A ge”, p. 241.
69 Ibid, p. 244.
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For Mill, however, this deference was only to go so far. Mill wants individuals 
to follow the lead of learned elites and experienced judges, but wants us to do so 
wilfully. His Religion of Humanity is a subtle and imperfect blend of influence, control, 
individuality and freedom. It is crucial that individuals adopt altruism and a desire for 
the higher pleasures, but only for the right reasons, i.e. they understand and accept the 
utility-producing properties of these attributes. These are the minimal substantive goals 
for Mill, and his Religion provides the framework for their pursuit. Indeed, others who 
have failed to recognise this implicit theory of progress have nonetheless concluded that
7 0the for Mill utilitarianism is his Religion of Humanity. Whereas Comte tried to 
revolutionise society once and for all, Mill’s system was the institutionalisation of 
progress.
ii. Freedom and Control
The rigidity of Comte’s system, coupled with the all-pervasive spirit of 
positivism that accompanies the Religion of Humanity leave little room for free 
expression. The seeds of the spirit of positivism are to be instilled in the child as part of 
its early education at the hands of the mother. The ever-present impulses o f vanity, 
egoism and for sex were to be suppressed, while the impulse of altruism was to be 
nurtured, as part of the spontaneous cultivation of the affective and aesthetic instincts. 
Then at age 14, the Sacrament of Initiation takes place whereby, the child leaves home 
and begins his or her systematic education of the sciences at the hands of the High 
Priests. Throughout education, the child repeats the evolution of human knowledge 
moving from theological to metaphysical, and finally to the positive state of
71 • • • ♦ •knowledge. The whole system is designed to replicate itself by turning individuals into 
cogs for the larger machinery of society. Free choice had little to do with one’s final
77destination because natures were set, and aptitudes could be tested. Mill also places 
great importance on the power of education to shape character. He too recognises that 
education could play a more substantial role in development of an individual than 
defence to elites in adulthood, although that was also very important. In Mill’s critical 
assessment of the utility of religion, he claims that much of what is credited to religion, 
actually belongs to education, as the Spartans exemplify:
70 Whittaker, Comte and M ill, p. 70. Or see Raeder, especially Chapter 7.
71 Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, p. 37.
72 Mueller, John Stuart M ill and French Thought, p. 125.
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“The power of education is almost boundless: there is not one natural inclination 
which it is not strong enough to coerce, and, if  needful, to destroy by disuse. In 
the greatest recorded victory which education has ever achieved over the whole 
host of natural inclinations in an entire people -  the maintenance through the 
centuries of the institutions of Lycurgus”
Therefore, such power cannot be trusted to be wielded spontaneously by families. 
Government must set standards and place expectations on families that they provide for 
the education of their children. Mill even goes so far as to declare it criminal to neglect 
the education of a child, equivalent to neglecting to feed it:
It still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence without a fair 
prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and 
training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and 
against society; and that the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State 
ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge of the parent.”74
By calling the neglect of education a “moral crime”, Mill is implying that such a neglect 
constitutes harm, and is thusly covered by the harm principle. It is doubly so, because 
not only is it a harm to the child, whereby some claim tp family sovereignty indirectly 
promoting utility might trump the invocation of the Harm Principle, but also against 
society. Such a move is yet another ambitious empirical claim just shy o f being a fully 
normative one. Mill is almost making a normative claim about what should constitute 
harm, rather than leaving it to be determined by society empirically. Regardless, it is 
clear that as in Comte’s utopia, education is instrumental to the maintenance and 
propagation of Mill’s next organic stage of history.
The import of education may be the same, but Comte is far more authoritarian in 
its application. Whereas Mill merely wants to provide “instruction and training” for the 
mind, i.e. develop its capacities, Comte wants to instil substantive values, like love for 
the great being, humanity. He also wants education to be centralised and administered 
by the High Priests of the Religion. Mill is explicit that such an arrangement serves not 
the greater good of society, but partial interests:
“A General State education is more contrivance for moulding people to be 
exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which 
pleases the predominant power in government, whether it be a monarch, a 
priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority o f the existing generation, in
73 Mill, “Utility o f  Religion”, p. 409.
74 Mill, “On Liberty”, in Collected Works XVIII, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routledge Regan Paul, 
1977), p. 302.
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proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the
*7 c
mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.”
Of course, this was the exact reason why Comte places education at the heart of his 
Religion, and why he makes it the exclusive domain of the Priests. He wants to exercise 
the influence of religion specifically to homogenise the psychology of each generation. 
Both recognise and employ the power of religion, but Comte goes further in its 
application thereby exercising much more extensive control over the individual than 
Mill’s system.
Freedom does play a crucial role in the evolution of society for both Comte and 
Mill, albeit in different ways. Comte recognises that freedom aided the transition from 
one organic period to the next. Organic periods, which enjoy a consensus of opinions do 
not need to protect freedoms. It is only during the transitional periods when liberties, 
like freedom of expression, enable critical opinions to counter balance the reactionary 
opinions that arise as the former beliefs are slowly eroded by scientific evidence. It is 
from the synthesis o f these competing views that the new beliefs emerge. Free and open 
discussion expedites the discrediting o f outmoded beliefs, and enables the dissemination
7 f\of the new dialectical beliefs. Once the next organic stage is reached, the same 
freedoms that helped elevate society, then become a threat to it. Without a guiding 
“social outlook”, freedom will eventually allow the ever-present, egoistic tendencies to 
re-emerge, thereby undermining the prevailing ethos o f the particular stage o f history -  
the altruistic spirit of Religion of Humanity.77 It is not government charged with 
censuring dissent, but public opinion. People are to live openly, permanently under the
< io
scrutiny of the each other. Under such a system, any distinction between public and 
private realms would evaporate. The totality of Comte’s Religion, ensure by the mutual 
vigilance of citizen, is the only logical formulation because o f the perfection of the 
system. Once his utopian vision is realised, the historico-philosophical concept of 
progress would itself become obsolete. Comte does not forecast another stage o f history, 
or state of knowledge, so the prospects of institutionalised liberties re-emerging are nil.
Before discussing how freedom and public opinion fit into Mill’s framework, 
one needs to note an element of relativism inherent in both systems. A particular liberal 
morality in one era becomes a threat in another, only to re-emerge again during the
75 Ibid, p. 302.
76 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society” , p. 61.
77 Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, p. 95.
78 Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, p. 29.
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following transitional stage. Aware of this, Comte attempts to tie the appropriateness of 
the system to an objective notion of his historico-philosophical concept of progress:
“The political regime must be and is necessarily relative to the state of 
civilisation; the best, for each era, is that which best conforms to that state. 
There is not, therefore, and cannot be a political regime absolutely preferable to 
all others; there are only states o f civilisation of which some are more perfected 
than others. Institutions that are good for one era can be, and even most often are,
7 0bad for another, and the other way round.”
The potential difficulty is with evaluating the appropriateness of a political regime for a 
given state o f civilisation. Do the reforms called for by civil unrest reflect critical, 
reactionary, or synthesised opinions? Ultimately, the sovereign must know when to 
yield to the winds of change. Is it merely a question of power - political, military, or 
otherwise? Even in hindsight, Comte’s methodology o f dynamics, studying the 
conditions of change, can be blind to external factors, like historical contingency. A 
transition that might seem to be the natural result of a growing trend in science may 
have much more mundane, or even sinister causes. This is a failing of not only Comte’s 
methodology, but of historiography in general, making it impossible to rely on 
indicators internal to Comte’s system to determine the appropriateness of a political 
regime and morality. Mill too, interjects a dose of relativism into his political morality 
of progress as well. The infamous caveat to his “one very simple principle” that it 
should only apply to people in the “maturity of their faculties”, and not to “backward” 
civilisations still in their “nonage”. For them, benevolent despotism is the most 
appropriate regime, until their society reaches a stage whereby it can guide its own 
improvement by free and equal discussion.80 Mill does state parenthetically that this 
period has long since been reached by most countries we are concerned with here. 
However, I think one needn’t underestimate the development of current moral capacities 
to consider Mill’s claim to be not uncontroversial. It could be argued that late modem 
Western European society is not improving, despite the degree of free and equal 
discussion it enjoys. The same problem exists for Mill, which is to decide when a liberal 
political morality is more utility-producing than a benign despot. Again, there may be 
nothing internal to the system that can determine the answer, especially in light of the 
low levels of propinquity of moral regeneration.
79 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, p. 106.
80 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 224
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Mill also recognises himself to be writing during a transitional stage of history, 
and crafts his normative claims accordingly. However, his moral prescriptions are 
permanent, to persist even during the next organic stage of history. He, in a sense, 
attempts to institutionalise progress. The freedoms that constitute experiments in living 
are an instrumental element of his theory of progress. In particular, the Harm Principle, 
as it applies to only first-order desires, protects a sphere around the individual within 
which he chooses for himself to adopt the utility maximising ethic of Mill’s version of 
the Religion of Humanity. Physically or morally coercing an individual’s first-order 
choices for the higher pleasures is not adequate because the grounds of the decision 
would not be known. It is crucial that individuals are free to err, and then -  with the
• 01
help of society, need be -  learn from the mistakes. This knowledge could then be 
spread throughout society helping others to learn from their experiments as well. The 
crucial departure from Comte is that these freedoms form a constituent part o f Mill’s 
Religion of Humanity, whereas they are antithetical to Comte’s version. Even after 
society entered its next organic stage of history, individuals would still need to wilfully 
choose the higher pleasures and altruistic forms of the good, rather than simply be 
coerced into doing so from a young age. This particular psychology of moral 
development is one of the key factors in retaining Mill’s liberal credentials, or at least 
precluding the fully illiberal elements of Comte’s thought.
Mill has a more ambivalent concern for public opinion. Whereas in Comte’s 
Religion, the public was the primary enforcer of morality, Mill cautiously relies on 
society to assist personal development. As he states in the Introduction to On Liberty, 
public opinion has the potential to practise “a social tyranny more formidable than many 
kinds of political oppression” because of the all-pervasive, unregulated and spontaneous
JOmanner of its influence (exactly why Comte charges the public with this duty). 
However, public opinion could also aid in the regeneration of morality during the 
critical period, and in its continuing propagation during the next organic stage. Chapter 
IV of On Liberty speaks extensively of society attaching “natural penalties” to 
behaviour emanating from “lowness or deprivation of taste”, characteristics that do not 
violate the harm principle. The progressive nature of public opinion turns on whether a 
majority of the population have already embraced Mill’s ‘Religion’ and their influence 
is intended to help the remaining few selfish individuals, as Chapter IV presumes, or if  
the majority still cling to the outmoded beliefs of the previous organic stage, and are
81 See Chapter Six, and Mueller, John Stuart Mill and French Thought, p. 128.
82 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 220.
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resisting the new morality exemplified by the regenerated minority, as Chapter III 
presumes. This tension will be examined in detail in Chapter Six of this thesis. Either 
way, the Harm Principle protects everyone’s ability to pursue their own conceptions of 
the good, and allows for society to influence the way individuals feel about these first 
order pursuits. If during the next organic stage when the majority were reformed, their 
influence would eventually lead the remaining few unreformed individuals to re­
evaluate the utility assessment of their pursuits, and eventually adopt the more 
enlightened ethic of the Religion. However, even during the [current] critical stage 
when older forms and beliefs are still exercising a significant hold over society, 
enlightened individuals would be immune to society’s attempts to suppress their higher 
natures because - like the higher pleasures - people who have chosen to embrace the 
superior form of life associated with the Religion would never regress back to the lower 
forms. Public opinion is a powerful force in society that was neither inherently 
progressive nor conservative. Limited by the Harm Principle though, public opinion 
could be harnessed to disseminate the virtues o f adopting Mill’s Religion o f Humanity 
without impeding “liberty of action”.
One final clarification needs to be discussed regarding the extent to which 
Comte and Mill regarded freedom as desirable. The discussion thus far has exclusively 
used the term freedom in the negative sense, referring to the sanctions on behaviour 
either by government, education, or public opinion. We must now consider the value 
placed on some notion o f autonomy that can be extrapolated from what we know about 
their systems. To begin with, as discussed above, we can say that both thinkers place a 
great deal of value on education. Neither are content to allow individuals to be shrouded 
in ignorance of the basic workings of the natural world, however we are on less certain 
ground when claiming that either considered this to contribute to the overall freedom of 
the individual. Neither use the term “autonomy” in their writings, but Nicholas Capaldi 
claims that Comte’s system “ignores the role that (autonomous) individuals play in the 
social process. That is, it violated Mill’s inherent belief in the dignity of the
04
individual.” I would agree with Capadli’s conclusion, but in a qualified way. The 
thoroughly selfless altruism demanded by Comte in complete prostration before the 
Great Being, humanity, does eclipse the moral significance o f the individual. However, 
it would be slightly misleading to say that it was the violation of autonomy in particular 
that put Mill off, because his own mechanism of progress involves influences that
83 See M ill’s discussion o f  the higher pleasures in “Utilitarianism”, p. 211.
84 Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p. 170.
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would question the application of such a modem concept. In addition to the capacity of 
rational self-direction, John Gray for example posits that “an autonomous agent must 
also have distanced himself from the conventions of his social environment and from 
influence of the persons surrounding him. His actions express principles and policies 
which he has himself ratified by a process of critical reflection.”85 As will be discussed 
in Chapter Six of the thesis, the crucial feature of Mill’s theory o f progress, whereby the 
Harm Principle only applies to lower level reasoning and desires, is that it allows for 
second order forms of influence. The penalties attached to discredited behaviours (and 
beliefs) by society are not intended to physically or morally coerce individuals into 
adopting the Religion of Humanity, but are intended to change the way people reflect on 
their beliefs, so that people would choose to adopt the Religion for and by themselves. 
Mill is clear about the power of public opinion, so we can be sure that the level of 
influence it wields, even at the second level, could potentially be quite extensive. For 
this reason, I think it inappropriate to ascribe to Mill a notion of autonomy, as used in 
contemporary philosophical discourse. However, his argument in Chapter Two of On 
Liberty for freedom of thought and discussion from knowing the grounds of truths, his 
insistence of the importance of individuality in Chapter Three, and his prohibition of 
state paternalism in Chapter Five, all suggest that he does hold the exercise of human
• • • ftAcapacities of choice and rational understanding in high regard. Whether this concern 
constitutes a conception of autonomy will be explored further in Chapter Six and Seven 
of the thesis. What is certain is that because of the high levels of social influence in 
Mill’s system, if  he holds a conception of autonomy to be a necessary precondition to 
progress, then it is a highly normative and constrained conception, possibly 
unrecognizable by contemporary liberal theorists. Comte, attaching little to no weight to 
the exercise of those capacities typically associated with a common-place notion of 
autonomy, certainly does not consider it to be a necessary ingredient for evolution to the 
next organic stage of history.
iii. Philosophies o f History
What animates Comte’s philosophy of history is the notion that humans are 
forever evolving towards an unrealizable telos of perfection. The study of progress is 
not only half of his entire methodological approach to the study of mankind, but also the 
underlying presumption of his system. All human knowledge passes through three semi-
85 John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 74. On this interpretation, one 
could say Mill held a conception o f  autarchy as requisite for individual progress.
86 See Chapters Five and Six.
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distinct stages as the ubiquitous advance of scientific discovery continues. Starting 
theologically, explanations of the material world gradually become more metaphysical, 
thereby shedding reference to deities and other supernatural beings. Eventually, 
scientific evidence would challenge metaphysical explanations of the world in favour of 
more positivistic ones. It is during this time, at the brink of the full assent to the positive 
system, that Comte considers himself to be writing. Mill, despite not describing the 
human race moving through such an epistemological narrative, does posit the conditions 
necessary for advance of human growth. Most famously, in On Liberty, Chapter Two, 
Mill gives his famous three arguments for the freedom of thought and discussion. 
Suppressing an opinion that may be true denies society of a potential truth. Suppressing 
an opinion that is false, denies society the practice of challenging and defeating the false 
opinion, which would have served to strengthen our grasp of the foundation of true 
opinions. Finally, suppressing an opinion that contains part o f the truth, which Mill 
contends is how most opinions are, denies society o f the benefits described in the 
previous two cases. Mill also affirms the conditions o f progress in Spirit o f  the Age:
“The progress which we have made, is precisely that sort of progress which 
increase in discussion suffices to produce...To discuss, and to question 
established opinions, are merely two phrases for the same thing. When all 
opinions are questioned it is in time found out what of those will not bear close 
examination. Ancient doctrines are then put upon their proofs; and those which 
were originally errors, or have become so by change of circumstances are 
thrown aside.” 7
Moreover, “It is by discussion, also, that true opinions are discovered and diffused.” 
Whereas Comte views the separation of temporal from spiritual power as one of the 
greatest achievement of civilisation, Mill considers the diffusion of superficial
QQ
knowledge to be the “grand achievement of our age”. As the dispersion of knowledge 
spreads, individuals are less beholden to powerful and learned individuals who they 
may rely upon for opinions, and the significance o f discourse within and between
O Q
groups raises. In fact, a measure of society is its level of cooperation. Mill points to 
the examples of trade unions and newspapers as two recent forms of cooperation that 
combine the disparate efforts of individuals to create a powerful and unifying force.90 
Comte too, considers the division of labour to be an integral part of his Religion of
87 John Stuart Mill, “Spirit o f  the Age”, in Collected Works XII, Fancis Mineka ed., (Toronto: Routlegde 
and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 233.
88 Mill, “Spirit o f  the A ge”, p. 232.
89 John Stuart Mill, “Civilisation”, p. 212.
90 Ibid., p. 125.
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Humanity. Most importantly, spiritual and intellectual power would be separated from 
the controls of the minimal state. Bankers and industrialists would coordinate the 
provision for the material needs of society, while the priests o f humanity would be 
charged with the theoretical guidance of society - including the theoretical counterparts 
to all practices of the temporal power -  and, most importantly, education. The 
differentiation was not only lateral. There would also be a rigid hierarchical division as 
well, based on the abilities of the individual natures of people. Though capable of 
development, human natures were otherwise fixed. For this reason, the labouring 
classes would be under the greatest influence of the “pouvoir spiritueF as commanded 
by the priests.91 For Mill, progress entails the ability of individuals to develop 
themselves in bounded, but indefinite ways which Comte found impossible, and 
moreover undesirable. And herein lies one of the crucial differences between Mill and 
Comte. Despite both being motivated to describe and facilitate social evolution, Mill 
starts with the individual and works up, whereas Comte is strictly interested in humanity 
as the only unit of moral significance, and deduces the laws that govern individual 
behaviour.
What underlies Comte’s philosophy of history, is the notion that history unfolds 
in cycles of two oscillating periods of stability and conflict.92 Organic periods are 
characterised by a consensus of opinions and modes of thought. Critical periods 
contained a range of opinions about the world all competing with one another until 
scientific evidence showed one to be most correct. Public opinion would gradually 
gravitate towards that which the evidence pointed towards, and another organic period 
would be inaugurated. These were not discrete changes, for Comte is quite clear that 
periods would overlap conflictingly, and progress would be slow. Comte claims to be 
writing during a transitional, dynamic stage of history, slowly moving beyond the 
metaphysical state of knowledge and at the verge of the next organic state, the positiveQTstate of knowledge. Mill as well, identifies his time to be one of transition, claiming 
that older beliefs and institutions have been rightly discredited.94 The implication being 
an anticipation of the next organic state, one that contains appropriate institutions for 
civilisation’s level of progress. Mill even describes the framework of the next organic 
period. Firstly, material needs would be provided for by a temporal power elite for 
which no other rival exists. This would be so, because power would be exercised by the
91 Iris Wessel Mueller, John Stuart Mill and French Thought, (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 1956) 
p. 125.
92 Coser, M asters in Sociological Thought, p. 8.
93 Comte, “Plan o f  the Scientific Work Necessary for the Reorganisation o f  Society”, p. 50.
94 Mill, “Spirit o f  the A ge”, p. 231.
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“fittest persons” who commanded the full obedience of the masses.95 Secondly, society 
would enjoy a predominance of “received opinions”. Mill identifies three sources of 
moral influence: wisdom, religion, and [temporal] power. He states plainly that an 
opinion that enjoys the sanction of all three becomes part of a lager “received 
doctrine”.96 Comte and Mill both agree upon what the lastest period of stability was in 
history, and perhaps ironically, they both claim it was during the reign of medieval 
Catholicism.
Despite Comte’s explicit calls to reject the traditional Christian theology, and 
Mill’s implicit movement away from it, both look back onto Medieval Catholicism as 
one of stability and harmony o f consensus. “The Catholics received the priest from God, 
and their religion from the priest.” In addition, they aligned themselves closely with the
0 7Monarch, and together, were able to “retard their own downfall.” The Church was 
able to draw upon the three sources of moral influence to maintain their received 
doctrine thereby sustaining that organic stage of history, which was the most 
appropriate at the time. Eventually, the spirit of the age became too strong, and society 
moved into the next critical, or transitional stage of history. Comte’s endorsement of the 
period is stronger because he holds that Catholicism actually contributed to the course 
human progress. Not only was Christian morality binding on everyone, regardless of 
class or wealth, but it also was officially separate from the exercise of material power, 
which Comte contends is “the greatest advance ever made in the general theory o f social
Q O
organism”. Now, however, both thinkers view the influence of the Church to be 
detrimental to the advance of civilisation to the next positive stage. Not only has the 
theological source of its ethic been largely eroded by the growth of scientific knowledge, 
but the content is also contrary to the spirit of the Religion of Humanity. Comte fully 
articulates his disdain for the selfish ethic imbibed in Christianity in his Systeme de 
politique positive."  Building on this, as part of Mill’s assessment of the utility of 
religion, in the essay by the same name, he states -  though not naming Christianity in 
particular - that
95 Ibid, p. 252.
96 Ibid, p. 290. Note that these are slightly different than the three sources o f  morality discussed in Utility 
o f  Religion: religion, via early education, authority, and public opinion. See John Stuart Mill, “Utility o f  
Religion”, in C ollected Works X, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routlegde, Kegan and Paul, 1969), p. 
407.
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99 Ibid, p. 27.
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“The religions which deal in promises and threats regarding a future life...fasten 
down the thoughts to the person’s own posthumous interests; they tempt him to 
regard the performance of his duties to others as a means to his own personal 
salvation; and are one of the most serious obstacles to the great purpose of moral 
culture”.100
Such a moral sanction was not only too individualistic for the more socially-minded 
Comte and Mill, but also destroyed the deontological nature o f moral duty. Ironically, if  
scientific evidence confirmed the reality of an after-life, Mill’s consequentialism would 
demand factoring it into any utilitarian calculus. Despite this and other failings of the 
Church, it played an important role in the progress of civilization that both thinkers 
acknowledge, despite advocating its fundamental rejection.
On the idea of progress and how exactly it unfolds, there seems to be wide 
agreement on between Comte and Mill. They both endorse Medieval Catholicism as the 
last organic period of history. They also both regard themselves as writing during a 
critical period, and subsequently view themselves as somehow catalytic for the assent to 
the next stage of history. However, what needs to be examined next is how exactly there 
philosophies of history differ, and then see what the implications are for their political 
moralities. The largest divergence between Comte and Mill has to do with 
characterisation of the next organic stage of history. Despite being ‘organic’, what we 
see is Mill institutionalising the conditions for individual and social progress, while 
Comte’s Religion attempts to freeze the system of organisation in such a way that 
betrays one of the central tenants of his positive philosophy - the idea o f progress.
As described above, human knowledge had already moved from the theological 
to the metaphysical stage of knowledge, and Comte was experiencing the critical stage 
of history, just at the brink of the positive stage. All that was needed was for the 
principles of positivism to be synthesised and articulated, and then they would naturally 
command the obedience of society. The vehicle Comte chose to disseminate and instil 
the principles in everyone, namely his Religion of Humanity, was probably not the most 
expedient method of proselytization. Moreover, in hindsight, we may actually attribute 
the totalitarian ritualisation of the religion to a historical contingency, the death of his 
beloved Clothilde de Vaux. Regardless of the reasons, it is true that Comte’s disciples, 
and those who actually did adopt the Religion were largely put off by the minutia and 
totality o f the ritual involved. As Manuel puts it, “his cult suffered the ridicule of all 
fabricated ceremonials that fail of acceptance by a sufficient body of believers to
100 Mill, Utility o f  Religion, p. 422.
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become sanctioned vehicles for the expression of religious emotion.” 101 More 
interestingly for our purposes here, when one examines the ritual involved it becomes 
clear that a shift in emphasis is made from progress to stability. True, human 
knowledge would become positive, but Comte made no attempt to speculate about any 
future states of knowledge, or further sub-divisions within the positive state.102 All 
purely theoretical research was to be ceased as it was a useless distraction. The research 
that was sanctioned was purely either for the advance of providing for the material 
needs of society, or for the benefit of the subsequent science, the moral (human) science 
being the ultimate one. Personally, the rigid distinctions both laterally between 
labourers and hierarchically between the classes all but precluded any individual growth 
or expansion. In order to maintain the Religion of Humanity with Clothilde as the 
symbolic embodiment of it, as the only means of propagating the spirit of the positive 
system, Comte arranged its educational structures to preclude the development of any 
critical perspectives. So despite “Order and Progress” being the positivist’s motto, 
Comte abandons the pursuit of progress in order to cement humanity’s positivism for all 
of eternity. It is for this reason, that Comte can be considered a “penultamist”, one who 
markets the next and final stage of evolution, thereby justifying every event -  regardless 
of how seemingly w«just -  in history, and explaining the present ‘crisis’.104
Mill does describe history as oscillating between two poles of stability and 
disorder, but he lacks the utopian vision that defined Comte’s Religion of humanity. For 
Mill, the next stage of social development would be one whereby the conditions for 
individual growth would be institutionalised, which would in turn drive society through 
the never-ending progressions of consensus and dissent. The Harm Principle, sanctioned 
by the Principle of Utility would ensure that society would never encroach upon an 
individual’s ability to improve oneself. In fact, society was instrumental for such growth. 
Like Comte, Mill recognises that elites would always command a leading role in the 
process of improvement. Via public opinion, elites would see to it that certain outcomes 
of experiments in living would be encouraged while other discouraged. As will be 
discussed in Chapter Six, such forms of influence would only be applicable to higher, or 
second order, reasoning with regards to lower or first order desires. Mill does not 
specifically articulate a hierarchical conception o f the self, but to employ one renders 
the disparate claims of On Liberty coherent. Mill’s system is structural, in that he makes
101 Manual, “The Prophets o f  Paris”, p. 268.
102 Mueller, John Stuart M ill and French Thought, p. 128.
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few claims as to the content of the good life, leaving that largely an empirical question. 
Comte, on the hand, makes as strong a substantive claim as is philosophically possible 
about form and content o f human flourishing. His Religion of Humanity is not only the 
next step in human progress, it is also the last. This progressive dimension that Mill 
brings to his system is crucial, because it is the only way to reconcile the disparate 
demands of liberalism and utilitarianism. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
progressive element of his thought enables Mill to defend liberal principles on 
utilitarian grounds, something Bentham could not do.
Conclusion
Auguste Comte’s place in the history o f social thought and philosophy of 
science is beyond doubt. Existing mostly in the margins of academic thought at the time, 
he gradually accumulated a modicum of recognition for his work in France. His thought 
then took, on a highly spiritual dimension after the death of his lost love Clothilde. He 
viewed his new positivist religion as the only cure for an ailing civilisation, and this 
remedy required the complete revolution of every facet o f human existence, down to the 
smallest detail. Mill, during a several year correspondence, professes his sympathy for 
establishing a new humanitarian religion in many of his writings, but in the end parted 
on philosophical and methodological grounds. This relationship culminated in the 1865 
essay, Augste Comte and Positivism, where Mill seems no less critical of Comte’s 
personality than he does of his writings. However, in light of, or rather, despite what 
Mill explicitly rejects, much of their work contain striking similarities. This Chapter 
sought to analyse the commonalities in their theories of progress while making clear 
their differences. What we have found is that much of Mill’s theory of progress can be 
traced back to Comte, and despite both endorsing a humanitarian religion, the content of 
each is very different. Comte’s is an authoritarian utopia for which society moved 
through stages before arriving at. Mill’s Religion of Humanity is the permanent 
institutionalisation of the conditions of moral and scientific progress. These conditions 
include a sphere of negative liberty as prescribed by the Harm Principle, and so cannot 
be understood to have the eventual obsolescence that Hamburger argues. However, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, it is possible to argue for negative liberty in a formal 
sense, and still be outside of the liberal tradition, and so we must determine to what 
extent Mill is guilty of this charge.
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4. Beyond Bentham:
A liberal-utilitarianism
It might seem strange to consider that one of the influences on Mill’s liberal 
doctrine is a thinker whose antipathy to liberalism is well documented. Comte may have 
considered liberalism to be a necessary step in the evolution towards his Religion of 
Humanity, but he thought civilisation had moved beyond it, and necessitated more 
social control in order to consolidate the new moral outlook. It must be then even more 
striking to consider that a second, and possibly the biggest, influence on Mill’s thinking 
is also outside of the liberal tradition that Mill supposedly sits squarely within. Jeremy 
Bentham, Mill’s Godfather, and one o f his home school teachers, is best known for his 
advocation of a classical form of utilitarianism. To be a liberal, roughly speaking, 
means to value freedom and or equality in some meaningfully political sense. This 
chapter argues that Bentham, although valuing freedom and equality, does not do so 
sufficiently for his thought to be considered truly liberal. Secondary liberal principles 
may be generated from an over-arching utilitarian commitment, as some scholars 
attempt to do, but such principles are only contingently expedient. Secondly, and 
moreover, the control Bentham’s system exerts over the individual is similar in scope to 
that of Comte’s system, albeit for different reasons. Comte relies on an unfailing 
altruism to restrain egoistic tendencies, whereas Bentham employs institutional 
arrangements to alter individual incentive structures. Finally, despite inheriting much of 
Bentham’s philosophical framework, this chapter argues that it is specifically the notion 
of progress that Mill takes from Comte that enables him to defend against some of the 
liberal criticisms of his utilitarian commitment, unlike Bentham. Mill’s departure from 
Bentham’s classical formulation is not without its problems, but we are beginning to see 
how Mill’s moral and political thought is more subtle and complex than has previously 
been acknowledged.
Bentham: the primacy o f security and the subtly o f control
It is generally thought that liberalism refers not to any specific political ideology, 
or doctrine, but to a family of them. The label “liberal” however uncontroversially 
refers to a system of thought that values liberty and equality in some form or another, 
but these terms themselves are meaningless unless given content. Liberty can be given 
positive, negative, or even republican formulations, while equality could be o f race, 
gender, opportunity, welfare, etc. It would be misleading to say that Jeremy Bentham is
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opposed to liberty and equality as such in his system, and yet it would be even more 
incorrect to describe his thought as broadly speaking, liberal. Bentham, a utilitarian, 
states that pleasure and pain are both empirically what governs human behaviour, and 
normatively the moral standard of all action.1 His endorsement o f liberty and equality 
are certainly undeniable, but as will be shown, his valuation of these staples of 
liberalism are purely instrumental. The issue at stake is not whether Bentham is a liberal, 
for he himself would have denied such a label. The question more interestingly is how 
Bentham makes trade-offs between secondary values such as liberty, equality and his 
summum bonum, pleasure. I will examine each value separately, and then consider one 
of the best known critiques of classical utilitarianism, that of John Rawls.
Although individuals could wrongly underestimate their interest in security, the 
normative force of utilitarianism is derived from human nature itself. The two sovereign 
masters of pain and pleasure would eventually, and naturally guide individuals to 
arrange themselves along utilitarian principles. Despite attacking contractarian theories 
of government, Bentham posits his moral and political framework as a hypothetical 
“trade-off’: anyone would give up the condition of unlimited freedom, which for 
Bentham is a condition of uncertainty and risk, for one of limited yet secure freedom, 
within which one could reasonably hold expectations of certain outcomes. Moreover, it 
is not culture or identity that binds a community, but this sense o f common security that 
provides the social bonds of a society3
For sure, Bentham values freedom and considers at great length its role in his 
utilitarian system. However, liberty is not an object or possession, like a right. In fact, it 
is not even an abstraction, as others had considered at the time. For this reason, 
Bentham considers it a ‘ficticious entity’, a word that has no specific idea attached to it, 
apart from the value-free condition of being ‘un-coerced’.4 Liberties are not created by 
law, and distributed like goods or benefit; in fact, it is in most cases consumed by law. 
The aim of the legislator is to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, 
as dictated by the Greatest Happiness Principle, and Bentham gives four specific means 
to this end. Security, subsistence, abundance and equality are the subsidiary ends of the 
utilitarian legislator.5 The four ends could, of course, conflict, but in all cases security
1 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation, J. H. Bums and H. L. A.
Hart eds., (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), p. 11
2 Ibid., p. 102.
3 Ibid., p. 170.
4 Douglas G. Long, Bentham on Liberty: Jeremy Bentham ’s idea o f  liberty in relation to his utilitarianism, 
(Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1977), p. 68.
5 Jeremy Bentham, “The Civil Code”, in The Works o f  Jeremy Bentham Volume I, J. Bowring ed., 
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 302.
79
would always take priority over the other three - it being the first condition of the 
pursuit of happiness, or survival for that matter. Anything that could be done to promote 
any of these ends can only be done at the expense of liberty.6 The only way a law could 
create liberty, is indirectly, by replacing or overturning a more restrictive law. Because 
of its incorporeal nature, maximising liberty for liberty’s sake was mistaken and 
anarchical.
Bentham is surely correct on this point. A freedom is only secure and therefore 
valuable if  it is circumscribed by law to prevent others or the state from interfering with 
its exercise. After security, it is the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the 
pursuit of happiness. In this regard, Bentham concludes that liberty is actually a branch 
of security.7 Put a different way, liberty is the pre-social substrate that surrounds all of 
us, as in the anarchical state of nature. Law, in a sense, consumes the substrate thereby 
creating secure islands and channels of liberties within which individuals pursue our 
own particular pleasures. One can only perform some action if  one is secure from others, 
and the state, from interfering in that activity, hence the primacy of security, and the 
import of a legal system in every society. D.G. Long concludes, “Only thus can men’s 
frequently misguides desire for liberty be reconciled with their overarching desire and
O
need for happiness.” There is no doubt that Bentham recognises the indispensability of 
liberty for the pursuit of happiness, but it is by no means the characteristic feature of 
such condition. Security is the first and indispensable condition for the pursuit of 
happiness, and is punctuated by protected spheres o f liberty, as opposed to comprising 
the defining commitment of the whole ideology.
Bentham may not make liberty an explicit goal, like contemporary liberals, but 
equality is one of his stated subsidiary ends of legislation. Bearing in mind that 
utilitarianism is a consequentialist morality, its aim of maximising happiness on balance 
requires that it be done so by the best way possible. Maximisation does not entail any 
specific pattern of distribution. Moreover, it is not the case that all people respond in the 
same way to the same stimuli. People have different tastes, sensibilities, and even 
capacities to feel pain and pleasure. Someone with refined tastes might require 
expensive pleasures, like pre-phylloxera claret, to experience the same amount of 
pleasure as a much more easy-going, accommodating individual.9 Surely, this would be
6 Long, Bentham on Liberty, p. 169.
7 Ibid., p. 101.
8 Ibid., p. 96.
9 Ronald Dwrokin, Sovereign Virtue, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 49. This 
brilliant example o f  expensive tastes is actually taken from Kenneth J. Arrow, “Some Ordinalist 
Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory o f  Justice”, Journal o f  Philospohy, Vol. 20, No. 9, 1973, p. 254.
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a threat to security as people would rightfully object to the discrepancy of resources 
committed to pleasing those few individuals with cultivated tastes for expensive 
pleasures. Of course, this presumes that such interpersonal utility comparisons are 
possible. If it is possible, then human beings are reduced to nothing more than units of 
pain and pleasure, and would subsequently require differential treatment to maximise 
the happiness of the greatest numbers.10 Furthermore, this aggregation may not even 
entail equality at all as some may have a greater capacity to experience happiness, and 
thusly have a claim to more resources.
Bentham attempts to avert these problems by relying on the trans-valuative 
nature of money.11 Individuals may have different tastes, sensitivities, etc, but with 
money each can reveal their own conceptions of happiness, and the strength o f their 
commitments. The question is, to what extent does this require the redistribution of 
wealth? Bentham is aware of the effects of diminishing marginal utility with regards to 
money, and so one might think that this alone would demand the redistribution of 
wealth in order to ensure that everybody has at least the minimum means to pursue their 
conceptions of happiness, if  not at least the equal means to do so.12 However, despite 
equality being a stated legislative aim, Bentham also recognises that the extensive and 
repeated forced redistribution would not only cause pain to the wealthy, but also spread
1 Talarm throughout society. A distribution of equal wealth may theoretically be the 
condition that maximises happiness, however moving to it from the current unequal 
distribution might require a prohibitive amount of redistributive coercion.14 Furthermore, 
maintaining the distribution of equal wealth may require a sustained policy o f such 
forced redistribution, as Robert Nozick points out.15 However, as Bentham and Nozick 
both fail to consider, there is a symmetry with regards to redistribution, as the pain of 
one losing money, is the pleasure o f someone else receiving it. The insecurity the 
wealthy might experience living with the fear that the state may place a heavy tax on 
them might be mirrored by the security the poor would experience knowing that their
10 Bikhu Parekh, “Bentham’s Theory o f  Equality”, P olitical Studies, Vol. XVIII, no. 4, 1970, p. 482.
11 Ibid, p. 482.
12 Parekh, “Bentham’s Theory o f  Equality”, p.484.
13 Ibid., p. 486.
14 Fred Rosen concludes that Bentham differentiates between the equality o f  wealth and power on the one 
hand, and the means to achieve it on the others. Equality is the goal that “can never fully be realised”. See 
Frederick Rosen, Jerem y Bentham and Representative Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983), p. 220.
15 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1973), p. 163.
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needs would be provided for if they fail in the market economy.16 Much o f this turns on 
empirical evidence about the utility of equality. The question is how far, in theory, is 
Bentham is willing to redistribute in order to alleviate the plight of the poor. In light of 
the extensive effort put into the creation of the National Charity company, Bentham’s 
Panoptic, in-house poor relief, I think we can safely conclude that his bias is towards the 
security of property rights, rather than the potential utility o f redistribution. However, 
this alone does not disqualify Bentham’s inclusion in the liberal tradition. Libertarians 
such as Nozick and Hayek also conspicuously lack a substantive commitment to 
equality, but are uncontroversially placed within the liberal camp. As will be shown in 
the next section, Bentham’s instrumental valuation of liberty enables him to arrange 
institutions so as to limit the scope of freedom individuals actually can in practice 
exercise. But first, I will show how the consequentialist nature of his doctrine makes it 
impossible to sustain liberal readings of his political thought.
One of the best known critiques of classical utilitarianism is given by John 
Rawls in his A Theory o f Justice.11 He begins by specifying that any ethical theory 
needs to articulate both what is good and what is right. It then needs to specify the 
relationship between these two concepts. A good can be any social value or condition, 
like honour, liberty, money, or opportunity, for example. The right specifies the dictates 
of distribution for the good, or goods, like equality, meritocracy, or the free market. One 
way to think about this distinction is to consider a football match. Goals are the goods 
that are distributed, and the right are the rules of the game that dictate how to distribute 
goals, namely by scoring them. Rawls begins his critique by pointing out that 
utilitarianism firstly defines the good, as pleasure, welfare, happiness, etc, and then 
defines the right or system of distribution, which is maximisation.18 In other words, in 
utilitarianism, after the good of pleasure (for example) is specified, then the right thing 
to do is to maximise it, by any means. Moreover, the goodness of an action or condition 
is determined without any reference to the right, or how it came to be. In this respect, 
utilitarianism is a consequentialist doctrine, in that the strategies that can be employed 
to maximise the good are limited only by the balance of pain and pleasure produced, not 
by anything inherent in the strategy. Consequently, utilitarianism cannot provide a 
pattern of distribution based on anything other than maximisation. Even if secondary
16 Diminishing marginal returns might demand some redistribution o f  wealth, and hence be an asymmetry, 
but here I am speaking o f  the distribution o f  security, which is difficult to conceive as diminishing within 
the range I am speaking of.
17 Rawls’ target is “utilitarianism generally”, but he mentions Bentham as one o f  its principle exponents. 
See John Rawls, A theory o f  Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 20, 26.
18 Rawls, A theory o f  Justice, p. 22.
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principles seem to deliver a particular pattern of distribution, like say equality, it could 
only do so contingently. If maximisation necessitated the marginalisation of a small 
minority of the population in order to serve the majority, then we would have no way of 
criticising it on utilitarian grounds. The interesting thing about all consequentialist 
doctrines is that it is very dependent on empirical facts and historical contingencies. As 
described above, Bentham is aware of the diminishing returns of marginal utility, and so 
endorses some forms of redistribution of wealth, in order to maximise happiness. But 
again, this strategy only holds for as long as the phenomenon of diminishing returns 
does, which it may not at all places, times and for certain types of utility.19
A second critique of utilitarianism stems from its consequentialist nature. 
However utility might be defined, i.e. as pleasure, preference-satisfaction, or welfare, its 
maximisation cannot be internally criticised. For example, if  we take utility as pleasure, 
as Bentham does, there are no grounds for criticising the sources of pleasure. One 
cannot argue on utilitarian grounds that one should take pleasure from books, opera, 
fine wine, and other higher pleasures, because to do so would be appealing to something 
other than pleasure to give them their superior designation.20 If one takes pleasure from 
less intellectual activities, or even irrational ones, then we must accept these sources, as 
we have no grounds with which to rank them, apart from the amount of pleasure they 
produce in each person. In fact, if  pleasure is maximised by the administration of some 
drug, or being plugged into Nozick’s “experience machine”, then that would be the right
9 1course of action. Even if the source of someone’s pleasure involves the expense of 
others, we must factor both the pleasure and pain into the overall calculus. There are no 
means by which to disallow them outright. For consequentialism, it is only the end state, 
or net utility that comprises the standards of evaluating the strategies of maximisation. 
Hedonistic utilitarianism is necessarily silent on the sources o f pleasure and pain.
The final, but related, critique is that “utilitarianism does not take seriously the
99distinction between persons” As described above, it is only the end state, or 
maximisation that is the only relevant criterion for judging the rightness o f some
19 Parekh says that despite happiness is related to money, it does not necessarily diminish in the same way. 
See Parekh, “Bentham’s Theory o f  Equality”, p. 492.
20 O f course, this is exactly what Mill does by claiming that higher pleasures are categorically superior. I 
will examine this claim later in the chapter to show that he does violate ethical hedonism in the process.
21 Nozick intends this as a critique o f  mental state utilitarianism. His intention is to show how if  
utilitarians seeks nothing more than to maximise pleasure, once technology could generate machines that 
enable us to experience anything we want for the rest o f  our lives. We could live out our days as a rock 
star, race car driver, or anything else one wanted. This scenario is supposed to be monstrously inhuman, 
like the premise o f  the Matrix films, however, it could only be so from third person perspective. From the 
perspective o f  the inhabitants, life would be very happy, because there would be no reason to question the 
authenticity o f  that reality.
22 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 24.
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strategy or legislative policy. This is analogous to how an individual distributes the 
pleasures and burdens of one’s own life. One may neglect certain sources of pleasures 
to pursue others, or endure burdens now to experience less later, but the goal for the 
individual is the same for the legislator: maximisation of utility. One cannot simply 
reflect upon the range of options at any given time, but must step back and take an 
external perspective on one’s life to consider future option-sets as well. Similarly, the 
legislator must remove himself from the particular biases he may have and become an 
“impartial spectator” sympathising with all in order to determine the strength of 
everyone’s desire to satisfy accordingly in order to maximise the utility of the entire 
polis. How the legislator distributes the means to achieving utility (again, however 
defined) can only be judged on how a particular distribution maximises utility. An equal 
distribution of the means to utility, i.e. rights, liberties, wealth, may be the strategy that 
maximises overall utility, but it may not be. If a different distribution of these means 
can provide a greater net balance, like concentrating wealth in the hands of an 
aristocracy, which produces an overall greater sum, then that is the right distribution. 
Because it is the net utility that is the concern, then there is no reason why increased 
utility of some cannot compensate for the disutility o f others. The impartial spectator 
must conflate every individual into a single person, and legislate as if  one would for 
oneself.
Despite these critiques of utilitarianism’s ability to generate and sustain 
principles compatible with liberalism, there is a section of the secondary literature
O'Xconcerned with a revisionary interpretation of Bentham’s thought. Although the 
principle of utility may demand the maximisation of utility, the best strategy for this, 
because of the nature of human social interaction, is a certain distribution of rights, 
namely, an equal one. This claim is still an empirical one, but one that is so rooted in the 
very nature o f humanity that it is considered a permanent feature. Ross Harrison 
describes the horror of a utilitarian transplant hospital snatching unsuspecting 
pedestrians as they pass by for their vital organs. Harrison says that the utility of the 
endless supply o f organs would need to be balanced against the “secondary mischief’ of 
alarm and danger.24 Alarm is the disutility that the public would experience upon 
hearing of such a practice. Danger is the actual risk pedestrians would be in when 
walking near the hospital. Harrison says, such practices on balance could not maximise
23 Ross Harrison, Bentham, (London: Routledge & Regan Paul pic, 1983); Paul Kelly, Utilitarianism and  
Distributive Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Frederick Rosen, Jeremy Bentham and 
Representative Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
24 Ross Harrison, Bentham, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul pic, 1983), p. 238.
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utility because of their inevitable secondary effects. Harrison must consider, however, 
that there might be ways to contain the alarm and danger in such a way as to make such 
strategies utilitarianly maximal. The hospital, for example, might limit their organ 
snatching to certain segments of the population, like some ethnic, religious, or racial 
minority. They could also place limitations on the numbers or timing of their snatching, 
thereby creating regular and predictable periods o f insecurity and security around the 
hospital. Harrison might be right that the brute fact of human nature precludes certain 
utilitarian strategies, but that doesn’t mean that a sufficiently contoured policy, perhaps 
one regulating the secondary effects, cannot produce more utility than liberal practices.
A variation of this liberal recasting of utilitarianism is made by Paul Kelly, who 
says that Bentham uses the ‘dissapointing preventing principle’ and the ‘security 
providing principle’ simultaneously as the expression of his substantive theory of 
justice. The ‘security providing principle’ is necessary for individuals to plan execute 
and revise their conception of the good life. It is necessary to have a stable system of 
expectations in order to maintain an “enduring conception o f the se lf’.26 Because it is 
impossible to know the particular strengths of everyone’s desires, and the corresponding 
level of satisfaction, the utilitarian legislator needs to allow the widest possible area for
each to pursue their goals. Kelly says this amounts to equal and inviolable spheres of
• • 01  non-interference, similar to Mill’s harm principle. The ‘security providing principle’
only specified the formal conditions of equal freedom, and Bentham also recognises that
in order to pursue one’s conception of the good life, material conditions would need to
be secured as well. Kelly argues that Bentham acknowledges that an equal distribution
of wealth satisfies those conditions, however the utilitarian legislator must first respect
* 0 8  the existing distribution of wealth. To move directly to a pattern of equal wealth
would prove a catastrophic shock to the political and economic fabric o f society. The
‘disappointing preventing principle’ limits the legislator as to what can be done to
reform governmental offices, and to redistribute wealth. It obliges him to compensate
individuals for their loss of office, status, or wealth, thereby maintaining the security
demanded by the first principle. Some examples of policies governed by this “gentle
equalisation” are compensating sacked employees holding redundant offices, placing
narrow constraints on bequeathments, and compensating slave-owners for the forced
emancipation of their property. The last example may not seem consistent with the
25 Paul Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 171.
26 Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice, p. 208.
27 Ibid., p 143.
28 Ibid., p 181.
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liberal flavour of Kelly’s reading, and even he concedes that this is where Bentham’s 
theory of justice is at its weakest. It is however consistent with Bentham’s main 
concern, namely to maintain security, and moreover to disregard the property rights of 
slave-owners prima facie, would require an appeal to a metaphysical theory o f human 
worth, beyond the calculus of pain and pleasure, which Bentham goes to great lengths 
to condemn. Nonetheless, Kelly’s rule-based version of utilitarianism attributed to 
Bentham is a laudable attempt at a defence of his liberal credentials.
The crux of Kelly’s defence turns on the claim that the principle of utility does
not demand a “global utility calculus” at every turn.30 Rather, the utilitarian legislator
promotes utility by means of indirect strategies, such as ones governed by the
11
aforementioned principles. The epistemological constraints and interpersonal 
comparisons required for direct strategies prove unfeasible, and possibly even self- 
defeating. The problem with this reasoning is that it presupposes that liberal practices 
always maximise utility wherever adopted. Proponents of this line argue that liberal 
policies are the only indirect way to maximise utility. They fail to consider other 
indirect strategies that might also indirectly maximise utility. Such indirect strategies 
might include semi- or even totally illiberal policies. It is conceivable that a legislator 
can maintain security and prevent disappointment, while still unequally distributing the 
material means and the opportunities to succeed in the world, however defined. For 
example, if a certain subgroup of the population [statistically] lacks an aptitude for a 
certain job, or are simply underrepresented in a certain profession for whatever reason, 
it might actually prevent disappointment by closing off the subgroup’s access to that 
profession altogether. Or if a certain crime is disproportionately committed by a certain 
subgroup of the population, the police might actually be providing security by denying 
their claim to equal civil liberties. As long as divisions of any kind exist amongst the 
population, the utilitarian legislator can always exploit people’s biases and prejudices to 
mitigate the disutility of such illiberal policies. These biases and prejudices are just as 
much facts of human nature as those that the proponents of this line of argument appeal 
to in order to justify the utilitarian grounding for their liberal principles. Such policies 
do not rely upon interpersonal comparisons or knowing the strength of individuals’ 
desires. They are as much indirect strategies that can maximise utility as their liberal
29 Ibid., p 213.
30 Ibid., p 133.
31 John Gray attributes an indirect utilitarianism to Mill in order to ground his Principle o f  Liberty. See 
John Gray, M ill on Liberty: A defence, London: Routledge, 1996), p. 22.
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counterparts. There is nothing inherent in humans (let alone Western European humans) 
to preclude such policies outright.
These liberal principles do play a part in the maximisation o f pleasure in 
Bentham’s system. Yet, at the same time his concern for security, and its over-arching 
primacy, make it difficult to sustain the liberal reading of Bentham’s political and moral 
thought. Furthermore, Bentham’s system entails high levels of social control. Like 
Comte, he creates a system that suppresses natural and social differences between 
individuals, albeit for totally different reasons. The striking fact of this similarity is that 
despite Mill’s efforts to distance himself from Comte and Bentham, he retains much of 
their thinking in his unique political morality.
A Return to Comte
Like Comte, Bentham is also one of Mill’s biggest influences, as he himself 
admits repeatedly. The irony of this truth is that it would be misleading to describe 
these influences as, broadly speaking, liberal, and yet elements of both thinkers 
underpin Mill’s seminal work on liberty. Both recognise the instrumental value of 
negative liberty, but subordinate it to other values, such as security in Bentham’s case, 
and social harmony in Comte’s. Both Comte and Bentham hold completely different 
visions of society, and yet there are some striking similarities that warrant our attention. 
In fact, as some have observed, turning to Comte was in some ways a return to the 
method of Bentham. This section examines the method of Comte and Bentham, and 
argues that both try to arrange society in such a way as to harmonise the interests of 
individuals as part of their larger visions o f society. The techniques range from subtle 
institutional arrangements to outright coercion, but both seek to draw upon their own 
conceptions of human nature to justify their conceptions of the just society. This fact 
then becomes particularly interesting when we consider that Mill seeks to 
institutionalise c//sharmony as a means of social progress in his own vision.
As Enlightenment thinkers, both Bentham and Comte maintain unshakable faith 
in science as the saving grace of mankind. Science is simultaneously the method o f their 
thought, and a good to be promoted like other ethical values. For Bentham, science is
32 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, in Collected Works I, John m. Robson and Jack Stillinger eds., 
(Toronto: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1981), pp. 173, 231. John Stuart Mill, “Auguste Comte and 
Positivism”, in C ollected Works X, John M. Robson ed. (Tomto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 
261-368.
33 Iris W essel Mueller, John Stuart Mill and French Thought, (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 1956), 
p. 98.
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the only source of knowledge; other sources only bring obscurity.34 His love of the 
natural sciences was the precondition of his scientific approach to jurisprudence, and 
eventually to politics. Comte, trained as a mathematician, considers science to be the 
driving force of civilisation throughout history. He identifies periods of stasis and 
progression that civilisation oscillates between as it gradually moves to the ultimate 
stage of history, the positivist Religion of Humanity. The Religion is Comte’s secular 
utopian vision, which employs all of the trappings o f a full-blown religion, but 
dispenses with the theological (and metaphysical) underpinnings, in favour of a 
rationalistic approach to social organisation. Bentham, the “modest utopian”, seeks 
merely to arrange institutions and laws in such a way as to negate the influence of 
individual personality on governance. Their aims are to generalise the scientific 
methodology beyond its narrow academic/research confines.
Bentham and Comte both attempt to turn politics into a science, albeit with 
opposite approaches. One of the three fundamental ideas of Comte’s positive 
philosophy identified in the previous chapter is the hierarchy of the sciences.37 Comte 
examines historically the positivisation of all the sciences to show how the more general 
sciences gradually give birth to the more specific ones. Astronomy, the most general of 
the sciences, becomes positive first, followed by physics, then chemistry, biology, and
•JO
finally the most complex of them all, the social sciences. Once the social sciences are 
fully positivised, they then became the theoretical foundation for their corresponding 
practice, politics. This top-down approach is to be contrasted with Bentham (and 
Mill’s) more inductive, bottom-up approach to the construction of a science o f man. 
Bentham’s attempts to reform law is an attempt to connect the duties and obligations of 
the law to the innate motivations that exist in all people.40 His entire system is 
inductively constructed upon his conception of human nature, whereas Comte’s is 
deductively reasoned from ever more general sciences.
The entirety of Bentham’s system turns on a simple observation regarding the 
motivational forces driving all humans, “Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.” These masters not only 
determine what it is each person will do, but also are the standards of judgement for
34 Shirley Letwin, The Pursuit o f  Certainty, (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1988), p. 197.
35 Long, Bentham on Liberty, p. 17.
36 Letwin, The Pursuit o f  Certainty, p. 199.
37 Chapter Three, p. 8.
38 Lewis A. Coser, M asters o f  Sociological Thought, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace and Company, 
1977), p. 9.
39Andrew W emick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), p. 27.
40 Long, Bentham on Liberty, p. 208.
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what is right and wrong, “It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well 
as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on 
the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.” Moreover, to 
cement the brute empiricism of this claim, Bentham claims that it can be verified 
endlessly because “every effort we can make to throw off our subjugation, will only 
serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.”41 This double role that pleasure and pain play, 
as both sources of motivation and criteria of right and wrong has been the source of 
much controversy. Put simply, how is it possible for the individual to promote the 
greatest pleasure for the greatest number concerned, when he can only act to promote 
his own pleasure? It is a tension between the ethical hedonism demanded by the 
Principle of Utility, and the psychological egoism of Bentham’s conception of human 
nature. The debate boils down to the extent to which the interests of the individual 
conflict, if  at all, with the interests o f the community.
David Lyons attempts to reconcile the two parts o f Bentham’s Principle of 
Utility by means of a strictly textual interpretation of An Introduction to the Principles 
o f Morals Legislation. Lyons employs a “dual standard” interpretation, where insofar as 
the individual is concerned, it is right that he promote and maximise his own pleasure 
(and this is in fact what he will do).42 The legislator, on the other hand, responsible for 
the welfare of the entire society, should maximise the interests o f all people concerned. 
This, however, begs the question how is it possible, if  the legislator is a person, for him 
to maximise the happiness of the entire community over his own? Lyons argues that 
there is no necessarily logical contradiction between the statements “that the general 
interest ought always to be maximised” and “that everyone always tries to maximise his 
own interests”. The two only conflict under certain factual premises, or “criterial 
properties”. Rather than being inconsistent, the two parts o f the principle of utility are 
“non-equivalent”, in that the criterial properties for one do not entail the criterial 
properties of the other, thereby rendering the extent to which they conflict or harmonise 
logically an “open question”.43
The question may be logically open, but in practice it’s quite obvious that the 
criterial properties of both parts of the principle are met quite regularly. The 
insufficiency of this interpretation becomes clear when we consider that in order for it to 
cohere, Lyons must attribute to Bentham the belief that the community’s and the
41 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation, p. 11.
42 David Lyons, In the Interest o f  the Governed, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1990), Chapters 3, 4.
43 Lyons, In the Interest o f  the Governed, p 40.
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individual’s interests naturally converge, at least in the long run, which he does.44 A 
more plausible reading is given by John Dinwiddy, who expands his textual analysis to 
include some of Bentham’s later writings, such as the Deontology. Dinwiddy also reads 
a type of dual role for the principle of utility, but one that entails only one standard -  the 
Principle of Utility, and does not presupposes a natural convergence of interests.45 From 
the standpoint of the individual, it is wrong to argue that a person must do that which 
they are not capable, namely, promoting the interests of the community at the expense 
of their own. From this perspective, the only judgement to be made is to what extent the 
pursuits that the individual makes will actually promote their own personal happiness. It 
is a judgement on the correctness of one’s stated interests. From the standpoint of 
society (or all persons to be considered), a person’s actions can be judged by the extent 
to which they actually promote the general happiness. Dinwiddy gets to the heart of the 
matter:
“In so far as his behaviour, judged from this point o f view, was in conflict with 
the dictates of utility, the principle implication for Bentham was not, one 
imagines, that the individual himself should be held personally responsible and 
culpable, but that the social arrangements and other factors that had conditioned 
his behaviour were at fault, and should as far as possible be adjusted so as to 
supply him with the proper motives.”46
The issue at stake is not what Bentham believes would naturally happen, but what his 
system is designed to do. I intend to show that he endeavours to arrange institutions so 
that the personal interests would converge with the general (which suggests that 
interests would not otherwise do). Even those who read the principle as a species of 
psychological hedomism, so as opposed to psychological egoism, like Lyons, 
nonetheless acknowledge a “significant tendency towards egoism in his thought.”47 It is 
this attempt to mould the individual’s interests in such a way as to harmonise with the 
interests o f the larger group that Bentham shares with Comte, as will be discussed 
below. First, we must examine how Comte conceives of the fundamental drives that 
motivate human action.
Like Bentham, Comte seeks to catalogue an exhaustive list o f the fundamental 
drives of all human action, or the “affective motors” as he calls them. Bentham, in his
44 Ibid., 54. Lyons later says that the belief in the convergence o f  interest was common belief amongst 
moral and political writers o f  Bentham’s time. See p. 55.
45 John Dinwiddy, Selected Writings, William Twining ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 
150.
46 Dinwiddy, Selected Writings, p. 150.
47 Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice, p. 27.
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“A Table of the Springs of Action”, identifies different motives, but clarifies that they 
are all fundamentally and irreducibly manifestations of either pain or pleasure.48 Comte, 
on the other hand, identifies ten affective motors that he classifies as ranging from 
egoistic to altruistic. In ascending order of altruism from purely egoistic, the motors are 
self-preservative, sexual, maternal, destructive (or militant), and constructive (or 
industrial). Next are the two ambitious motors, ones that are egoistic, but require the 
others for gratification; they are pride (or the desire power), and vanity (or the desire for 
approbation). Finally, are the three altruistic motors: attachment, veneration, and 
benevolence, or universal love 49
Both Comte and Bentham attempt to create a science of human behaviour, and 
identifying the generic motivational forces is the first step in such a science. The goal of 
Bentham and Comte are the same, in that they aim to create a harmonious society 
whereby science would liberate individuals from the selfish and sinister influences on 
individual behaviour. In a bid to rid society of selfish and antisocial tendencies, they 
both turn to techniques of control and influence to harmonise individuals’ lives, albeit in 
different ways.
The egoistic and altruistic motives in individuals are ever-present. Therefore, the 
basis of Comte’s ethic is the encouragement of the altruistic drives, and the suppression 
of the egoistic ones.50 Individuals could be trained to behave ethically, and the full 
systemisation of his Religion of Humanity is designed to do just that. From birth, the 
child is to be inculcated into expressing love for the family, the first community of 
concern. Love for the siblings developed a sense o f solidarity, while love for the parents 
instils a concern for the future.51 At the age of 14, the child leaves home in order to 
begin its positive education at the hands of the scientist-priests (of whom Comte was the 
High Priest). Every aspect of daily life is designed to reinforce the positivistic 
sentiments. Even prayer is designed to be an invocative outpouring of pure love and 
devotion concentrated on a specific symbol, a woman of one’s choosing, in order to
9^ • * •make the expression of such emotions habitual. Moreover, any such distinction 
between public and private life is rendered obsolete, as individuals are to live openly 
thereby allowing fellow citizens to act as the guarantors of morality.53 The totality of the
48 Jeremy Bentham, “A Table o f  Springs o f  Action”, in The Works o f  Jeremy Bentham Volume I, J. 
Bowring ed., (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 205.
49 T.R. Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 31.
50 Andrew Wemick, Auguste Comte and the Religion o f  Humanity, (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), pp. 31, 60.
51 Wright, The Religion o f  Humanity, p. 31.
52 Ibid., p 35.
53 Ibid., p 30.
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systemisation of Comte’s Religion of Humanity is, in part, an expression of his faith in 
the strength of education and indoctrination. Rather than create a system of formal and 
political equality, whereby the egoistic desires and competitiveness might naturally 
wither away, such as in Marx’s vision, Comte’s Religion is the institutionalisation of a 
rigid hierarchy. For sure, the scientist-priests maintained exclusive coercive powers over 
the citizenry, but to exercise it would tacitly be an admission of the weakness of the 
system. It is totally dependant on the individual’s love for the Great Being, Humanity, 
to restrain the egoistic impulses. Everyone from the Highest Priest, Comte, to the lowest 
proletariat is to revel in his toil, accepting the meagre rewards as paling in comparison 
to the selfless devotion to the species. Comte and Mill are correct in recognising the 
extent to which education and religion can shape character, but there is an air of naivety 
to Comte’s system relying solely on a continual and unfailing altruism to propagate its 
entire existence.
Bentham, on the other hand, maintains no such faith in individuals restraining 
their own desires for the greater good of society. On the contrary, he holds that 
behaviour could be shaped by direct and indirect means so that the desires that would 
benefit society become the egoistic desires. Bentham maps the sources of intentional 
activity in his Table of Springs of Action, but these springs, being nothing more than 
manifestations of the desire for pleasure and avoidance of pain, could be elicited from 
external stimuli.54 These external sources, or sanction, that trigger the springs are 
classified as either physical, political, moral, or religious.55 The physical sanction refers 
to the natural world that exerts its own behaviour-shaping influence on individuals, 
independent o f any human agency. These include effects like, boiling water burning us, 
a beautiful sunset pleasing us, or hungry bears eating us. They are the mundane pains 
and pleasures o f certain actions that reinforce certain behaviours within our 
surroundings. The political sanctions are the pains and pleasures individuals experience 
resulting from the law. These sanctions are created by legislators and controlled by the 
courts, and the most direct means the government has to influencing behaviour. The 
moral, or public sanction, is exercised by society in general and expresses their value 
system(s) or moral outlooks. Even though it is not under direct control of the 
government, the moral sanction could still be massaged in order to exert an indirect 
control over the citizenry. Finally, there is the religious sanction which has the unique
54 Bentham, “A Table o f  Springs o f  Action”, p. 205.
55 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation, p. 34. There is a fifth sanction o f  
sympathy, but only discussed in Jeremy Bentham, “Deontology”, in D eon to logy; together with A table o f  
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ability to offer rewards and punishments in the after-life, as well as in the here and now. 
This sanction can also be manipulated in indirect ways, like legislative sanctioning, or 
funding, to exert a form of control over individuals.56 These sanctions are the means to 
controlling behaviour in any organised society, and Bentham employs all four in order 
to minimise the conflict between different interests in society. Comte employs only the 
religious sanction (or at least subordinates the other two social sanctions to it) to force 
individuals to behave in certain ways, which may be contrary to their own economic 
and political interests. The religiosity of his system enables him to claim that the 
interests o f Humanity’s simply are the individual’s interests, and so no such disharmony 
exists. Bentham, on the other hand, uses a more subtle application o f the sanctions, 
which alleviates the need to appeal to anything other than individuals’ interests. To see 
how Bentham arranges institutions, and bends circumstances to enable a convergence of 
interests, it will be helpful to look at his best known example of social control, the 
Panopticon.
The panopticon is Bentham’s infamous design for a prison that is ingenious for 
its creation of power relations by mere architecture.57 It consists of a circular 
arrangement of prison cells stacked several levels high, with a guard’s tower in the 
centre. The observation room at the top of the tower is enclosed behind Venetian blinds 
making it impossible for the inmates of the cells to know if the guard is inside or not. 
The inmates, uncertain as to whether they are being observed or not, are forced to police 
their own behaviour, lest they be witnessed misbehaving. Part of the novelty of the 
panopticon is its efficiency; only one guard is required to manage a large number of 
prisoners, and his presence is not even required all o f the time. The real ingenuity of the 
design, however, is the way it subtly exerts total control over the inmates. As Foucault 
explains,
“it makes it possible to perfect the exercise o f power. It does this in several 
ways: because it can reduce the number of those who exercise it, while 
increasing the number of those whom it is exercised. Because it is possible to 
intervene at any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before the 
offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed. Because, in these conditions, 
its strength is that it never intervenes, it is exercised spontaneously and without 
noise, it constitutes a mechanism whose effects follow from one another.
56 Charles F. Bahmueller, The National Charity Company, (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 
1981), p. 204.
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Because, without any physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, 
it acts directly on individuals; it gives ‘power of minds over minds’.”58
The panopticon was not merely a plan for a prison system, as Bentham spent several 
years trying to sell the design as a work-house (or, in-house relief) alternative to the 
welfare system of the time.59 The possible applications of the panopticon are manifold. 
Any practice that involves the creation, correction, or regulation of behaviour, be it 
penal, medical, pedagogical, or even productive could be institutionalised in the 
panoptic design. The panopticon is an ingenious, horrifying device in the totality and 
subtly of its control. How is one to reconcile the implications of its design with 
Bentham’s principle aim of promoting happiness? Is the panopticon a model solution to 
the problems of governance, as Halevy and Himmelfarb suggest, or is it merely one of 
several digressions from the main thread of his thought, as Harrison argues?60
The extent to which the panopticon serves as a model for Bentham’s ideal 
society is a difficult question that would require extensive research into published and 
unpublished manuscripts in order to fully ascertain, and is beyond the scope of this 
project. Bahmueller is correct therefore in stopping just short of attributing the 
panopticon this status, as the embodiment of his philosophy.61 What is certain is that the 
panopticon is very representative of the way Bentham thinks about governance. The 
inmate of a conventional prison has the short term interest in immediate gratification, be 
it by participating in some forbidden activity, or the enjoyment of contraband. He 
simultaneously has the long-term interest in good behaviour, which will be conducive to 
being in good favour with the Warden, or even a curtailed sentence. This second interest 
is considerably weaker than the first, as it is only applicable while under surveillance. 
Not only can one receive credit for the good behaviour only when it is noted or recorded, 
but in the absence of surveillance, the first interest in flouting the rules of the prison 
becomes pressing, as the fulfilment of the desires becomes possible. The panopticon 
renders the first interest null as it is dependant on a degree o f privacy which cannot be 
secured while in one of the cells. Furthermore, the fact that the guard might be watching 
the prisoner -  with the prisoner never certain -  the second interest becomes the one of 
primary concern. Having always to police his own behaviour, the prisoner is forced to 
internalise the prison guard. With no possible opportunity of indulging in the taboo
58 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Alan Sheridan trans., (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 206.
59 See Charles F. Bahmueller, The National Charity Company, (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 
1981). And, Janet Semple, Bentham’s Prison, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
60 Semple, Bentham ’s Prison , pp. 3, 7.
61 Bahmeuller, The National Charity Company, p. 211.
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behaviour, and forever correcting one’s actions, the prisoner reforms himself. It is 
neither by force nor extensive conditioning that the prisoner changes his behaviour, it is 
by simple architecture. Analogously, the Benthamite social engineer need not resort to 
coercion in order to get individuals to behave in mutually beneficial ways; institutions 
can be arranged so that individuals do so o f their own accord.
A similar logic can be found in Bentham’s defence of the sovereignty o f the 
people as embodied in representative democracy. The sovereign monarch has the power 
to maximise his own interests on a scale unrivalled by anyone else in society. On its 
face, this may not seem like a problem, provided the monarch recognises that his own 
interests are in fact completely harmonious with those of everyone concerned in the 
long run (as Lyons argues Bentham holds). However, if the interests diverge, due to 
sinister influence, or simple akrasia on the monarch’s part, then the potential for real 
exploitation is very high. A democratically elected legislator on the other hand, while in 
a similar position to the monarch with respect to the power to unfairly maximise his 
own utility, would be institutionally restrained from doing so. For even though he may 
have a seemingly primary interest in maximising his own utility, even at the expense of  
others, his longer term interest in securing enough votes for re-election gives him the 
“moral aptitude” to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers.62 Like the 
panopticon, we see how institutional arrangements render the purely egoistic interests 
null, thereby enabling a longer term interest to ascend to the primary consideration.
Examples abound of this sort of institutional tinkering. The National Charity 
Company, Bentham’s scheme for in-house relief (which also relied on the panoptic 
design), tied the salary of wardens to the overall profitability of the workhouses. 
Wardens could no longer allow their workhouses to be the neglected dens of  
wretchedness that Bentham found them to be. Another example of manipulating 
interests is the procedure for appointing positions in the civil service. Rather than 
simply choosing the most qualified candidates, a group of qualified candidates are asked 
to bid deductions in their annual salary. The candidate who is willing to take the lowest 
salary for the position is appointed.64 Every candidate of course has an interest in a 
generous salary, but the entire polis has an interest in fiscal austerity. Bentham, 
expecting no one to act out of love for humanity, or even a mild altruism, manipulates
62 Frederick Rosen, Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democray, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 
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people’s options such that acting upon their own egoistic desires simultaneously 
promotes the happiness of the community.
These institutional arrangements are illustrative o f Bentham’s attempt to tie long 
term interests to shorter term ones, or render them void. It can be argued that everyone 
in society do actually share the same long term interests, and in this sense Lyons might 
be correct in attributing this belief to Bentham. Everyone shares an interest prisoners 
behaving well, legislators legislating impartially, and the state maintaining sufficient 
coffers (e.g. by having self-sufficient, or even profitable workhouses, or by not paying 
its civil servants too much). In fact, these long term interests that everyone posses might 
even be described as duties. Hence Bentham coins the duty-interest junction principle.65
“No means to be omitted that can contribute to strengthen the junction between 
interest and duty, in the instance of the person entrusted with the management: - 
i.e. to make it each man’s interest to observe on every occasion that conduct 
which it is his duty to observe”66
Duties are nothing more than long-term interests that all people share. A duty would not 
be levied on someone unless it contributed to the overall net utility of society, and so to 
neglect it would be in violation of the normative aspect of the principle of utility. The 
problem, with regards to the dual standard reading, is that the long term, shared interests 
- duties, can lose their efficacy when compared (or sometimes contrasted) with more 
immediate interests. Evidently recognising this, Bentham arranges institutions so that 
the any competition between competing interests is neutralised by either rendering an 
egoistic interest un-fulfilable, or by harmonising the interests. The individual then fulfils 
the empirical aspect of the principle of utility, its psychological egoism.
Whereas Bentham relies on institutional arrangements and direct and indirect 
pieces of legislation to mould people’s behaviour, Comte relies entirely on the adoption 
of his Religion of Humanity. The strict pedagogical regiment beginning in the home is 
the start of a life-long practice of ritualistic worship designed to suppress the egoistic 
tendencies in the mind and nurture the altruism. This altruism finds its fullest expression 
in the devotion one has to the species. Comte’s system employs education, law, public 
opinion, and, of course, religious sentiments in order to shape individuals to fit the 
needs of the species. Their projects are entirely different -  Bentham’s being one of
65 Jeremy Bentham, “Pauper Management Improved”, in The Works o f  Jeremy Bentham Volume VIII, J. 
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social and political reform, Comtes’ one of utopian revolution, but where they share 
common ground is in their efforts to move beyond mere coercion in order to shape 
behaviour. They both turn to science in order to understand human motivation, in an 
attempt to regulate it. Science would reveal the truth about human behaviour, and in a
fnsense, liberate it.
A Progressive Utilitarianism
As should be clear by now, Bentham, like Comte, though valuing liberty to a 
certain extent, does so only instrumentally, as high levels o f implicit social control are 
to be at work simultaneously. Therefore, it would be a stretch to label Bentham ‘liberal’, 
and out-right misleading to label Comte as such. This peculiar fact begs the question 
how is it that despite these acknowledged influences on Mill’s thinking, he crafts a 
political morality that places liberty at its heart. However, as will be discussed shortly, it 
remains unclear what species of liberalism Mill belongs to, if  at all. For despite the 
seemingly unambiguous simplicity of the harm principle, I will argue that Mill’s system 
retains substantial levels of social control and influence, albeit in a very different 
manner than Bentham and Comte. Before moving on to examine the recognisably 
liberal influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt, it is important to explore some key 
elements o f Mill’s movement away from Bentham. As with Comte, Mill acknowledges 
his debts to Bentham, but does not fully articulate the commonalities of their thinking, 
and the extent of the differences. This section addresses some of these omissions by 
looking at three key areas of their thought. Firstly, I will describe how Mill opposes 
Bentham’s attempts to tie duty to interest, based on his progressive conception of 
utilitarianism. Secondly, I will discuss how Mill expands Bentham’s conception of 
pleasure, as a key departure from his version of utilitarianism. His expansion is 
sometimes thought to be a violation of hedonism, and I will explain how on the standard 
reading of Mill it is. I will then explain how a progressive interpretation of Mill enables 
him to retain more -  but not complete -internal consistency. Finally, I will make a more 
general comment on the distinction between consequentialist and deontological 
arguments, and how this distinction can be blurred. This point is important because by 
remaining within the utilitarian framework, Mill is limited to the nature of his claims.
For Bentham, the convergence of interests between the legislator and the 
majority provides a handy justification for popular sovereignty, based on the principle 
of utility. Universal suffrage would ensure that every minority interest has, at the least,
67 Both thinkers would object to characterising the effect o f  science this way.
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access to the legislator’s consideration. Moreover, application of the duty-interest 
junction principle wherever possible would ensure that egoistic, or rather individualistic 
interests would never diverge from those of society. For Bentham, these were ingenious 
solutions to ubiquitous problems plaguing the monarchies o f the ancien regime. 
However, for Mill, Bentham was not so much replacing a bad form of government with 
a good, so much as with another bad form of government. The prospect of a majority of 
people wielding unrivalled political power threatened the entire progress o f civilisation.
“Where there is identity of position and pursuits, there also will be identity of 
partialities, passions and prejudices; and to give to any one set of partialities, 
passions and prejudices, absolute power, without counter-balance from 
partialities, passions and prejudices o f a different sort, is the way to render the 
correction of any o f those imperfections hopeless; to make one narrow, mean 
type of human nature universal and perpetual, and to crush every influence 
which tends to further improvement of man’s intellectual and moral nature.”68
Mill is a democrat, but he is also acutely aware of the despotic power of public 
opinion.69 Not only is Mill keen to protect the welfare of minorities, but he is also 
protecting the enlightening influence of social elites. Majoritarian rule is not just in 
itself, it is “less unjust” than the aristocratic and monarchical alternatives. The majority 
could wield its power legitimately, provided “its exertion is tempered by respect for the 
personality of the individual, and deference to the superiority of cultivated 
intelligence.”70
Mill’s solution to the potential tyranny of the majority is the institutionalisation
71of an official opposition. Bentham finds representative democracy to be the only way 
to maximise the welfare of the greatest numbers, while Mill finds it potentially 
tyrannical. The majority would always be beholden to one interest or set of interests, 
and would marginalise the rest. Only sufficiently diverse, competing interests could 
counter-balance the domination of the majority interest. For Bentham, the arrangement 
of harmony of interest is the prudential way to get individuals to behave in ways that are 
mutually beneficial. Mill fears that the total victory of one idea over another ends 
deliberation on a matter, which tends society towards “Chinese stationariness”. For Mill,
68 John Stuart Mill, “Bentham”, in C ollected Works X, John M. Robson ed., (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 107.
69 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, in Collected Works XVIII, John M. Robson ed., (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 220.
70 Mill, “Bentham”, p. 108.
71 Ibid., p. 108.
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progress can only be ensured by the guaranteeing a sufficient level of disharmony in 
moral and political matters.
A fuller articulation of Mill’s thinking on the conditions of social progress are 
given in Chapter II of On Liberty. In Mill’s second argument for the freedom of thought 
and discussion, he stresses the importance of our deepest and firmest held truths 
constantly being vigorously debated to maintain them as “living truths”, instead of 
degenerating into “dead dogma”.72 Only by periodically engaging with attacks on these 
truths can we cement our understanding as to their groundings. So important is this 
threat to our understanding that in the absence of such challenges, society is obliged to 
create them. This argument is one more example of Mill’s particular philosophy of 
history that holds social diversity to be a key condition of human progress. Even if such 
diversity does not occur ‘naturally’, it must be maintained by society. Mill’s fear is that 
the growing conformity and social homogenisation he perceives in his time will lead to 
“Chinese stationariness” and an end to progress altogether.
Bentham maintains no such philosophy of history. Human nature is fixed, and 
society should be organised to tap into and guide the basic motivations of human action. 
For Bentham, this entails harmonising the interests o f as many people as possible, in 
order to make their fulfilment as mutually beneficial as possible. This strategy is 
dictated by the descriptive and normative elements of the Principle of Utility. It is not, 
however, the only interpretation. Mill takes a more developmental approach to 
maximising utility. Rather than gratify individuals’ given desires, society should instil 
an ethic of self-improvement, whereby qualitatively better desires will yield more utility 
when fulfilled. This interpretation, coupled with Mill’s philosophy of history makes the 
idea of progress pivotal in his theory. The most important element is to maintain the 
conditions of human progress and improvement, which as we will see in Chapter Six, is 
embodied by the principle articulated in On Liberty. This strategy of maximisation is 
universally recognised as a departure from the classical Benthamite version of 
utilitarianism, however there is less consensus as to whether this expansion constitutes a 
violation of the Principle of Utility.
Another major departure from Bentham is Mill’s taxonomy of pleasure. 
Bentham is not merely pontificating on the experiential properties of pleasure, he is 
quantifying the dimensions of pleasure so as to weigh them. Pleasure and pain vary in 
intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity (or remoteness), fecundity (or the possibility
72 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 243.
73 Ibid., pp. 245, 251.
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of leading to more pleasure/pain), purity (or the extent to which pain/pleasure is mixed 
with its opposite), and the extent that other people share in the sensation.74 The source 
of the pleasure is irrelevant to its value, unless of course it is derived from an offence 
against another person. While claiming to adhere to the Principle o f Utility all o f his life, 
Mill nonetheless radically departs from Bentham’s felicifc calculus. For Mill, “It would 
be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.”75 
Pleasure is not merely a question of its sensual properties; pleasures also differ in kind. 
Mill states unequivocally that it is totally consistent with the principle of utility that 
some pleasures be more desirable than others, apart from being of greater quantity.76 
The higher pleasures are ones that excite the higher faculties of human beings, as 
opposed to the more sensual, or animal-like ones. The higher pleasures do not merely 
yield more pleasure, they produce pleasure of a categorically higher kind. In fact, so 
superior are the higher pleasures that no amount o f the lower would ever be preferable 
to any amount of the higher. How to identify a pleasure is by comparison:
“Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience 
of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation 
to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who 
are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they 
prefer it, even knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and 
would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is 
capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority 
in quality so far outweighing quantity a to render it, in comparison, in small 
amount.”77
On its face, this seems not only a departure from the classical Benthamite calculus o f 
pleasure, but from ethical hedonism altogether. If no amount of the lower pleasure can 
outweigh a given amount of the higher pleasure, then what is it other than pleasure that 
confers its higher status? It would appear this question cannot be answered without 
importing values from outside of hedonism. Mill appeals to “higher” faculties to justify 
the superior quality o f the higher pleasures, however the Principle o f Utility cannot 
allow for the excitement of these faculties alone -  pleasure aside - to be valuable in 
themselves. Bentham makes no normative claims about the desirability o f pleasure, 
beyond what his felicific calculus demands. He does maintain a degree o f flexibility, or
74 Bentham, Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation, p. 39.
75 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in C ollected Works X, John M. Robson ed. (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 211.
76 Ibid., p. 212.
77 Ibid., p. 211.
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imprecision, when he defines utility as “that property in any object, whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness”, but he nonetheless maintains 
that pleasures can be estimated and ranked cardinally.78 Mill is unsatisfied with this 
narrow picture of human psychology, and so seeks to expand it - but at what price?
Mill’s expansion of pleasure to include hierarchical distinctions has been met 
with general approval in much o f the secondary literature. 79 There is nothing 
inconsistent with hedonism to posit a class (or classes) of pleasures to be categorically 
higher than others. The pleasures yielded by these higher activities are superior -  by 
which I mean productive of more utility - because of some specific feature inherent to 
them, like exercising certain capacities of the brain. However, where Mill does appear 
to violate hedonism, and subsequently the Principle of Utility, is with his insistence that 
the superior nature o f the higher pleasures is such that it would not be resigned for any 
amount of the lower pleasure. Mill is not saying that the higher pleasures are such 
merely with respect to magnitude, because then at some point a very large amount of 
lower pleasure would eventually be preferable to some amount of the higher; rather, he 
is saying that there is something that renders them infinitely superior.
Roger Crisp defends Mill’s hedonistic credentials by describing the higher/lower 
distinction as yet another property of pleasure, like its duration, intensity, etc.80 As 
pleasure of 8 minutes is preferable to one of 3 minutes, so too is a mental pleasure 
preferable to bodily one. It is still only pleasure that we are describing, and so safely 
within the confines of hedonism. The nature (whether it is higher or lower) of a pleasure 
may be yet another dimension of it, but Crisp does not account for its uniquely 
mcommensurating effect. Whereas the duration of a pleasure may compensate for its 
lack of intensity, nothing can compensate for it being lower. The nature o f the pleasure 
sets it apart in a way that its other properties do not, and it is unclear how hedonism can 
accommodate this transformative dimension. Similarly, John Plamenatz analogises with
o | t
colour. If colour is the only good, and a person were to then rank the colours m order 
of beauty, he would not be importing any new value to do so. To rank colours is not to 
admit any other good, apart from colour because that is the only manner in which they 
vary. Similarly, to rank pleasure is to do so only with respect to pleasure and nothing
78 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and Legislation, p. 39.
79 John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), p. 137. John Skorupski, 
John Stuart Mill, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 304. Roger Crisp, M ill on Utilitarianism, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p 34. Jonathan Riley, “Is Qualitative Hedonism Incoherent?”, Utilitas, Vol 11, N o 3, 
1999.
80 Crisp, M ill on Utilitarianism, p. 34.
81 Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians, p. 137.
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else. However, it is one thing to rank colours, or pleasures, with respect to their 
desirability, it is another to declare that some colours are inherently and categorically 
superior. Whereas the former is an expression of the person’s subjective preference, the 
latter is a normative claim regarding what every rational person’s ranking should be, 
and therefore must be justified with reference to some criterion - duration, intensity, etc 
aside. Remember, Mill’s claim is that no amount of the lower can ever rival the higher, 
i.e. no incremental increases can be made to make the lower pleasure more attractive. 
Whereas colour can gradually shift from one to another, and pleasure can shift from one 
length to another, the nature of a pleasure cannot, according to Mill. The analogies that 
these writers use fail to capture the radical incommensurability of his qualitative 
hedonism.
Mill’s problematic revision of hedonism is not limited to his taxonomy of 
pleasure. Generalising from this distinction, and its supposed psychological 
underpinnings, Mill famously asserts that “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied 
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” In other 
words, a life with the capacity to enjoy the higher pleasures, but not have them 
exercised, is still superior to a life of solely lower pleasures. (Of course, a life of 
developed capacities and their exercise is best.) Even if  we grant that the higher 
pleasures yield not only more, but also categorically superior pleasure, I still do not see 
how we can admit that a life of frustration and dissatisfaction can be preferable to a life 
of simple contentment, sensual gratification, or even ignorant bliss, without fatally 
violating hedonism. It may be true that “Few human creatures would consent to be 
changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of the 
beast’s pleasures”, but that is because of a fallacy of counterfactual reasoning. Humans 
know what is like to be a human, and even might think to know what it is like to live the 
life of an animal, and may therefore judge the life of a human to be superior. What 
humans don’t know, and in fact cannot know, is what it is like not to be a human. 
Humans can observe the lives o f animals and come to reasoned judgements about the 
relative welfare of the animal life, but they do so from a human perspective. Humans 
cannot know what it is actually like to live as an animal without reasoning, thinking, 
abstracting, etc, and then compare that to their own condition. Humans can imagine 
what it might be like, but can never know for sure. For that matter, intelligent humans 
cannot know what it is like to be a fool, or persons of feeling and conscience to be 
selfish and base. Such argumentation cannot be used to justify the hierarchical
82 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 212.
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distinctions between existences. If it can be shown that the animal experiences relatively 
more pleasure than humans, then ethical hedonism must deem it to be superior.
This conclusion, however, is not the end of the story for Mill and hedonism. My 
intention in the above paragraph was only to show that Mill makes a crucial departure 
from Benthamism, and from ethical hedonism as it has typically been formulated. What 
I now must show is how Mill maintains internal consistency by adding a progressive 
dimension to his hedonism (more or less). I still maintain that the incommensurability 
aspect o f Mill’s qualitative hedonism is untenable, but I now want to show how this 
progressive dimension enables Mill to avoid some of the illiberal implications that 
utilitarianism holds for Bentham, and for utilitarianism in general. In particular, I will 
show how Mill can maintain his self-regarding sphere, and its equal distribution, and
• O '!
what Don Habibi call’s Mill’s Growth Ethic. I will then conclude this section and the 
chapter by a more general point about progressive consequentialist theories.
The key to Mill’s Religion of Humanity, or the system that entails his utilitarian 
and liberal thought is its progressivism. Mill is not merely concerned with the present 
social and political situation, like Bentham, he is more concerned with institutionalising 
the conditions to facilitate the advance of human civilisation. Mill can therefore make 
utility trade-offs that Bentham cannot make. For example, as argued above, the trade-off 
between security and equality falls clearly on the side of security. For him the 
immediate utility loss of insecurity o f property rights outweighs the potential long-term 
gains from less socio-economic disparity. In other words, the propinquity and certainty 
of pleasures to be had from redistribution on balance render it legislatively inexpedient. 
It is not that Bentham is totally unconcerned with the future, it is that as a legal reformer, 
he is obliged to limit the extent of his longitudinal thinking. Mill, on the other hand, at 
the outset o f On Liberty states that the utilitarianism upon which he bases all ethical
o4
questions is “grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.” He 
can therefore attach more weight to the utility gains o f future generations with more 
internal consistency.
Sir Isaiah Berlin in his seminal lecture on Mill fails to note this progressive 
dimension. Arguing that Mill fails to protect the freedom of thought and discussion by 
grounding it on a prior principle of utility, he charges:
83 Don Habibi, John Stuart M ill and the Ethic o f  Human Growth, (Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001).
84 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 224.
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“Again, it may well be that without full freedom of discussion the truth cannot 
emerge. But this may be only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of its 
discovery; the truth may, for all our efforts, remain at the bottom of a well, and in
Of
the meantime the worse cause may win, and do enormous damage to mankind.”
Berlin here is expressing a legitimate concern. Hate speech or the propagation of 
erroneous or dangerous thought may certainly do great harm to society. However, in 
order to fully discredit such thought, pernicious ideas must be confronted and 
challenged, repeatedly. For one of the measures of human progress Mill mentions is the 
“consolidation of opinion”:
“As Mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or 
doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being o f Mankind may 
almost be measured by the number and gravity o f the truths which have reached 
the point of being uncontested.”87
Incontestability may be an asymptotic limit never attained, but forever approached. 
Chapter II o f On Liberty clearly obliges people to find a devil’s advocate to construct
oo
the strongest counter arguments possible. Mill can claim that in order for progress to 
be sustained thereby enjoying maximal utility in the future, society must endure the 
potential harm of free (but, non-inciteful) speech. In other words, the propinquity of [the 
utility of] expanded knowledge may be low, but its certainty is high.
More generally, the Principle o f Utility has come under criticism that finds its 
fullest expression in C.L Ten.89 Expanding on Berlin’s critique, Ten says that the 
Principle of Liberty cannot be grounded on a prior Principle of Utility. Whether one 
interprets Mill to be employing a hedonistic form of utilitarianism (which I do), or a 
preference-satisfaction based form, the Principle of Liberty cannot sustained without 
substantial utility costs.90 There will always be people for whom the maximisation of 
utility would require the interference with other people’s supposed self-regarding 
activities. Mill gives the examples of Muslims or Sabbatarians. He concedes that they 
would feel great offence at the sight o f someone eating pork, or celebrating on a Sunday, 
but that we would nonetheless not be justified in prohibiting these activities. Mill claims
85 Isaiah Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends o f  Life” in J. S. M ill on Liberty in Focus, John Gray and 
G. W. Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 144.
86 Mill does not discuss the possibility o f  speech being harmful, but this topic will be covered in Chapter 
Six o f  the thesis.
87 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 250.
88 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 245.
89 C.L. Ten, “M ill’s Defence o f  Liberty”, in John Stuart M ill on Liberty in Focus, John Gray, and G.W. 
Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996); Also Gray, M ill on Liberty: A Defence, Postscript.
90 Ten, “M ill’s Defence o f  Liberty”, p. 214.
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that these are questions of taste and therefore self-regarding, and so the Principle, of 
Liberty actually protects these activities. However, Ten argues that there is no good 
utilitarian reason for excluding the consideration of such people when calculating the 
utility of interference. The “offence” they experience may actually constitute harm, and 
so would require the prohibition of consuming pork and Sunday celebrations. There are 
no good reasons to disregard these “morally dependant harms”.91 To take everyone’s 
preferences into account, or even their conceptions of happiness, may require the 
protection of religious or cultural sensitivities, and the interference of other people’s 
supposed sinful activities.
I agree with Ten that to maintain equally distributed self-regarding spheres 
would require some immediate utility costs, unless we acknowledge the progressive 
perspective that I am interpreting in Mill. With this perspective, we can see how Mill 
thinks the long term utility pay-offs justify the short term utility costs of enduring such 
offences. Like I said, the propinquity may be high, but so too is the certainty that an 
equal distribution of self-regarding spheres is the necessary condition to facilitate the 
moral regeneration described in Chapter Three. For although Mill attaches great weight 
to cultural and intellectual elites, their role is primarily instructive. Even though the 
ability to appreciate the higher pleasures requires cultivation, it is generic. As will be 
described in Chapter Six, the condition of negative liberty is required in order for 
individuals to develop these capacities, because of a particular conception of human 
psychology Mill holds. For now, my point is merely that to consider man as a 
“progressive being” enables him to justify immediate utility costs of maintaining these 
conditions.
The progressivist reading of Mill also makes it understandable why he claims 
that the life of a Socrates dissatisfied is preferable to that of the contented pig. I 
maintain that on the more static reading of Mill, such a claim is incompatible with 
hedonism. Regardless of how pleasure is cached out, or even which version of 
hedonism is in question, I do not see how any life of dissatisfaction can be preferable to 
a life of contentment, without importing some foreign value criterion. The life of 
Socrates might be more noble, beautiful, or Romantic, but these are values external to 
hedonism. However, with the progressive interpretation, we are not merely concerned 
with the temporal locality. To consider the future of these lives, we must realise that 
there is always the possibility that frustrated Socrates may attain the happiness that his
91 Ted Honderich tries to do just that. See Ted Honderich, “On Liberty and morality dependant harms”, 
Political Studies, No. 30, 1982.
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elevated capacities are capable of, thereby experiencing categorically higher, and more 
pleasures. As long as the possibility exists to develop the capacities to enjoy the higher 
pleasures, then it is a preferable state of affairs when compared to the life with no such 
possibility. Dissatisfied Socrates not only has the capacities developed and so may one 
day be able to enjoy the higher pleasures, he may also be instrumental to helping others 
develop their capacities to appreciate the higher pleasures. On this view then, we can 
understand how Socrates’ life might be superior to that o f the pig; Socrates’ 
dissatisfaction may only be temporary, whereas the pig’s lowly pleasures are permanent.
The Achilles heel of this progressive project is its epistemological grounding. 
Despite Mill’s commitment to the ubiquitous fallibility of human knowledge, he must 
maintain total certainty with regards to his method of facilitating individual moral 
regeneration if he is to justify the utility costs of maintaining the conditions of progress, 
the equal distribution of spheres of self-regarding activity in particular. Evaluating 
Mill’s supposed empiricism is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to note 
that his entire project rests upon a theory of human psychology which cannot be 
challenged like other theories. The ‘evidence’ supporting Mill theory is far removed 
from the practices his project demands. The condition of negative liberty a person 
experiences may not lead to the prescribed character development until possibly many 
years in the future. Furthermore, it might be difficult to separate the conditions Mill 
posits with other confounding variables. This complication is especially probable when 
Mill is generalising across an entire society. Mill describes the generic capacities of all 
rational humans that can be cultivated under the right conditions. However, his theory 
may not be sufficiently sensitive to local differences in human pedagogy or psychology. 
The central dilemma is that challenging this model of human development prevents the 
whole project from being fully realizable. Supporters o f Mill must either accept his 
empirical grounding for his principle of liberty, take his project on faith, or both. Fully 
assessing Mill’s scientific methodology is a vast project. It is nonetheless important 
when considering his political project to recognise the contestability o f the theory of 
human psychology upon which it rests.
The faith required for Mill’s project illustrates a larger point about utilitarian 
theories in general. Utilitarianism is committed to maximising utility however defined, 
and as Rawls points out, it matters only indirectly how the sum total of utility is 
distributed.92 There is nonetheless a commitment to the best available practices 
available for maximising utility, and these may vary with the growth of knowledge, or
92 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 23.
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other historical contingencies. Direct appeals to the standard o f utility are 
straightforward, simplistic, and ultimately un-workable. The utility costs o f attempting 
to calculate all o f the consequences of every action would be too high as the decision 
maker would be paralyzed by deliberation. Furthermore, the epistemological 
impossibility o f knowing all of the consequences of an action further makes this 
approach self-defeating. Mill comes roughly to this conclusion when he judges “utility, 
or happiness much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought except through the 
medium of secondary ends”. 93 Alternatively, utilitarian theories that introduce 
secondary principles or rules, such as indirect utilitarianism, or rule utilitarianism 
attempt to institutionalise best practices as a means to maximisation. Every such theory 
needs to take an empirical stand on 1) the nature of human psychology, 2) the 
conditions of social coordination, or 3) take a longitudinal perspective and make a claim 
about the conditions o f social progress, as I argue Mill does, if  they are to avoid 
collapsing back into a form of act-utilitarianism. In other words, from a liberal point of 
view, the Harm Principle can only be meaningful, by which I mean ultimately utility 
maximising, if  it trumps all utilitarian reasons for overriding it. This may seem 
paradoxical at first, but maintaining such a principle can only be justified on utilitarian 
grounds if there are weightier indirect reasons for respecting the Harm Principle in the 
face of direct reasons to override it, or greater utility gains in the long-run. For example, 
if one were to consider two societies, one that respected the Harm Principle as a rule, 
and one that abided by act-utilitarianism, in order to claim that the first society would 
experience more utility, it would be necessary to make at least one of the following 
claims. Some fact about human nature might make direct appeals to the Principle of 
Utility self-defeating. To do so might require one to sacrifice his her own interests in 
order to maximise the aggregate’s, and the possibility o f having to do so at any point, 
might prove too psychologically taxing for individuals to securely frame and execute 
their own life-plans. Another type of claim might say that the conditions of productive 
human coordination require such a principle in order to maximise utility. Directly 
appealing to the Principle o f Utility might require the mass redistribution of goods, 
thereby upsetting the existing patterns of expectations upon which people have already 
based their life-plans. In both cases, the Principle of Liberty provides the necessary 
security for individuals to plan their goals and then reason about how to achieve them.94 
Whereas it can be admitted that direct appeals to the Principle o f Utility are self-
93 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 210.
94 John Gray makes this point regarding secondary principles in his version M ill’s indirect utilitarianism. 
See John Gray, M ill on Liberty: a Defence, pp. 46-47, 65-67.
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defeating, it is not necessarily the case that the Principle of Liberty is the only 
intermediary principle that maximises utility. It might be the case that a different 
principle, or even an altogether illiberal principle is empirically the most expedient to 
maximising utility. Therefore, taking the longitudinal perspective, and claiming that the 
utility pay-off o f respecting the Principle of Liberty, despite the short term utility losses, 
ultimately will be maximal remains as the best interpretation. By empirically appealing 
to a particular fact about human psychology, and the conditions for individual 
development, and social progress, Mill can justify the short term utility losses of 
maintaining the Harm Principle, for the greater good of long-term, wide-spread 
reformation of people’s characters. This justification may enable Mill to ground his 
liberal principles on a utilitarian foundation, but at the cost of advancing questionable 
empirical claims. It is only in this way, I argue, that Mill can maintain status both as a 
liberal and a utilitarian.
If a practice is adopted that promises to maximise utility in the distant future, 
and has utility costs in the short run, the practice may gradually become disassociated 
from the alleged utility. The practices would remain to be followed seemingly for  
themselves, without the consequentialist grounding they once had. In other words, if  for 
consequentialist doctrines, the right is defined as maximising the good, and the resultant 
good is maximised gradually over time, or even altogether in the distant future, then the 
two might become disassociated from each other over time. The means to the end of 
utility maximisation -  the Harm Principle -  might become separated from the ultimate 
goal that justifies it. It is in this way that a consequetialist doctrine can appear to be 
more like a deontological one. The consequences may be so far off, or removed, that 
the emphasis shifts to the best practice, or means, as the right thing to do. The 
imperative nature of the practice is emphasised when the short term costs, be they utility 
or other goods, seem unduly high. The doctrine may stress that these costs will 
eventually be outweighed by the benefits, but if they are far off, distant, or even 
uncertain, then the practices seem to be followed for themselves. Christianity and other 
religions o f salvation appear to have this dual character. Utopian, apocalyptic or even 
some perfectionist doctrines may fit this model as well. They are essentially 
consequentialist doctrines, but appear to take on a deontological air in practice.
Conclusion
Mill may not be as influenced by Comte as Hamburger argues, but he is 
certainly more so than he, or much of the secondary literature acknowledges. Bentham’s
108
influence on Mill is well documented, as are those specific elements he rejects, such as 
Bentham’s simplistic hedonistic calculus. Another aspect o f Bentham’s thought that 
Mill rejects is the subtle way in which Bentham attempts to manipulate individuals by 
institutional arrangement. In this way, it is for very similar reasons that Mill rejects 
elements of both Comte and Bentham’s systems. Both aim to control behaviour -  
Comte directly, and Bentham indirectly -  albeit for completely different reasons. Comte 
is articulating a utopian vision that is the end-state of an unfolding historical narrative; 
while Bentham is merely interested in securing the conditions for the harmonious and 
simultaneous pursuit of individual sources of utility. Perhaps ironically, it is this 
philosophy of history that enables Mill to defend against some of the liberal criticism 
made against Bentham’s hedonistic utilitarianism. This progressive dimension that Mill 
brings to his system enables him to retain coherence, against the claims of Berlin and 
Ten, but weakens the strength of his empirical grounding. Mill’s system isn’t about 
maintaining as much liberty as possible, because his system calls for a different kind of 
control than the forms advocated by Comte and Bentham. But before we examine the 
exact mix of liberty and control in Mill’s system, one more influence must be assessed, 
that o f Wilhelm von Humboldt.
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5. W ilhelm  von Humboldt as the savant of On Liberty:
Individuality as the new summum bonum
As I have described in the previous chapters, more of Mill’s thought can be 
traced back to Comte’s writings than Mill acknowledges, but the full illiberal reading 
put forward becomes unsustainable upon closer inspection, especially in light of the 
influence of the thought of Wilhelm von Humboldt and German Romanticism. Von 
Humboldt’s influence on Mill’s moral and political thought is evident, as he is the only 
thinker Mill credits and quotes, repeatedly, in On Liberty. However, despite this fact 
being widely acknowledged by the secondary literature, the full extent of this influence 
have not been fully explored. This chapter seeks to remedy this lacuna by firstly giving 
a brief background to the currents of political thinking during the time The Limits o f  
State Action was conceived. Secondly, it will explore the commonalities between Mill 
and von Humboldt’s thought by isolating what I deem to be the key similarities in their 
thinking. Finally, I will show how it is specifically these influences on Mill’s thought, 
which precludes it from being fully Comtean, as Hamburger and others have argued.1 
Mill is unique in his eclectic blending of rationalistic positivism and Romantic thought 
to create a version of liberal utilitarianism. His project is worth dissecting because many 
of its elements still resonate in contemporary forms of liberalism.
Behind The Limits o f State Action
Before this exegesis of German Romantic political thought begins, I must clarify
* tVithat my focus will be on the early years, approximately during the last decade of the 18 
century. Later Romantic political thought in the middle of the 19th century was widely 
derided by the left as a religious reaction to the Enlightenment, and by the right as an a-
• • • 9political aesthetic movement. Moreover, this broad categorisation will necessarily 
overlook the finer distinctions between its proponents. Nonetheless, German 
Romanticism started out as a literary group of well-known intellectuals in Jena around 
1797 where political thinkers such as Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Holderlin, Ernst 
Daniel Schleiermarcher, and Friedrich von Hardenberg, who wrote under the name of 
Novalis, attempted to combine elements of conservative and liberal thought. I focus on 
the early years because von Humboldt’s Limits o f  State Action was conceived between
1 See Linda C. Raeder, John Stuart Mill and the Religion o f  Humanity, (Columbia MI: University oo f  
Missouri Press, 2002).
2 Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism , (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), p. 225.
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1791-1792, and so probably reflects the currents o f political thinking of this time. The 
early German Romantics (“Romantics” from now on) were concerned with the extremes 
of both liberalism and conservatism, and attempted to forge a middle ground. 
Conservatism did not have adequate regard for the negative freedoms demanded by 
human flourishing, and liberalism with its hyper-concern for individualism destroyed
t f i  •communities. Like all political thinking of the late 18 century, the French Revolution 
was the biggest influence of the time. In particular, the Romantics believed that the only 
true community could be created by the ideals of liberty equality and fraternity in a 
republic. In addition to, and prior to the Revolution, the Enlightenment played a 
formative role in the evolution of political thought, however the Romantics had a much 
more ambivalent attitude towards it than the unambiguous attitudes of the liberals and 
the conservatives.
German Enlightenment thinking was confident in its ability to understand 
human nature by reason alone. And following from this the Romantics agreed with Kant 
and Fichte that pure reason could generate moral rules. 4 They endorsed the 
revolutionary values o f liberty, equality and fraternity, and saw these as being products 
of Enlightenment reasoning. Their faith in the Revolutionary project began to falter 
though, as the Jacobin Terror emerged. The Romantics began to feel that something 
more than reason was required to prevent the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity 
becoming corrupted into egoism and materialism.5 Reason was negatively powerful; it 
destroyed many beliefs and traditional commitments to community. The violence and 
destruction following the Revolution illustrated to the romantics that the Enlightenment 
may have liberated individuals and made them rational, but it also made them “rootless” 
without faith. Nothing could escape the scrutiny o f rationalism. The central dilemma for 
the Romantics was how to replace the void created by reason, without violating it.6The 
Romantics were neither revolutionaries nor reactionaries. They wanted to bring the 
republican ideal to Germany, but realized that society needed to be educated in a deep 
sense in order to overcome this crisis of the Enlightenment.7 This reconciliation of
3 The distinctions between romanticism, conservatism and liberalism are not so clear, and as w ill be 
shown share elements with each other. In fact, Beiser, in Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism  
categories von Humboldt as an early liberal, but as my discussion progresses, it w ill become evident that 
his thought shares much with Romanticism and can only be considered as such when contrasted with the 
contemporary Rawlsian formulation o f  liberalism.
4 Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism  , p. xv.
5 Ibid., p. 228.
5 Ibid., p. xvii.
7 Ibid., p. 229.
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opposites would come to form one of the defining elements of romanticism, and it took 
three forms.
The three approaches to the crisis of the Enlightenment were artistic, religious, 
and organic. Each has been advocated at different times by different thinkers, and some 
by several. I shall treat them a-historically as they are, for the most part, three aspects of 
the same approach.
The Romantics central critique focussed on modem civil society. They were not 
critical of private property as such, but o f the effects o f the market economy, as they
D
saw it destroying culture. All relationships between people were reduced to cmde 
utilitarian calculations o f costs and benefits. The advanced division o f labour that 
accompanied modernity differentiated individuals into narrower and narrower cogs of a 
machine. Philistinism was the result. This compression o f expertise and activity was the 
exact antithesis o f the central animating notion o f the romantics (and some liberals): 
Bildung. Simplistically, Bildung translates to “education” or “self-development”, but as 
the discussion below will show, it is much more subtle concept than that. Following 
from Schiller’s Aesthetic Briefe, art was the central instrument of Bildung.9 It was to 
unify the people and excite the imagination. Whereas reason was negative and critical, 
art was productive. For Schlegel, art was to restore a sense of community to humans. It 
restored magic and beauty to the world so humans can feel at one with it again.10 At the 
end of the day, the Romantics were concerned with Man’s separation and alienation 
from a natural and integrated community and endeavoured to facilitate a restoration of 
this superior state. To that end, art was one method, but religion was also another.
By 1800, the Romantics had seen a significant shift towards religion amongst 
themselves.11 Schleiermarcher in his Reden argued that religion should be the central 
vehicle of Bildung, because only it could enable Man to realise his powers. However, he 
and Scheller both thought art and religion were very similar. Both regarded the universe 
as an organic whole, and both the expression of an individual’s highest spiritual powers 
as a human being.12 Novalis went even further with the claim that art and religion were 
the same activity. By bringing mystery and magic back to the mundane, the artist was 
performing the role of the priest. Apart from Schlegel and Tieck converting to Roman 
Catholicism, most Romantics practised a form of pantheism. Pantheism is the 
worshipping of God as the universe and, vice versa. It denies the transcendent,
8 Ibid., p. 232.
9 Ibid., p. 229.
10 Ibid., p. 231.
11 Ibid., p. xviii
12 Ibid., p. 240.
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anthropomorphised conception of the supreme being. Pantheism is also egalitarian,
cosmopolitan, and humanist. As such, it formed the ideal foundation from which to
critique the alienating effects o f modernity. The Romantics still valued the
Revolutionary values of liberty, equality and fraternity, but religion, like art, was a
11means to countering the corrupting affects egoism and materialism.
Not so much a method as a model, another way of reconciling the crisis of 
reason was within the organic society. Articulated by Schlegel, Novalis, and 
Schleiermarcher, it was intended to contrast the machine state of monarchical 
absolutism that reigned throughout Europe for so long.14 The machine state consisted of 
various isolated parts, a la modernity’s division of labour, and it had an external 
controller, the Monarch. It was also held together by force, by way o f the laws and 
coercion exercised over the unwilling people. And finally, the machine state was the 
product of a blueprint or plan. By contradistinction, the organic society was a 
community of cooperating individuals motivated by development of each other’s 
individuality, rather than self-interest. Each person’s identity was derived from the 
group, and the goals were not utilitarian, but spiritual. It consisted of citizens actively 
participating in democratic institutions as means of political self-expression. 
Subsequently, the organic society was held together by a common culture and sense of 
belonging, not externally imposed laws. Finally, the organic society was the result of 
gradual historical evolution, adapting to the changing circumstances, and not the 
product of a utopian blueprint.15 The use of the metaphor gradually became associated 
with conservative thought in Germany with the publication of Adam Mueller’s 1808 
Elemente der Staatskunst, but during the early years of the Romantics, it was an ideal by 
which to measure the current political trends of Germany and Europe itself.
Though not inherently reactionary, Romanticism is best understood as a 
response to first the Enlightenment, and then to the French Revolution. Like the other 
dominant ideologies o f the time, Romanticism varied between exponents, and then 
evolved over time. The romantics tried to forge a middle ground between the extremes 
of liberalism and conservatism. It therefore shares elements of each. Before examining 
how von Humboldt’s thought figures in Mill’s On Liberty, it will be helpful to 
distinguish Romanticism from its two main ideological competitors. The liberalism and 
conservatism I describe now are not ascribed to any particular thinker, but should be 
understood as a sketch of the most common elements of each, or as stereotypes.
13 Ibid, 241.
14 Ibid, p 237.
15 Ibid, p 237.
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At the heart of Romanticism was the metaphysical claim that Man needed a 
culture and a community in order to thrive. This claim the Romantics shared with 
conservatives, but not with liberals. However, despite this embedded conception of man 
Romantics simultaneously thought individuals needed to be sufficiently separate from 
society in order to be free of its potentially corrupting influence. This tension between 
the sociableness of Man and the need to develop one’s capacities beyond the established 
norms will be replicated in Mill’s thought. Opposite the conservatives, the liberal 
conception of human nature was a-historical and individualist. Man’s desires were 
entirely his own, and reflect nothing other than his or her own will. Liberals were 
therefore motivated purely by self-interest, whereas the Romantics and conservatives 
were disdainful of this selfish motive.16 For conservatives, sentiment was the motivating 
force of individuals, which must coincide with obligation. For the Romantics, love was 
the most powerful drive in the human psyche. It was the desire to give and receive 
affection which motivated individuals to develop themselves within groups.17 Humans 
were in essence social animals, but this needed to be balanced with the private and 
semi-private need to be creative and unique.
Conservatives also maintained that humans were social animals, situated in both 
a historical and physical context. This outlook was dominant amongst the absolutist 
monarchies that reigned throughout Europe during the middle ages. There was not much 
of a liberal tradition in Germany by the late 18th century, but one grew as a reaction to 
this tradition, largely inspired by the events in France.19 The primary liberal concern 
was for the protection of rights, which enabled the private pursuit of happiness. Unlike 
the conservatives, the Romantics also advocated a system of rights, but this was to 
facilitate the development of individual capacities, like creativity and spontaneity. The 
Romantics were trying to reconcile the obligations of freedom and community.
Institutionally, this reconciliation of seeming opposites would be accomplished 
by a plurality of intermediary groups between the individual and the sovereign. 
Associations like churches, and labour guilds would provided the requisite networks 
within which each would develop his or own capacities as a creative being. Following 
this reasoning, the Romantics claimed the direct relationships between the sovereign 
and the people under liberal and conservative states was problematic. Whereas the
16 Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 41.
17 Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, p. xxvii.
18 Rosenblum, Another Liberalism , p. 59.
19 Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, p. xxii.
20 Ibid., p. xxv.
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liberal’s laissez faire approach to welfare caused anomie, the conservative’s centralised 
state and adherence to custom proved tyrannical.
Amongst the liberals at this time, the protection of rights was the central element 
of their thought. They varied however as to the best way to protect those rights. On the 
right, von Humboldt advocated a constitutional monarch with no popular participation. 
Only a strong king or queen could protect individual rights, because any form of 
popular sovereignty could easily turn into mob rule.21 In the middle were Kant, Jacobi, 
and Schiller who were also concerned about the potential for ochlocracy, but also 
recognised the need for some popular participation. They advocated a constitutional 
monarch coupled with a parliament. On the left was Forster who called for an abolition 
of the monarchy and aristocracy and advocated a fully democratic republic.22 Forster, in 
this respect, shared a similar vision as the Romantics.
The political manifestation of the crisis of reason for the Romantics was the 
reconciliation of the demands of freedom and community. The liberals underestimated 
the value of communities and have focused too much on the individual pursuit of 
personal goals. Conservatives, on the other hand, placed too much emphasis on 
community sacrificing any notion of a right to individual liberty. For Romantics, the 
state was not an umpire regulating individual endeavours, but more like a schoolmaster 
maintaining the conditions for the individual exploration and development of the self. 
Generally speaking, this was the organic state. It’s main features being the plurality of 
intermediary groups like guilds and religious associations, and the evolutionary nature 
of its progress.23 Stemming from man’s social nature, individuals could best develop 
their capacities and cultivate their individuality within communities. This cultivation 
comprised the central animating value of the Romantics, Bildung. More specifically, 
Bildung was the “fullest, richest, and most harmonious development of the potentialities 
of the individual, the community, or the human race.”24 The notion of Bildung was 
superior to Enlightenment reasoning because it reconciled opposites that were 
ubiquitous to the human experience, rather than proceeding in a linear progression.
21 Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, pp. 20, 111. Beiser classifies von Humboldt as a 
liberal because o f  his commitment to libertarian institutional arrangements. However his conception o f  
human flourishing is not based on utility, welfare, or liberty but on the Romantic notion o f  Bildung, 
diversity and spontaneity. These are the values we see re-emerging in On Liberty, and so why I discuss 
von Humboldt as a Romantic and not liberal.
22 Ibid, p. 20.
23 Ibid., p. xxiv. Von Humboldt does not subscribe to the organic metaphor o f  the state. To do so is to 
grant it extensive powers that he argues impairs individual se lf development. See J. W. Burrow, 
“Introduction” in Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Limits o f  State Action”, J. W. Burrow ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 
1969), p. xvii.
24 Burrow, “Introduction”, p. xviii.
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Liberal and conservative regimes were too one-sided in their conception of the 
individual, and subsequently in their political outlook, only Romantics captured the 
unique contradictions that comprised the human experience.
Romanticism may not have been a clearly defined political ideology with clear 
boundaries and a consistent doctrine, but it certainly was distinctive in its endorsement 
of certain values, like creativity and spontaneity. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s thought may 
have consisted of some conservative and liberal political prescriptions, but his 
conception of human nature is thoroughly romantic. By our standards his thought would 
be considered libertarian, however his book conveys much more than a sketch of his 
minimalist state. It also gives a very romantic picture of human needs, and it is this that 
touches Mill.
On Liberty and Limits o f State Action: A lineage
Perhaps it would not be controversial to say that Mill is von Humboldt’s biggest 
publicist, at least in the English speaking world. In addition to the epigraph to On 
Liberty, where Mill quotes one of von Humboldt’s more eloquent lines, he is also the 
only writer that Mill speaks favourably of repeatedly throughout the whole essay. For 
this reason von Humboldt’s influence on Mill’s writings is self-evident, and for sure 
most o f the Mill scholarship acknowledges this truism. However, despite the approving 
nod to German Romanticism scholars make, there is little examination of the specific 
commonalities between the two works.25 This section aims to address this gap in the 
literature by highlighting what I deem to be three key similarities between the two 
works, namely their conceptions of human flourishing as stemming from their 
conceptions of human nature, the means of development, and finally, their identification 
of the distinctly human capacity of choice. This section seeks to show that Mill borrows 
generously from von Humboldt in the construction of his own liberal theory, more so 
than is commonly acknowledged.
i. Human Nature
Like Mill’s one very simple principle, von Humboldt’s thesis can be distilled 
down to two straight-forward sentences:
25 Notable exceptions are Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), and J.W. Burrow “Introduction” in Wilhelm von Humboldt, Limits o f  State Action, J.W. 
Burrow ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 1969).
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“The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable 
dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the 
highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and 
consistent whole. Freedom is the first and indispensable condition which the 
possibility of such a development presupposes; but there is besides another 
essential -  intimately connected with freedom, it is true -  a variety of 
situations.”26
The first thing to note is that for von Humboldt, this principle is the product of pure
9 7reason, and so is a priori. Mill, on the other hand, grounds his conception of human 
flourishing on a supposed empiricism. For von Humboldt, the development of human 
powers is merely a deontological duty, and not for the maximisation of utility, liberty, 
or to promote some larger end like that of the state or nation. In fact, “the highest ideal, 
therefore, of the co-existence of human beings, seems to me to consist in a union in 
which each strives to develop himself from his own inmost nature, and for his own
98sake.” Mill makes a similar claim about the rightness of self development in Chapter 
Three of On Liberty, “among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed 
in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance is man himself.”29 Furthermore, 
this development for both is not open-ended or even socially determined, but is 
governed by “inward forces”, or in von Humboldt’s case, “inmost nature”. 30
Whereas for von Humboldt, self-development is an a priori duty, for Mill it is 
demanded by the Principle of Utility. To see how will necessitate the consideration of 
On Liberty and Utilitarianism simultaneously, as previously discussed in Chapter Two. 
Mill’s argument takes two forms. Firstly, because o f distinctly human powers and 
capacities, only the development and exercise of them can yield the highest amounts of 
pleasure, of the relevantly ‘higher’ kind, as spelled out in Utilitarianism. Secondly, 
one’s development, or individuality, which Mill equates in Chapter III, can also assist 
other peoples’ development as well. As Don Habibi points out, Mill ascribes both 
intrinsic and extrinsic value to development.31
26 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Limits o f  State Action, J.W. Burrow ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), p. 16. Mill 
quotes this passage John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, in Collected Works XVIII, John M. Robson ed., 
(Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1977), p. 261.
27 Burrow argues that von Humboldt intended to make this point more empirically in a later writing 
entitled Plan for Comparative Anthropology. See Burrow, “Introduction”, p. xxiv.
28 Von Humboldt, The Limits o f  State Action, p. 19.
29 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, in Collected Works XVIII, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1977) p. 263.
30 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 263.
31 Don Habibi, John Stuart M ill and the Ethic o f  Human Growth, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), p. 27. This is one o f  the best books written about Mill and self-development. Following 
Habibi, I w ill use terms such as development, self-development, improvement, betterment, edification, 
and self-realisation interchangeably.
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To begin with, human beings have certain capacities that separate us from other 
animals. Such “faculties” are not merely different, but “elevated” from those o f the
• • T9animal kingdom. Once one has discovered these generic human capacities, they will 
comprise a central element to one’s happiness. This line o f empirical reasoning is how 
Mill posits the distinction between higher and lower pleasures. The higher pleasures are 
those that excite the intellect, imagination and moral sense, and are to be contrasted with 
the lower pleasures, which are purely sensual and so more animal by nature. However, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, Mill runs into trouble with such a distinction 
because the claim is not that the activities that excite the higher capacities yield more 
pleasure than the lower ones, but that they yield pleasure o f a incommensurably higher 
kind. Moreover, he says that anyone experienced in both pleasures would not resign the 
higher pleasure for any amount of the lower. Mill considers the excitement of such 
capacities a necessary ingredient of human flourishing because of their utility-producing 
properties, and that such capacities need to be nurtured, lest they atrophy.
In addition to experiencing more utility, individuals who have developed their 
capacities or individuality are of instrumental value to others as well. Self development 
is not a natural tendency, but is a product of the social conditions.
“It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in 
human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, 
and point out what were once truths are no longer, but also to commence new 
practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and 
sense in human life.”33
Mill recognises that even in advanced civilizations, the best practises and beliefs can 
become mechanical and dogmatic. There is an enduring need of society to have 
individuals that posses genius and spontaneity to stimulate each other’s self­
development, which in turn drives human progress. The implication is that anybody can 
potentially play this leading role in society thereby maximising not only their own 
utility, but society’s in general. All that is required is the desire to flourish in this way, 
because everyone has the ability to a certain extent.
For both von Humboldt and Mill, individuals are active authors of their own 
lives and create themselves. Inmost nature and inward forces are not to be confused 
with human essence, either generic or unique. There is not a ‘true se lf at the core of 
each individual struggling to manifest itself in the world, either given free play to be
32 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in Collected Works X, (Toronto: Routlegde and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 210.
33 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 267.
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expressed, or suppressed at the hands of society or the individual. Rather, there is 
something that is best described as ‘potential’ within each individual that is acted upon 
by personality or character to create a life. Von Humboldt speaks of “powers” (p. 16), 
“creative powers” (p. 35), “energy” (p. 80), and “form and Substance”. Form is idea; 
and substance is sensuous perception. “Form springs from the combinations of 
substance. The richer and more various the substance that is combined, the more 
sublime the resulting form”34 Similarly, Mill speaks o f “inward forces” (p. 263), 
“energy” (p. 263), “Pagan self-assertion” (p. 266), and “personal impulse” (p. 264).
“A person whose desires and impulses are his own -  are the expression of his 
own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture -  is said 
to have character...If, in addition to being his own character, his impulses are 
strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic 
character”(emphasis added). 5
Human beings are essentially creative beings, however how that essence is reified will 
vary depending on the circumstances and character of each person. Not only do von 
Humboldt and Mill both extol the virtue of creativeness, but they also see it as a socially 
embedded activity.
For both Mill and von Humboldt, human flourishing is a social endeavour, 
however there is one key difference in their communal projects. Mill, concerned about 
the self-inflicted levelling down of society, and the “present low state of the human 
mind”, appeals to enlightened elites to lead the masses to a more evolved state. 
Whereas for von Humboldt, individuals come together to appreciate each other’s 
differences as a means to enhancing their own uniqueness. No such role is articulated 
for elites in von Humboldt’s system.
“Hence the principle of the true art of social intercourse consists in a ceaseless 
endeavour to grasp the innermost individuality of another, to avail oneself of it, 
and, with the deepest respect for it as the individuality o f another, to act upon 
it.”37
Von Humboldt does not articulate a specific theory of higher goods or pleasures, and so 
flourishing is a much more open ended ideal than Mill’s. Merely interacting with other 
individuals uninhibited by the state facilitates self development. In fact, any peasant or 
craftsmen who lovingly labours for its own sake is able to “ennoble their character, and
34 Von Humboldt, p 18.
35 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 264.
36 Ibid., p 269.
37 Von Humboldt, The Limits o f  State Action, p. 32.
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exalt and refine their pleasures”.38 On the other hand, because of Mill’s theory of the 
higher pleasures, he is committed to a more normative notion of human flourishing, one 
that is revealed by elites, who are the experienced judges from Chapter II of  
Utilitarianism,39 True, what actually stimulates the higher capacities may be different 
for everyone, but any flourishing life must entail their exercise. The only constraint on 
von Humboldt’s conception of human flourishing is that one develops one’s powers 
harmoniously, and to do so within the confines of Kantian ethics.40 However, von 
Humboldt does not clarify this claim, for at one point he posits that goods worthy of 
human pursuit can never conflict, while at another point he states that “each individual 
can achieve only one of those perfections, which represent the possible features of 
human character.” 41 Again, this attempt to reconcile opposites is captured by the 
Romantic notion of Bildung. In von Humboldt’s case, individuals are to unify as many 
different experiences into a coherent whole. It is therefore not inappropriate that Burrow 
concludes that the attempt to combine this Faustianism with Kantianism can only be 
judged on aesthetic grounds, as opposed to moral, or hedonistic grounds, as in the case 
of Mill. Despite human flourishing being essentially a social endeavour for both Mill 
and von Humboldt, the role of elites as facilitators would seem to limit the range of 
valuable lives down from von Humboldt’s more subjective conception of flourishing.
ii. The means to flourishing: A principle o f liberty
One of the ironies of Mill’s repeated praise of von Humboldt is that as the most 
liberal among Mill’s major influences, he nonetheless rejects von Humboldt’s rights- 
based libertarian project. Liberty is at the heart of both of their systems, but the 
philosophies upon which their systems are drawn from divergent theories o f knowledge 
-  Mill’s is an empirical conception of harm, von Humboldt’s an a priori system of rights. 
Moreover, the extent to which morality and law overlap is quite different as well. As 
Burrow points out, the two systems perform the same function, namely, to govern the 
terms of interaction between individuals,42 however with a more progressive perspective, 
two key differences emerge. Mill’s system of ‘rights’ evolves along with society’s 
understanding of harm, whereas von Humboldt’s is fixed, and the extent to which rights 
and morality correspond differs between them as well.
38 Ibid., p. 27.
39 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 211.
40 Burrow, “Introduction”, p. xxxi.
41 Von Humboldt, The Limits o f  State Action, p. 17. See p. 32 for his statement on the non-conflicting 
nature o f goods.
42 Burrow, “Introduction”, p. xxxix.
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Mill states in the introduction to On Liberty, that the entire essay is nothing but 
a vehicle for one very simple principle, “That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of the civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”43 This statement introduces two central elements o f Mill’s 
thesis, the dichotomy between self and other-regarding behaviour, and the notion of 
harm. A person’s own good is not a reason to coerce someone. With regards to others, a 
person’s action must be harmful in order to be eligible for legal coercion. Moreover, as I 
will discuss in Chapter Six, harm only constitutes the necessary condition because the 
harmful action must also be wrongful. Despite articulating his thesis in the language of 
harm, Mill creates a area of absolute non-interference, frequently referred to as the self- 
regarding sphere. This sphere is the ‘area’ within which a person’s actions do not effect 
others, and so are not morally evaluable. The key feature o f this ‘territory’ is that its 
boundaries are fluid. In other words, what actually constitutes harm may change, as our 
understanding of the natural world grows. Something that may have traditionally 
seemed harmless to others, i.e. a self-regarding activity, like smoking, is now 
understood to have harmful affects on other people. Whereas smoking was once 
tolerated by most non-smokers and the law, the growth o f knowledge on the subject 
now suggests that it should not be. Conversely, something that may have traditionally 
been considered harmful, like certain recreational drugs, or homosexuality, might 
become tolerated as our expanding understanding o f these activities gradually 
overcomes prejudice and myth.
Having stated unequivocally that an individual’s welfare is not a legitimate 
reason for policy, von Humboldt must state under what conditions the state can act to 
restrict freedom, if at all, or what are the limits o f state action. Von Humboldt, in fact, 
isolates only two purposes for which the state may act, and that is to maintain security 
for itself and for its individuals. Like Mill, von Humboldt recognises that “without 
security, it is impossible for man either to develop his powers, or to enjoy the fruits of 
so doing; for without security, there is no freedom” 44 However, unlike Mill, von 
Humboldt explicitly employs a system of rights to protect the freedoms of the state and 
the individual.
“According to the principles we have already determined, the State ought not to
interfere with these simple human relations, except where there are grounds for
fearing some violation of its own rights, or those of its citizens.”45
43 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 223.
44 Von Humboldt, The Limits o f  State Action, p. 43.
45 Ibid., p. 86.
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But like Mill, von Humboldt is willing to tolerate some amount of interference between 
individuals, that is, other regarding activity, provided such interference does not violate 
one’s rights.
“...it is not enough to justify such restrictions, that an action should imply 
damage to another person; it must, at the same time, encroach upon his 
rights...Right, then, is never infringed except when some one is deprived o f a 
part of what properly belongs to him, or of his personal freedom, without his 
consent or against his will.”
Von Humboldt’s definition of a right is the property that properly belongs to one, and 
one’s personal freedom. A violation only incurs if one is deprived of either. A person 
may even incur some level of damage, provided it does not constitute an infringement. 
Like the permanent interests that need to be protected from harm, a person’s rights 
demarcate the sphere that others may act within, and vice versa. Even though von 
Humboldt’s system defines the space within which individuals operate and governs the 
terms by which people interact with each other, much like Mill’s system, the key 
difference is that it is fixed. The ‘space’ defined by Mill’s system changes as society’s 
understanding of harm evolves. This can either shrink or enlarge the sphere of self- 
regarding activity. The area of activity defined by von Humboldt’s rights is determined 
by reason and so is an a priori claim. Disagreement may exist over what constitutes 
possession and personal freedom, but once determined, there would be no new grounds 
for altering the rights. For sure, Mill’s notion of harm is as contentious, if not more so 
than von Humboldt’s notion of rights, but whereas this disagreement stimulates the 
evolution of Mill’s notion, von Humboldt’s remains static.
The second key difference that exists between their systems is between the 
extent to which law covers morality. For Mill, there is a perfect overlap, because an 
action that is a wrongful harm to another constitutes the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the legitimacy of interference. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, the 
category of harmful actions is larger than the one that triggers state intervention, 
because according to the Principle of Utility, there are good reasons to tolerate some 
harmful, other-regarding actions, like competition in the free market. Wrongful, other- 
regarding, harmful actions, on the other hand, are simultaneously a moral offence and 
the grounds for the state to interfere in the action, either to regulate it or to prohibit it 
altogether. There is a perfect overlap between the categories of legally and morally 
prohibited activity. For von Humboldt, morality covers a larger category of behaviour 
than rights protect, as he explains in this application of his principle:
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“He who utters or does something to wound the conscience and moral sense of 
others, may indeed act immorally; but, so long as he is not guilty of being 
importunate, he violates no right.”
Von Humboldt is acknowledging that his minimalist theory of state action does not 
protect against the full range of moral wrongs or offences. Von Humboldt’s definition 
of rights as protection of property and personal freedom is sufficiently vague to extend 
the coverage to a more inclusive extent, even to the extent of Mill’s harm principle. 
However, von Humboldt’s illustrative example of his principle reveals that there can 
always be a category of actions -  either small or large -  that may be morally wrong, but 
not prohibited by the state.
Despite these differences, the fact remains that both von Humboldt and Mill are 
trying to create the conditions for people to develop their capacities and express their 
particular individualities. They both appeal to the same fact of human diversity, but 
come from different epistemological and moral groundings. For Mill, the content of 
harm changes as human knowledge progresses, which subsequently alters the 
boundaries of the sphere within which individuals pursue their conceptions of the good. 
Von Humboldt’s conception of rights, on the other hand, are determined by reason, and 
are therefore immune to historical and empirical contingences.
iii. The Distinctly Human Capacity o f Choice
The second, and more powerful, reason for demanding liberal principles is that 
both von Humboldt and Mill recognise that humans posses a unique capacity that 
separates us from animals, or machines. This capacity is free choice and in order to 
exercise it, individuals must be free from physical and moral coercion either from the 
state or other individuals. I want to stress however that with regards to Mill I am not 
speaking about free will in a metaphysical sense. Furthermore, the concept of autonomy 
in Mill is a highly normative one, because as I will argue in Chapter Six, individuals 
will experience quite a bit of higher order influence on their decision making processes 
that I think challenges the notion, as most people have employed it. Nonetheless, both 
thinkers appeal to such capacity to make their claims about liberal society, and their 
arguments become particularly forceful when they argue against any kind of 
paternalism.
As a self-proclaimed utilitarian advocating thoroughly liberal principles, Mill 
has an obvious challenge to address, namely the possibility that in some cases non­
liberal principles might promote utility better than liberal ones. As will be discussed in
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greater detail in Chapter Six, Mill’s system actually employs a subtle blend of negative 
liberty and higher order influence (whether this constitutes illiberal practices is 
debatable), but he does confront this challenge by appealing to the more utility- 
producing capacity of choice. Even though it may seem more expedient to have the state 
conduct some administrative business on behalf of the individual,
“it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than the 
government, as a means to their own mental education -  a mode of 
strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgement, and giving them 
a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are left to deal.”46
Bearing in mind that humans are “progressive beings”, Mill takes the long-term view of 
the utility gains of self-development. It will be more utility-producing to have 
independent, self-reliant individuals freely pursuing their goals, rather than a population 
dependent on the state for making the most of their lives. In fact, this ability to choose 
one’s own life is actually a combination of several features o f being human, and so of 
central importance to human flourishing.
“He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, 
has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one o f imitation. He who 
chooses his plan for himself, employs all of his faculties.”47
The exercising o f such capacities in the choosing of one’s life constitutes a necessary 
ingredient for human flourishing. For, “if a person posses any tolerable amount of 
common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not 
because it is best in itself, but because it is his own mode.”48 Only a situation of 
negative liberty can guarantee the ability to utilise such capacities. However, it is not the 
case that any life would constitute flourishing, provided the human capacities were 
employed to choose it. Chapter Four of On Liberty is an extensive catalogue of 
behaviours and character types that although self-regarding may rightly incur the 
hostility of society. Provided such “natural” penalties do not amount to harm, Mill 
envisions society influencing individuals in their efforts to develop their powers. 
Society is to help individuals discriminate between lower and higher forms of the good, 
thereby steering individuals away from those lifestyles that past experiments in living 
have shown to be suboptimal. This influence, I will argue, precludes the ascription of a 
purely procedural conception of autonomy in Mill’s normative theory, and bounds
46 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 305.
47 Ibid., p. 262.
48 Ibid, p .l 270.
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flourishing within certain limits. Despite being bounded, flourishing can still take 
infinite forms, but this is to be contrasted with the more subjective and unbounded 
conception of human flourishing articulated by von Humboldt.
Like Mill, von Humboldt also recognises that the distinctly human capacity of 
free choice is a necessary ingredient to human flourishing. They both even acknowledge 
the situated-ness o f individuals developing themselves. This fact necessitates the 
cooperation of other individuals in the pursuit of this goal. Where they differ is that von 
Humboldt does not articulate a theory of higher pleasures, and so flourishing would 
appear to be more open ended.
When von Humboldt and Mill speak of free choice, they refer partly to the 
external conditions of negative liberty whereby a decision is made free o f moral or 
physical coercion, and partly to a more positive deliberative process of decision making.
“Whatever does not spring from a man’s free choice or is only the result of 
instruction and guidance, does not enter his very being, but still remains alien to 
his true nature; he does not perform it with truly human energies, but merely 
with mechanical exactness.”4
The condition of negative liberty, then, is necessary to reflect one’s “true nature”. 
However, von Humboldt also recognises that individuals are closely enmeshed with 
their surroundings, which also exert forces on the individual’s will. These “external 
purposes” are distinct from “internal sensations”, and can constitute an impetus to act, 
apart from inner spontaneity. The truly evolved individual does not resist or attempt to 
overcome these external influences, but harmonises them with one’s own will.
“The more unity a man posses, the more freely does his choice o f these external 
matters spring from his inner being, and the more frequent and intimate is the 
cooperation of these two sources of motive, even when the he has not freely 
selected these external objects.”50
Even though human flourishing may require a reconciliation of one’s will with one’s 
immediate surroundings, it is not clear to what extent this limits the content of 
flourishing. In fact, von Humboldt explicitly states that this higher form of existence is 
even open to the peasant or craftsman, provided they “love their labour for its own 
sake”.51 Without a theory of higher goods to limit the content o f flourishing, it is a much 
more subjective ideal than in Mill’s system. If anything, von Humboldt’s insistence of a
49 Von Humboldt, The Limits o f  State Action, p. 28.
50 Ibid., p. 27.
51 Ibid., p 27.
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harmony of internal and external forces, and the correct attitude towards one’s life limits 
the form  of flourishing, but there is little that suggests its content. He does say that “the 
highest ideal...of the co-existence of human beings is, seems to me to consist in a union 
in which each strives to develop himself from his own inmost nature, and for his own 
sake”, and this social interaction might have the same regulating effect as it does in 
Mill’s system, but again, there is little textual evidence to suggest that there is anything 
beyond a system of rights to limit the trajectory of self development, and the content of 
human flourishing. Both von Humboldt and Mill demand negative liberty in order to 
utilise certain human capacities, and both require a social framework for this, but 
whereas Mill expects a convergence of the content of the good life, von Humboldt’s 
procedure leaves it much more open.
The are several common elements to Mill and von Humboldt’s thought, but I 
have isolated and discussed what I deem to be three most important commonalities. The 
three elements I discuss here are actually aspects of a greater concept that Mill and von 
Humboldt employ, namely individuality. Not only does the conception comprise the 
main argument of Chapter III of On Liberty, it also is the crucial addition to Mill’s 
thought that prevents it from having a much more Comtean or Benthamite air. Without 
it, much more of Mill and Comte’s thought would be compatible, which is problematic 
for those who hold Mill as a paragon of liberal thought.
Comte vs. von Humboldt in On Liberty
To recap the thesis so far, Joseph Hamburger argues that the controversial thesis 
that couched within the arguments for liberalism in On Liberty, are intimations that Mill 
actually intended to bring about a new Religion of Humanity, one that entailed high 
levels of social control. Along with Linda Raeder, Hamburger’s main’s argument is that 
Mill’s thinking is deeply influenced by the writings o f Auguste Comte. As I have 
shown in Chapter Three, Mill’s thinking does have a lot in common with Comte’s 
system, more so than he admits, and than the secondary literature acknowledges. 
However, at the same time, crucial differences remain between their thinking, which 
precludes the illiberal reading of Mill that Hamburger puts forward. For example, Mill’s 
concern for the distinctly human capacity of deliberative choice requires at the least, a 
sphere o f negative liberty within which to deliberate. If we take On Liberty along with 
Utilitarianism to be the ultimate articulation of Mill’s moral and political thought, what 
I now want to show is that it is specifically those elements of von Humboldt’s thought
52 See Raeder, John Stuart M ill and Religion o f  Humanity, Chapter 2.
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which preclude Mill’s vision of society from being fully Comtean. What I propose is
that it is specifically von Humboldt’s concern for individuality that prevents Mill’s
normative claims about society from being compatible with Comte’s utopian vision.
As was described above, Mill’s system is geared towards the development and
refinement of human sensitivities and capacities. Society, and elites in particular, would
assist individuals in their efforts to discriminate between higher and lower forms of
activity. Pursuits that require intellectual and aesthetic sensibilities like poetry, Mill has
a clear preference for. Individuals would thusly experience more utility from such
refined enlightened existences than those who passively revelled in pleasures o f the
body. Any form of human flourishing on Mill’s account would have to include the
exercise o f such capacities, which bounds the range of possibilities. However, within
this range can still exist an infinite number of possibilities. Mill is unequivocal: self
development simply is individuality. People should not merely cultivate an
appreciation for a handful of haut-activities established by cultural norms, but should
also cultivate the natural differences that exist between individuals. People are
inherently different, and rather than suppress these differences to conform to the sway
of custom - as most people do, Mill argues -  individuals will experience more utility by
allowing their spontaneous characters to express themselves. Moreover, unique
individuals constitute part of the conditions necessary for others to explore and develop
their own individuality, and possibly even genius.
“In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes 
more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to 
others.”54
There are both direct and indirect utilitarian reasons for developing one’s individuality. 
A diverse and dynamic population thrives, unlike China, according to Mill, which 
seems an ironic counter-example these days.
Mill scarcely makes mention of the virtue of individuality prior to On Liberty, 
and it plays a central role in the articulation of his moral and political thought. The call 
to develop one’s individuality is also the central claim of The Limit o f State Action. 
Arguing against a nationally centralised education, von Humboldt states, “the grand, 
leading principle, towards which every argument hitherto unfolded in these pages 
directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development.” As 
to whether von Humboldt actually influenced Mill’s thought, I think evident in this 
aspect: Mill quotes the exact same passage in the epigraph to On Liberty. However, the
53 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 267.
54 Ibid., p. 266.
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sanction of von Humboldt’s principle could not be more different -  Mill’s being 
empirical, von Humboldt’s being a priori -  but his passion is matched. He observes that 
“men have now reached a pitch of civilisation, beyond which it seems they cannot 
ascend except through the development of individuals” because the “greatness of 
mankind” ultimately depends on individuals never losing sight of the import of 
“individuality of power and self-development”.55 As described above, some of von 
Humboldt’s methods of facilitating self-development vary slightly, but Mill’s extolment 
of individuality can clearly be traced back to his work.
As Chapter Three argues there are more commonalities between Mill and 
Comte’s work than is typically acknowledged. What is important about individuality is 
that it is the key feature of Mill’s thesis that precludes it from being compatible with 
Comte’s Religion of Humanity. Individuality does play a role in Comte’s philosophy of 
history, but it would pose an undermining threat to his utopian vision of the religion of 
humanity. This point is particularly salient when one considers the similarities between 
Comte and Bentham’s methods of facilitating social harmony, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.
To be sure, freedom is a crucial element in both the philosophies of history of 
Comte and Mill. Both perceive history to be oscillating between two periods of stability 
and progressive turbulence. Organic periods, characterised by a harmony of moral and 
scientific beliefs, consist of relative political stability. Both Comte and Mill cite the age 
of Medieval Catholicism as the last organic period in history. During such periods, the 
unity of belief and practices rendered freedom at best irrelevant, and at worst, 
subversive. However science would eventually mount enough challenges to the status 
quo to discredit the old regime, thus ushering the next period of competing and 
conflicting norms and beliefs. During this next critical period, liberty of thought and 
expression would be crucial. Critical opinions would counter reactionary ones, thereby 
allowing another consensus dialectically to emerge - the next organic period. What 
becomes clear from von Humboldt and Mill’s discussion of liberty is that it is merely a 
means to larger ends. To have the freedom of thought and expression is one thing, to 
make use of it another. Individuals easily, and very often, squander their liberties 
engaging in conventional activities that are established, non-productive, or both. In 
order to challenge existing norms, and push the boundaries o f knowledge, it is essential 
that individuals experiment with and explore their own lives. Different experiences 
would yield new perspectives on the world, which produce new knowledge and
55 Von Humboldt, The Limits o f  Slate Action, pp. 51, 17.
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practices. This is the instrumental value of individuality and both Mill and von 
Humboldt recognise it. Comte also acknowledges the productive dimension of freedom 
and its utilisation, but fears its subversive potential.
Comte’s instrumental valuation of freedom resulted in an ambivalence towards 
it. Freedom of thought and discussion and individuality fuels the progression of 
civilisation, but it also disrupts the harmony of organic periods. As argued in the 
Chapter Three, Comte betrays his own philosophy of history with his static vision of the 
Religion of Humanity, the ultimate organic period. The system he creates entails the 
ritualisation of every minute aspect of life into a perfect harmony and stability. The 
totality of systemisation left no room for the negative liberties enjoyed during the 
previous critical periods. Comte is certain that the positivisation of all thought and 
politics would be the final stage in the evolution of civilisation. As such, Comte holds 
that no other critical periods are to follow, and so the instrumental value of liberty 
would evaporate. Aptitudes could be tested and natures could be revealed, so the most 
appropriate role in society for every individual could be determined. Furthermore, 
unlike Mill and von Humboldt, Comte attaches no weight to the human capacity of 
deliberative choice, and so does not provide for a sphere of negative liberty within 
which to deliberate. Comte is not concerned with the grounds or reasons for people’s 
decisions, provided they make the right decision, as determined by positivistic thinking. 
Whereas Mill is concerned with individuals knowing why one must hold a certain belief 
or participate in a certain activity, Comte forecasts all actions to be motivated by love 
for the Great Being, humanity. Under these conditions, moral conflict would evaporate 
thereby making all disputes resolvable by science, as practised by the scientist-priests, 
the clergy of Religion of Humanity. They alone would be charged with the direction of 
society, and their power and authority is absolute. Any system of rights granted to 
citizens would only infringe upon their ability to govern effectively. The real threat 
however comes not from merely possessing any particular set of liberties, as the family, 
education and society all work to integrate and harmonise the individual into the Great 
Being, thereby making nonconformity unlikely. The real threat comes from the 
spontaneous outbreak of individuality, which could produce critical or even subversive 
ideas about Comte’s utopian vision.
Mill’s valuation of individuality, derived in part from von Humboldt, is the key 
difference between Comte and Mill’s systems. It not only is the crucial aspect of Mill’s 
system that precludes it from being very Comtean, but also makes it a much more 
progressive doctrine than other varieties o f liberalism. Upon initial inspection, it may
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appear that the crucial difference between their systems is Mill’s institutionalisation of 
liberty, as opposed to Comte’s selective application of it, but as I will show it is not so 
much the possession of freedom, as its use. Both Mill and Comte have highly situated 
conceptions of the individual who experience influence and guidance from society. Both 
also recognise the homogenising and harmonising effect this has on society in general. 
Whereas Comte celebrates this social harmony once the final stage of history is 
achieved, his religion of humanity, Mill is alone in adding the Romantic notion of 
individuality to counter the integrative -  but necessary -  influence of society. To make 
this point more clear, I will now briefly describe how On Liberty would look without 
Mill’s valuation of individuality. Despite the liberties argued for in the essay remaining, 
there would be a gradual convergence on a small handful o f forms of human flourishing. 
Progress would halt and a static equilibrium would be reached, much like in Comte and 
Bentham’s system.
In order to conduct this hypothetical experiment, we simply need to remove 
Chapter III, “Of Individuality, as One of the elements o f Well-Being”. As such, 
individuality loses its direct and indirect utilitarian value. The upshot of this is the fact 
that the natural differences that exist between individuals no longer need to be 
cultivated. Chapter III makes much of the fact that society currently has the tendency to 
force individual desires and interests to conform to customary forms. No longer being 
the social harm this once was, we lose one of the arguments for liberty, namely the need 
to accommodate the innate differences between individuals. The Essay, however, rests 
on several arguments for liberty that remain despite the loss of individuality as 
utilitarian virtue.
Even without the Romantic concern for the individual authorship of self-created 
lives, the freedom of thought and discussion would remain, as argued in Chapter II. The 
arguments are threefold, but can be put under two broad headings: the infallibility o f  
human knowledge, and the grounds of human knowledge. The arguments regarding the 
harm of suppressing certain opinions. In the first case, the suppressed opinion might be 
true, in which case its censure would reinforce a status quo of ignorance.56 In the second 
case, the suppressed opinion might contain part of the truth, in which case only by 
openly confronting the opinion in discussion can the truth of the opinion be separated 
from the falsity o f it.57 These arguments have a clear utilitarian logic to them that even 
Comte would have endorsed. The examples Mill cites in the chapter exemplify the
56 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 229.
57 Ibid., p. 252.
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critical periods, for which Comte says freedom of thought is instrumental. This 
particular argument for liberty gives On Liberty a Comtean air to it. Finally, the most 
powerful of the three arguments for freedom of thought and discussion is that even 
though the suppressed opinion is well known to be false, repeatedly affirming our true
co
opinions prevents them from becoming “dead dogma”. This argument is one of 
several interspersed within the essay that illustrates Mill’s concern for deliberative 
choice. Mill is not only concerned with individuals holding the correct beliefs, but is 
clear that he wants individuals to also understand the grounds for those beliefs. 
Similarly, as he argues in Chapter V, state paternalism prevents individuals from 
exercising and fully developing their reasoning and choice-making capacities. Mill 
wants individuals to understand the grounds for their choices as well, like for the higher 
pleasures. The arguments for freedom are manifold in On Liberty, and so removing 
Mill’s concern for individuality does not detract from the overall thrust of the book. 
However, Mill does much more than justify liberal principles in On Liberty; his 
arguments demonstrate the Romantic potential of individuals to create themselves in 
indefinitely different ways, and it is this progressive dimension to Mill’s thesis that is 
lost with the subtraction of individuality.
To see how progress would all but stop in Mill’s system without the call for 
individuality, one must bear in mind the extensive influence society has over 
individuals’ development. Society, and elites in particular, are to help individuals 
discriminate between higher and lower forms of the good or pleasure, so that they may 
develop their capacities in order to experience more utility. This is the main argument of 
Chapter IV, “Of the Limit to the Authority of Society over the Individual”. Here, Mill 
discusses the “the severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly 
concern only him self’. Of course the harm principle limits the actions of individuals 
conducting experiments in living, but so too do the sentiments of the already- 
enlightened individuals. Such people would exercise second order influence that would 
not morally or physically infringe upon one’s freedom of action, but on one’s character, 
the higher-order self that attaches weight to the outcomes o f different experiments. An 
example of this might be people ostracising or excluding an individual who flirts with 
heavy drinking, or some dangerous drug. Others could not interfere with the 
individuals’ act of becoming intoxicated, but could respond negatively - and perhaps 
severely so -  in a bid to discourage the antisocial behaviour. The same group might also 
take steps to incentivise other activities, like those that utilise distinctly human
58 Ibid., p. 243.
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capacities -  the higher pleasures. Ultimately, the individual must decide how to live his 
or her life, society may only exercise this second-order influence. This point will be 
discussed at length in the next chapter.
Mill envisions an indefinite range of different forms of human flourishing in this 
enlightened way. The matter may not be as subjective as von Humboldt’s, but provided 
the chosen life is the self-creation of the individual, and involves the exercise o f the 
elevated human capacities, there could be as many possibilities as there are people. 
However, without the encouragement of individuality, individuals would converge on a 
shrinking number of lifestyles. The call for individuality is in part for individuals to 
realise their own unique potentials, but also to share new experiences and ideas with 
other people so they can realise theirs. Without individuality, progress would cease 
altogether as society encourages individuals to take up lives that have been established 
and proven. Furthermore, the number of proven lifestyles would shrink, as society 
gradually ranked some as being superior to others. Some would be deemed to exercise 
the human capacities more than others, and since diversity no longer is a virtue of 
society, there would be no reason to tolerate the less-utility producing lifestyles.59 
Society would become static as individuals would become socialised into a handful of 
different lifestyles and activities. The few lifestyles would not represent the “inward 
forces” of everyone, but since individuality is not an element of well-being, there would 
be no harm in forcing oneself into one of the proven lifestyles. In short, individuality is 
the key to progress in Mill’s system. The duty to explore oneself and one’s life is the 
never-ending source of new perspectives and practices. Mill argues that the way 
individuals experienced the most utility is by creating their own lives in accordance to 
their own natures. This active conception of human flourishing is in stark contrast to 
Bentham’s more passive human psychology, and is traceable back to von Humboldt’s 
Romantic thought, to whom he is indebted.
One final point needs to be made about what On Liberty would look like without 
the concern for individuality. Mill makes several arguments for liberty in the essay, the 
need to stimulate and accommodate individuality being only one, albeit a central one. 
Even though all progress would cease as society honed in on a small handful of 
maximally-utility producing lifestyles, the Harm Principle would still function as it does 
without individuality. Bearing mind that Mill maintains a deep concern for deliberative 
choice in humans, that is individuals must fully understand the grounds for their choices
59 O f course all o f the forms o f  human flourishing excite the human capacities, as opposed to the lower 
forms o f  existence characterised exclusively by the lower pleasures. Nonetheless, it might be possible to 
further rank the higher forms o f  life and their corresponding pleasures.
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and beliefs, it would still be necessary to understand the reasons for adopting one of the 
few forms of human flourishing. Whether there are indefinite possible lifestyles, or just 
a few, knowing the reasons why the approved lives are better than the lower forms 
would still be crucial for their full appreciation, even if  this entails experimenting with 
other, less utility-producing lives. Despite it appearing more expedient to coerce people 
into these maximally utility-producing lifestyles, the deliberative capacities would 
wither, along with those that enable the highest and most amount of utility. To a certain 
extent, even Bentham recognised this fact, which is why he arranges institutions so as to 
harmonise people’s interests. Even though society would settle on a static equilibrium, 
like one of Comte’s organic stages or Bentham’s ‘institutional uopia’, negative 
freedoms would remain, but would be hardly utilised, which is only just slightly better 
than not having them at all.
Conclusion
It is impossible to deny the connection between von Humboldt and Mill’s 
thought. Von Humboldt’s influence is self evident from the many endorsements o f it 
Mill makes throughout On Liberty. My purpose here is not to argue this point, but to 
explore the many commonalities between their works neglected by the secondary 
literature. As Chapter Three argues, there are more commonalities between Mill and 
Comte’s thought than he or most commentators have noted, which is potentially 
problematic considering the anti-liberal vision of society Comte constructs. Similarly, 
Chapter Four argues that Bentham shares the same concern for social harmony that 
Comte does, and seeks to achieve it by employing subtle forms o f control. Since 
Bentham’s influence on Mill’s thought is well documented, this commonality further 
strains the conventional reading of Mill. The point of this chapter is to show how among 
the many commonalities between Mill and von Humboldt’s theories, it is specifically 
the Romantic notion of individuality Mill takes from von Humboldt that gives Mill’s 
thought a permanently progressive twist that precludes Mill’s vision from evolving into 
a static positivistic ‘harmony’. Mill is unique in blending antithetical stands of thought 
into his version of liberalism. This eclecticism can be found in intuitive notions o f self- 
fulfilment and authenticity found in contemporary strands of liberal thought. The 
question that remains however, is how to reconcile the control rightly perceived by 
Hamburger with Mill’s unambiguous valuation of negative liberty, to which I now turn.
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6. Freedom and Control in On Liberty:
Introducing the hierarchical conception of the self
It should now be clear that Mill’s moral and political thought synthesizes diverse 
doctrines into a single project. What is striking about this feature is that two o f three 
major self-evident influences on his thought are decidedly non-liberal. At this stage in 
my analysis, I can conclude that Mill shares much of Comte’s thinking about society 
and history, but does not share his particular vision of the Religion of Humanity. Mill is 
a utilitarian, but he does not hold Bentham’s narrow conception o f human psychology, 
and subsequently is immune to some of the classic liberal challenges to Bentham’s 
utilitarianism. Finally, Mill takes on board von Humboldt’s concern for individuality 
and authenticity, but does not share his rights-based conception o f social organisation. 
Mill’s moral and political thought combines these seemingly disparate doctrines into a 
coherent project that is widely considered to be paradigmatic of a recognisable lineage 
of liberal thought. Before challenging this orthodoxy, I will propose a new 
interpretation of Mill’s moral and political doctrine, as articulated in On Liberty and 
Utilitarianism. This interpretation goes further than others before it in accommodating 
the forms of influence Hamburger correctly reads in Mill’s thought, while maintaining a 
principle of negative liberty at its heart. To that extent, this chapter firstly looks at the 
forms of behaviour Mill seeks to correct and the way in which he differentiates between 
forms of influence. Mill places too much emphasis on the reasons for intervention, 
rather than the effect the different forms of influence would have on the individual, 
thereby leaving the possibility of coercion very real, even for self-regarding flaws. 
Secondly, I will show that Mill’s conception of liberty is best understood to entail both 
positive and negative elements. Thirdly, the chapter will use a hierarchical conception 
of the self in order to show how Mill applies the Harm Principle only to first-order 
reasoning and action-taking, while leaving second-order reasoning open to explicit 
influence. Finally, I will clarify Mill’s conception o f harm and the scope of the Harm 
Principle. Harm alone does not satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
application of the Harm Principle; the harm must be other-regarding, and most 
importantly, wrongful. This chapter is intended to show that despite negative liberty 
being the key condition to social progress, there remains a very positive element to 
Mill’s conception of freedom. This positive element sanctions a form of control that any 
advocate of liberty should be at least suspicious of. The final judgement as to what kind 
of liberal Mill is, if at all, will be reserved for the final chapter o f the thesis. Much turns
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on the extent to which one considers the influence o f people’s thoughts and beliefs to 
actually be forms of coercion. What this chapter will show is that Mill’s system 
simultaneously contains high levels of influence along with provisions for a particular 
yet absolute sphere of non-interference.
The Non-Neutrality o f Mill
One of the big distinctions between Mill and contemporary liberals like Rawls, 
is Mill’s partiality towards certain conceptions of the good, or ways of life (I will use 
the two interchangeably), which supposedly produce more utility. Chapter IV contains a 
litany of behaviours and dispositions disfavoured by Mill. He goes to great lengths to 
articulate the consequences of certain actions as meted out by the law, or spontaneously 
by society. Mill begins, “I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded 
by others ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or 
deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable.”1 He then goes on to say that people 
who are successful with their own pursuits deserve praise, while those who do not “a 
sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow.” 2 Mill continues, “lowness or 
deprivation of taste” renders the individual “necessarily and properly a subject of 
distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt”. This evaluation o f preferences goes 
beyond On Liberty, for even in the contemporaneously conceived Utilitarianism, Mill 
makes similar claims about the disvalue of certain forms of life. His infamous 
classification of higher and lower pleasures reinforces his partiality for the more 
intellectual and elevated pursuits.
“No intelligent being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be 
an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, 
even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is 
better satisfied with his lot that they are with theirs.”3
Apart from the unsustainability of this claim as discussed in Chapter Four, Mill makes 
clear his preferences with regards to conceptions of the good. What is important about 
these well-trodden passages is Mill’s endorsement of penalties for individuals who 
display these character types. He is not lamenting the unfortunate consequences that 
some people will experience as they pursue their own conceptions of the good; he is
1 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, in Collected Works XVII, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 278.
2 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 278.
3 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in Collected Works X, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 211.
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employing public sentiment and disapproval in order to shape behaviour in ways that 
would be inexpedient to do by law. Underpinning Mill’s endorsement of this particular 
conception of the good, is a philosophy of history largely taken from Comte, yielding a 
theory of progress based on his conception of human psychology that will be discussed 
shortly. Placing individuals within the conditions prescribed by the 
Harm Principle will enable this gradual convergence on a particular range of 
conceptions of the good, namely those that comprise the higher pleasures, or his 
Religion of Humanity.
Mill does go to great lengths to distinguish between these natural consequences 
that result from displays of poor character, and those forms of interference that result 
from ‘prejudiciously affecting or harming others’ interests. He consistently 
differentiates between penalties, which are the spontaneous and natural consequences of 
one’s imprudence, and punishments, which are the moral retributions emanating from 
our resentment, but dispensed and embodied by law.4
“The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly 
incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is 
due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal 
distinction. It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct 
towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have right 
to control him, or in things in which we know we have not.”5
Mill makes his well-known distinction between the part o f a person’s life that concerns 
others, and the part that concerns only oneself. As will be discussed shortly, this 
distinction comprises part of the three criteria of the Harm Principle. Imprudence and 
indignity, though not violations of the principle, still are to incur certain reactions. 
These reactions, or the aforementioned “natural penalties” can only be those 
“inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgements of 
others”. 6 Violations of rights to others, on the other hand, are categorically different. 
Transgressions of the Harm Principle demand that society inflict some punishment on 
the agent.7 The punishment, as opposed to penalty, necessarily must involve some
o
curtailment of liberty of action, even if by indirect means. Penalties cannot take the 
form of direct interference because they express public disapproval of certain
4 Joseph Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999), p. 190.
5 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 279.
6 Ibid., p. 278.
7 Rights here refer to everyone’s obligation to each other not to infringe upon the conditions for the 
pursuit o f  utility.
8 A fine or duty might be an example o f this.
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characteristics. Mill singles out “rashness”, “obstinacy”, “self-conceit”, those “who 
cannot live within moderate means”, and those “who pursue[s] the animal pleasures at 
the expense of those of feeling and intellect” as fit for moral reprobation. These defects 
of character warrant a different response because they are not violations of any specific 
obligation (except, arguably to oneself). Why Mill goes to such lengths to articulate two 
distinct types of control society wields is an issue to be taken up shortly. For now, it 
suffices that Mill does conceive of two necessary responses to different kinds of 
failings: one for social obligations, and the other for character traits that do not concern 
others.
Before analysing the way in which Mill’s system employs both control and 
freedom of action, it will be helpful to briefly look at some challenges to Hamburger’s 
thesis. Defending Hamburger’s thesis will demonstrate the need for a more nuanced 
interpretation of Mill’s thought. In the article entitled, “Was Mill a Liberal?”, C.L. Ten 
directly challenges Hamburger’s thesis.9 He argues that Hamburger distorts and 
misrepresents key passages to support his claim that Mill deliberately misled the readers 
of On Liberty. 10 Hamburger highlights the fact that Mill devotes much ink to the 
condemnation of ‘selfishness’ and ‘self-indulgence’ and considers them key obstacles to 
the realisation of the Religion of Humanity. Ten retorts that “selfishness affects others 
and is not a self-regarding fault. So the controls here do not support Hamburger’s 
thesis.”1’Two responses can be made to this claim. First, if  we confine ourselves to J.C. 
Rees’s definition of other-regarding actions as being only, “cases where the interests of 
others are either threatened or actually affected”, it’s not clear to me that selfish actions 
do meet this criterion.12 Leaving aside the issues of what ‘threat’ and ‘affect’ actually 
constitute, I don’t see how a failure to be generous can in any way be a frustration of 
someone’s interests. It may not forward their interests, but it certainly does not make 
lower one’s interest-satisfaction than it otherwise would have been. If one were 
contractually or legally bound to redistribute one’s own resources, then the harm of 
failing to oblige would be plain. But in this case we would not describe the person as 
‘selfish’, but rather ‘delinquent’ or maybe even ‘criminal’. A selfish person is one who 
parts with the absolute minimum of one’s own resources or considerations, not one who 
violates agreements, or actively thwarts others people’s interests. Selfish people don’t 
deserve moral praise, but neither do they deserve moral condemnation, at least not in the
9 C.L.Ten, “Was Mill a Liberal?”, Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, Vo.l., No.3, 2002.
10 Ten, “Was Mill a Liberal?”, p. 367.
11 Ibid., p. 357.
12 J.C. Rees, “A Re-Reading o f  Mill on Liberty”, in J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G.W. 
Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 180.
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same way as liars, scoundrels and criminals. With regards to moral regeneration, Mill is 
not so concerned with people violating contracts and laws as he is with the disposition 
of not considering other people’s interests as primary, a wholly self-regarding 
characteristic, I would argue. The second reason I think Hamburger’s thesis retains its 
force is that (quite simply) if selfishness is the other regarding flaw that Ten argues it is, 
then there would be no contradiction in Mill’s principle if  the government or society 
coerced individuals displaying such qualities, and this is clearly not in line with the 
traditional or revisionary interpretations that Ten argues from. Mill explicitly denounces 
legislative paternalism, but he does allow for -  and even requires - individuals 
displaying miserable individuality and other self-regarding faults to be moulded into 
refinement.
Ten also denies that the scom and loss of consideration experienced are truly
coercive because they are “natural”, “spontaneous”, and not “purposely inflicted on him
1 ^for the sake of punishment.” Ten states plainly, “Control o f self-regarding conduct is 
to be achieved through non-coercive means.”14 Like Mill, Ten here seems to focus too 
much on the reasons for intervention, rather than the affects. He joins Jonathan Riley in 
reasoning that if a consequence is “inseparable” from some self-regarding behaviour or 
disposition, then society cannot be held responsible for any of the consequences 
incurred by the agent, be they harmful or not. Riley illustrates, “my liberty to avoid 
what displeases me, and to advise others to avoid it, deprives you of my company and 
support. But that is a direct consequence of your action, not of any prior design on my 
part to inflict perceptible hurt on you against your will.” 15 This strikes me as 
dangerously apologetic for dominant social prejudices and antiquated norms. If my 
racism or homophobia is the cause of your loss of consideration in my eyes (to put it 
mildly), then it hardly seems reasonable to consider that a “natural”, “inseparable”, or 
even a spontaneous consequence for which I have no responsibility. Bankruptcy may be 
the natural consequence of financial recklessness, but Mill has much more than 
prudence in mind. Reviewing his litany of character traits rightly to cause public 
disapproval, it is clear Mill’s system promotes a very particular conceptions of the good, 
as described above. The reason may be to inculcate prudence into one’s fellow man so 
they may enjoy more utility, but the affect may be received in a far different light. 
Indeed, Ten concedes the difficulty in demarcating legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
interference, “when the penalties suffered for the condemned conduct are severe enough,
13 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 278.
14 Ten, “Was Mill a Liberal?”, p. 361.
15 Jonathan Riley, M ill on Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 161.
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individual liberty is also threatened, even if not intended as forms of punishment, and 
are not the products of a coordinated and organised campaign.”16 He rightly distances 
himself from Mill’s reliance on intention because of the ambiguity of affect on the agent, 
and attempts to demarcate the legitimacy of influence by form. Mill explicitly endorses 
the spontaneous reactions of individuals, provided we “not treat him like an enemy of
1 7the society.” Part of Mill’s self-proclaimed reasons for writing On Liberty is because 
he is acutely aware of the all-pervasive influence society can have over an individual. 
Society may not intend to punish an individual for some supposed defect of prudence, 
or display of contra-social behaviour, but the aggregate expression of everyone’s
‘individuality’ may amount to a serious inhibition to one’s pursuit of his or her
1 ftparticular source of utility, and indeed, Mill recognises this. Ten is sensitive to this 
distinction between the form and reason of interference, but there is little in chapter IV 
to protect against the potentially coercive forms he and Riley presume the penalties will 
not take. Again, Ten concedes that:
“Mill seems to attach too much weight to the intention behind the interference as 
opposed to the effect. If the interference is to be legitimate, it must, for him, be
designed not merely to change the victim’s conduct, but also to change his
beliefs about the normative status of the conduct.”19
Ten does not believe that the penalties endorsed for certain beliefs and forms of 
behaviour violate any conventional reading of the harm principle. However, Mill 
distinguishes between forms of influence by the nature of the offence, not by effect, 
which leaves open the possibility that the severe penalties may appear to be quite 
coercive. Much o f this debate turns on the conceptions of freedom and coercion we 
understand Mill to be employing, to which we now must address.
Mill's Conception of Freedom
As noted above, the most controversial element o f Hamburger’s thesis is the 
extent to which he attributes illiberal strategies and goals to Mill’s project. Taking the 
individual’s point of view, Hamburger stresses that the penalties incurred for displays of 
certain character types could be coercive, thereby threatening Mill’s status as a 
paradigmatic liberal. Hamburger claims that Mill is intentionally obscure about his goal
16 Ten, “Was Mill a Liberal?”, p. 361.
17 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 280.
18 M ill’s language is unambiguous: a person “may suffer severe penalties”, “must expect to be lowered in 
the opinion o f  others”, and “he has no right to complain”, Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 278.
19 Ten, “Was Mill a Liberal?”, p. 361.
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of moral regeneration, but he also states plainly that Mill never misleads, or lies about
9 0his thesis in On Liberty. For this reason, in order to make our post-Hamburger 
interpretation powerful enough to accommodate the seemingly disparate claims made in 
Mill’s work, we must take very seriously the wrcambiguous passages in the text. The 
biggest challenge to Hamburger’s thesis, and one not adequately addressed in his 
provocative book, is Mill’s ‘one very famous principle’ itself. He is explicit: “that the 
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
91with the liberty of action of any of their numbers, is self-protection.” This sentence 
fragment (no less) affords very little room for interpretative movement, but at this stage 
I think it fruitful to look at and consider how “liberty o f action” fits into Mill’s larger 
thesis. With the help of some contemporary theories o f the self, I will attempt to show 
how in order to reconcile the control Hamburger correctly identifies in Mill’s system 
with the explicit endorsement of negative liberty correctly identified by both traditional 
and revisionary readings of Mill, it will be necessary to employ a hierarchical 
conception o f the self  Mill does not explicitly articulate such a conception, but one 
emerges from the synthesis of Mill’s theory of human progress from Comte, his post- 
Bentham psychology and epistemology, and is animated by his concern for 
individuality. I will argue that the lowest level of choice-making-cum-action-taking 
must remain completely free of moral and physical coercion, but that higher levels of 
the self remain open to influence, conditioning, and even indoctrination. The novelty o f  
this interpretation then turns on the extent to which one considers these forms of 
influence to be actual restrictions on one’s liberty, which will be discussed in the final 
chapter o f this thesis.
A good way to begin is to determine what conception of liberty Mill uses in the 
arguments of On Liberty. If we take Mill to be employing a purely negative conception 
of liberty, it would be difficult to understand how Mill’s defence of individuality from
99the oppressive effects of society fits into the larger thesis o f On Liberty. The whole of 
Chapter III is dedicated, as its name clearly states, to individuality as one of the 
elements of well-being, and the impediments to it are mainly internal defects of 
character stemming from an unsupportive social environment. On the other hand, a 
purely positive conception of liberty would force us to radically reconsider the Principle
20 Hamburger, John Stuart M ill on Liberty and Control, p. 217.
21 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 223.
22 For interpretations o f  Mill as holding purely a negative conception, see Roger Crisp, M ill on 
Utilitarianism, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 198-199; Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self: John Stuart 
M ill’s moral and po litica l philosophy, (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 162; Gerald F. 
Gaus, The M odern L iberal Theory o f  Man, (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 164-165.
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of Liberty and what constitutes harm. Such a reading would sanction coercion and other 
infringements on individuals’ ability to act as a means to promoting ‘utility in the 
widest sense’. Therefore, it would be one-sided to attribute to Mill only one formulation 
of freedom. On Liberty endorses a very particular notion of freedom, one that contains 
both positive and negative elements. G. W. Smith reads Mill’s conception of freedom as 
the product o f three factors:
1. Possession of the capacity to alter one’s character, if one wishes.
2. Absence of the impediments upon the exercise of this capacity when one 
does wish to exercise it.
3. Absence o f conditions inhibiting the occurrence of the desire.23
Point 2 is plain from the outset of the essay. The first sentence of On Liberty states 
unequivocally that the subject is not “Liberty of the Will”, but “Civil, or Social Liberty: 
the nature and limits of the power which can legitimately exercised over the 
individual”.24 Clearly, there is the element of un-coerced action involved. Once the limit 
of this power is located, what remains is the sphere of activity within which individuals 
are free to pursue their goals in accordance with their life-plans. However, the same 
passage makes reference to the nature of this power as well. The aptly named Chapter 
IV, “Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual” spells out exactly 
how this power operates and for what ends. As Hamburger highlights, society is to play 
a substantial role in inducing certain forms of behaviour. As discussed in the previous 
section, Mill is not neutral between different forms of the good, but rather is trying to 
turn people away from what he identifies as the largest obstacle to moral and social 
reform -  the selfish, unsophisticated pursuit of lowly pleasures by the masses. Reform, 
or regeneration, necessitates the positive element described by point 1. The implication 
of Chapter IV is that only with the help of society, and elites in particular, can 
individuals hope to discriminate the highly from the lowly, or the prudent from the 
imprudent. It is society’s natural penalties that manifest themselves as the consequences 
of such defects o f judgement, and so the community’s role cannot be underestimated. 
However, Chapter III of On Liberty argues from the opposite direction. ““Pagan self-
9 ^assertion” is one of the elements of human worth, as well as “Christian self-denial.”” 
Here Mill argues that diversity of inclination and disposition are matters of fact, and that 
the conformity demonised in On Liberty is the unnatural superimposition by the
23 G. W. Smith, “Social Liberty and Free Agency”, in J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G. W. 
Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 250.
24 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 217.
25 Ibid., p. 266.
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Victorian ethos of the time. To that end, I think it more appropriate to word Smith’s 
point 1 in the affirmative, rather than the negative. Full freedom is not merely an 
absence o f the impediments to the occurrence of the desire to alter one’s character, 
because such a desire is positively induced by society. In this characterisation, point 3 is 
subsumed by point 1, because there is little to suggest that Mill concerned himself with 
the origins of the desire to alter one’s character -  either the individual has met this 
necessary but insufficient condition independently, or requires the assistance of those 
regenerated members o f society, i.e. elites, to achieve it. Clearly, Mill’s conception of 
full freedom argued for in On Liberty has both positive and negative elements, and as 
such requires us to take seriously some of Hamburger’s claims regarding the extent to 
which Mill envisions a convergence of individuals’ behaviour, if  not control of it.
Before proceeding, two tensions need to be addressed, namely, that Chapter IV 
seems to conflict with the two proceeding chapters, albeit in different ways. As we have 
discussed above, and as Hamburger points out, Chapter IV is where Mill seems to 
diverge from the previous chapters. It is where Mill writes at great lengths about the 
legitimate and illegitimate influences of society over the individual. As described above, 
Mill is not lamenting the unfortunate consequences of some individuals’ pursuit of  
utility, but is employing public sentiment to guide and curb certain behaviour. This 
chapter, if given full consideration may seem antithetical to the preceding chapters, 
Chapter II in particular where the importance of full freedom of thought and expression 
is given its most forceful articulation. However, Hamburger neglects another tension 
that arises from paying close attention to the implications of Chapter IV. Employing 
public sentiment to help individuals regenerate their moral outlooks would only be 
effective if it were a small minority of individuals still stuck in their selfish and lowly 
ways. The argument of Chapter IV is that the majority would help the unreformed few 
see the imprudence of their ways, and assist them in turning their desires to higher, 
more utility-providing conceptions of the good. The presumption is that it is merely a 
small minority that need assistance inducing the ability to alter one’s character, whereas 
a majority have either already reformed their moralities, or have been bom with the 
correct character disposition Mill endorses. The second tension becomes manifest when 
we compare this argument to those made in Chapter III. Here, Mill pontificates 
eloquently on the diverse nature of human beings:
26 Hamburger, John Stuart M ill on Liberty and Control, p. 180. Not only does Hamburger say that Chapter 
IV pulls in the opposite direction o f  Chapter III, he also says it is frequently neglected by interpreters o f  
Mill.
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“Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly 
the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself 
on all sides, according to the tendency of inward forces which make it a living 
thing.27
If human nature is as such, then Mill needs to account for those who are yet to reform 
their moral outlooks. His judgement that “despotism of custom is everywhere the 
standing hindrance to human advancement”28 is the central thesis of Chapter III, and the 
presupposition is that the majority of people are still under this “yoke”. If this is the case, 
then the natural penalties which result from expressions o f lowly taste would not have 
the force required to assist individual efforts to regenerate themselves, and herein lies 
the tension. Chapter IV is coherent only if there is a small minority of individuals yet to 
be regenerated, whereas chapter III argues that the natural order o f things -  that humans 
are innately creative, diverse beings -  is being artificially suppressed, i.e. the sway of 
custom is getting the better o f society. Unfortunately, Mill cannot have it both ways. 
Either an endangered minority of independent elites are resisting the homogenising 
effects of custom and tradition, in which case it is difficult to see how the natural 
penalties would come about from people who display the same lowly behaviour, or only 
a few un-reformed troglodytes still remain entrenched in their ways, scarcely holding 
back the inevitable progression towards the entire moral regeneration of society. 
Unfortunately, we will have to turn to other writings to ascertain the extent o f Mills
• • 9 0“strategic optimism”. However, we needn’t determine that in order to tease out an 
interpretation of Mill’s thesis in On Liberty that can accommodate both positions. This 
interpretation is where we now must turn.
The Hierarchical Conception of the Self
In order to reconcile the seemingly disparate and conflicting claims regarding 
individual freedom versus control, we must understand Mill’s conception of the self. 
Only by interpreting a particular conception of the self, namely a hierarchical one, can
TOwe integrate the arguments made in Chapters II and IV. This conception enables us to 
accept the influence society is to have over the individual, while maintaining a sphere of 
negative, first order, liberty. There is nothing contradictory about this claim, because for 
Mill, “truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the
27 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 263.
28 Ibid.,p. 272.
29 Smith, “Social Liberty and Free Agency”, p. 251.
30 This interpretation will not necessitate our taking a position on the conflict between Chapters III and IV.
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o 1
reconciling of opposites”. As will be shown, this sphere is the necessary condition 
within which individuals must choose to alter their characters towards higher, and 
therefore more utility-providing goods. Conceived this way, the societal influence 
exercised over the individual’s second-order desires and reasoning in no way betrays the 
Harm Principle, or adversely affects freedom in the more positive sense that Mill 
implies. In fact, it promotes freedom in this sense. Before mapping this conception onto 
Mill’s thought, it will be helpful to fully articulate the hierarchical self.
A helpful way to think about how it might be possible to reconcile the influence 
individuals experience with the Harm Principle is given to us by Harry Frankfurt’s
• '3 ' )
conception of a person. A wide range of creatures, both human and animal, experience 
desires. Lots o f creatures experience competing desires as well, and a simple weighing 
of desires produces the one that moves the creature to action. Person G may desire both 
x and y, but if his desire for y is stronger, then it will stimulate his will to action. A 
smaller range of creatures not only have desires, but have desires about desires as well, 
or second-order desires. The existence of such desires signifies the conscious capacity 
for reflective awareness, and precludes the inclusion o f the animal species, as far as 
humans know. Such desires can be about the presence or absence of first-order desires, 
or more strongly, about a first-order desire constituting one’s will. This latter case 
Frankfurt calls second-order volitions, and he states plainly that possession of them are 
“essential” to be considered a person.33 One who merely has second-order desires, but 
who is indifferent as to whether any of his first-order desires constitute his will, 
Frankfurt calls a wanton individual. An individual who not only has second-order 
volitions, but who can realize them by having the first-order desires in question actually 
move the individual to action enjoys freedom of the will.34 Because the wanton fails to 
have any second-order volitions, only second-order desires, freedom of the will is not 
possible for such an individual.
Another version of the hierarchical self is given by Gerald Dworkin. Dworkin 
also conceives of lower and higher-order desires along the same lines as Frankfurt, but 
adds that one must identify with the motivations that move one to act on one’s lower 
order desires. Furthermore, this process of identification must not be influenced by
31 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 254.
32 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom o f  the Will and the Concept o f a Person”, The Inner Citadel, John 
Christman ed., (Oxford: OUP, 1989), p. 63.
33 Frankfurt, “Freedom o f  the Will and the Concept o f  a Person”, p. 67.
34 Ibid., p. 69.
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external forces; it must enjoy what Dworkin calls “procedural independence”. A 
person held at gunpoint may be freely giving her money over to the robber, but is not 
doing so wilfully. The motivational factor of having to hand over one’s money in order 
to keep one’s life is clearly not one that the person identifies with as her own. Dworkin’s 
account of autonomy as authenticity plus identification o f desires differs to Frankfurt’s 
account in one striking way. Frankfurt gives the example of a willing drug addict, one 
who desires to a have first-order desire to consume some drug, and subsequently allows 
that desire to stimulate the will to consume it. Frankfurt then points out that this person 
is not truly free because his first-order desire to consume the drug will remain effective, 
even if  his second-order desire about the drug changes. Dworkin, on the other hand, 
maintains that so long as the addict identifies the desire to consume the drug as 
authentically his own, he is autonomous, and subsequently morally responsible for his 
actions. Interestingly, Frankfurt says that despite being unfree, because it is more than 
the addict’s first-order desire, or addiction, that moves him to action, he is morally 
responsible for his actions as well.
With these two conceptions in mind, we can now see how society wields 
influence over individuals without violating the Harm Principle. Mill can be 
frustratingly ambiguous at crucial places in his writings, which is why we must take 
very seriously his wrcambiguous passages. The very first line of On Liberty gives the 
scope of the principle, and a clue as to Mill’s conception o f liberty in the book.
“The subject of this essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so 
unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine o f Philosophical Necessity; but 
Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be 
legitimately exercised by society over the individual.”37
The emphasis on “Civil” or “Social” liberty does seem to imply a purely negative 
conception of liberty being articulated by the essay. Not only can there be positive 
elements to social liberty, but as our analysis above reveals, Mill’s normative claims in 
the essay definitely employ both positive and negative aspects o f his conception of 
liberty. However, he states plainly that he is not describing a deeper, metaphysical 
“Liberty of the Will,” the antithesis of the “doctrine o f Philosophical Necessity,” or 
determinism. Furthermore, Mill’s one very simple principle is equally modest in its
35 Gerald Dworkin, “The Concept o f  Autonomy”, The Inner Citadel, John Christman ed., (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 61.
36 Dworkin uses the word “authenticity”, but it does not suggest some essentailist quiddity being 
expressed by the desire; it merely refers to one identifying a desire as an expression o f  who the person is, 
or rather, wants to be.
37 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 217.
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object, “that the sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the liberty o f action o f any of their numbers, is self-protection” 
(Emphasis added).38 I therefore posit that the Harm Principle elucidated in Mill’s 
seminal work only to applies to the lowest order of decision-making cum action-taking, 
or first order activity, as I will refer to this process as. This level is analogous to 
Frankfurt and Dworkin’s lower order desires, but includes both the reasoning and the 
physical attempt to fulfil the desire. This level of activity however differs from their two 
models in that it does include some reflective processes regarding desires, and how to 
fulfil them. In short, it is character, as described by Mill, and G. W. Smith. Therefore, 
individuals who only display my first-order activity would still be ‘persons’ on the 
Frankfurt model. Some individuals might also possess higher, or second-order desires 
regarding their first-order activity, or character. This realm of reasoning I will call 
second-order activity, and is analogous to Smith’s first factor for full freedom, as 
described above. It includes all reflective desires about one’s character, a capacity to 
reason about one’s character, and most importantly, the ability to change one’s 
characters, i.e. freedom of the will on Frankfurt’s model. However, I am reluctant to 
employ Frankfurt’s label, or even to refer to the exercise of this capacity as “autonomy” 
because I fear it will confuse my aims here. The introduction o f this type of 
interpretation will enable us to reconcile the higher-level influence society is to have 
over individuals, because the natural penalties incurred by individuals displaying lowly 
characters are those that affect only second-order activity. Provided the first-order of 
decision-making cum action-taking is protected from interference, elites or society can 
influence individuals without violating the Harm Principle. For example, elites may do 
anything from encouraging to indoctrinating new forms of behaviour. They may also 
ostracise, or deny opportunities to those displaying lowly characters, as part of the 
“natural” consequences to their character defects. The influence o f the elites may even 
take on a much more subtler and pervasive form as described by thinkers such as 
Foucault or B. F. Skinner. This is one of the dangers overlooked by negative liberty 
advocates, such as Berlin, but not by some recent feminist writers who rightly see
• I Qinfluences on preference formation and conditioning as obstacles to truly ‘free’ choice. 
This danger is not the irrational fear of radical critics of liberalism, for Mill himself 
acknowledges the potential authoritarianism of the ‘public pedagogy’. Society
38 Ibid., p 223.
39 For example, see Janet Radcliffe Richards, The Sceptical Feminist, (London: Penguin, 1994).
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“practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds o f political 
oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it 
leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details 
of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”40 '
Presumably, this is a perversion of the influence society posses over the individual. It is 
important to keep in mind that this formulation of the Harm Principle is compatible with 
this extreme form of second-order control.
On this interpretation, such influence could not be considered harmful or 
morally coercive, because it actually contributes to the personal development of the 
individual. This strategy is to be contrasted with patemalistically coercing individuals to 
choose the higher forms of the good at the first-order, because it denies individuals the 
ability to exercise their deliberative capacities, and so would be considered harmful. As 
described in the previous chapter, deliberative choice is how a person’s individuality is 
actualised, and is the source o f the highest utility. However, it is not merely the 
procedure that yields the highest utility, the content of the choice is just as important. If 
upon deliberating, one chooses the lower pleasures, then this would be evidential of 
defective reasoning skills. One must choose the higher forms in order to experience the 
fullest utility possible, and be ‘free’.41 Read this way, society induces the emergence of 
the ability to alter one’s character towards higher conceptions of the good, while 
protecting first-order activity by application of the Harm Principle. Bearing in mind that 
moral regeneration is the goal to which Mill aims, the principle maintains the conditions 
for the equal pursuit o f individual utility, regardless of how lowly. What I am 
suggesting is that the Harm Principle is part of a larger strategy to facilitate individual 
development, or progress.
This strategy consists of arguments put forward in Chapter IV for the prohibition 
of paternalism, Chapter II for the freedom of thought, and finally Chapter III for the 
promotion of individuality. Mill’s strategy is based on his empirical epistemology, and 
privileges certain reflective choices, namely those for the higher goods, over the ability 
to choose in itself. This concern for a socialised procedure and content of choice makes 
for a highly normative conception of autonomy in Mill’s thought, possibly one at odds 
with contemporary conceptions. 42 Although he is promoting the development o f a
40 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 220.
41 This point on freedom will be taken up more fully in the concluding chapter.
42 “an autonomous agent m ust.. .have distanced himself in some measure from the conventions o f  his 
social environment and from the influence o f  the persons surrounding him.” John Gray, M ill on Liberty: 
A Defence, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 74.
147
reflective capacity to choose, this capacity is only a means for the proper appreciation of 
the higher forms of the good, which yield more utility.
Mill’s theory of progress is the bridge on which we move from the freedom 
protected by the Harm Principle in Chapter II to the penalties sanctioned in Chapter IV. 
The clearest exposition of this theory is found in Chapter V, in the form of his argument 
against paternalism. This argument can be viewed as the key to Mill’s theory because 
any such theory would have to account for the unambiguous freedom demanded by the 
Harm Principle, especially in light of Hamburger’s thesis that Mill intended a high level 
of control. The last things Mill considers in On Liberty are not applications o f the Harm 
Principle, but reasons extraneous to the arguments of the main thesis prohibiting 
government involvement in the affairs of individuals. Following from his first objection 
to governmental involvement, where he claims that regarding the affairs of the 
individual the individual is the most suited and knowledgeable to deal with such affairs, 
he considers those cases where the government may in fact be better suited to deal with 
certain affairs of the individual. Mill says:
“it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the 
government, as a means to their own mental education -  a mode of 
strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgement, and giving them 
a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal.”43
Moral or physical coercion might initially seem a more efficient means to facilitating 
moral regeneration if coercive -  by which I mean interference with liberty of action, but 
the price would be individuals with deficient faculties of reasoning and choice-making 
of the second-order kind. This is Bentham’s problem discussed in Chapter Four of the 
thesis: that it’s simply not evident that maintaining equal spheres of non-intervention 
would maximise utility, unless one has a concern for the capacities one develops within 
that sphere in the long run. The case against paternalism rests not on moral claims about 
the inherent evil o f government interference, but on the expediency of allowing 
individuals free reign to tend to their own matters in order to stimulate these crucial 
faculties. Mill continues:
“These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject by 
remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a 
different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as part of a national 
education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of citizens, the practical part of 
the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of
43 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 305.
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personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of 
joint interests, the management of joint concerns -  habituating them to act from 
public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite 
instead of isolating them from one another.”44
With the fullest possible legal and social freedom for experiments in living, and with 
more successful and morally regenerated individuals ‘helping’ to promote certain 
outcomes via penalties, namely those that yield more utility, individuals will gradually 
develop the character that will desire and can appreciation the higher forms of the good.
A similar argument can be derived from Chapter II, where Mill makes his most 
forceful arguments for freedom of thought and expression, which also contributes to his 
larger theory of progress and personal development. In particular, the second case Mill 
considers -  where the suppressed opinion is false -  illustrates the point that Mill is not 
only concerned with ends, but means as well. In this particular example, the end is 
knowledge. Mill laments the fact that:
“There is a class o f persons...who think it enough if a person assents 
undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of 
the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against 
the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can at once get their creed 
taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its 
being allowed to be questioned.”45
Such people infamously only hold “dead dogma”. Without knowing the grounds of a 
certain truth, the truth’s instrumental value is diminished. In other words, there are 
sound utilitarian reasons for not just holding a position, but for knowing why one holds 
that position as well. Merely surrendering to the truth is insufficient because of the 
tenuous, unreflective grasp the holder will have on it. One must have knowledge of 
one’s knowledge, thereby ascending to a reflective, secondary level perspective on the 
first-order activity of truth-exercising. Not only can we map a hierarchical conception of 
the self onto Mill’s epistemology, but this particular epistemology will, in turn, support 
the thesis that choice, albeit in the qualified way described above, is a crucial ingredient 
to appreciating the higher forms of the good. Individuals should know why they must 
choose the higher pleasures, and wilfully assent to their inherent superiority. Coercing 
individuals to choose the higher pleasures denies them the understanding why they must 
do so. Therefore, the Harm Principle prohibits coercing people into behaving in morally 
regenerated ways because individuals need to know the grounds of their choices. Mill
44 Ibid., p. 305.
45 Ibid., p. 242.
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presumes that with the help of society via the sanctioning o f very severe penalties 
individuals will naturally converge on a fixed range of conceptions of the good. Despite 
the range being fixed, spontaneous expressions of individuality would ensure infinite 
manifestations of higher pleasures. There is an analogous relationship between one 
knowing the grounds for a certain truth, and knowing the grounds for a certain choice. 
Both involve the exercise of second-order reflection in order to claim a comprehensive 
understanding.
Let us consider who a person who as expressions of his character exhibits the 
first-order desire to drink beer excessively, holds the belief that racism is bad, and is 
committed to stay home and raise children, rather than enter the workforce. Let us say 
that this person has not reflected on these desires/beliefs/commitments, but simply has 
come to hold them through social osmosis. The Harm Principle protects this person’s 
ability to act on all o f these elements of his character, but society has an interest in 
inducing second-order reflection on this first-order activity, in order to weed out those 
suboptimal desires and beliefs, and cement the optimal ones. Drinking beer excessively 
is clearly not utility-maximising, but prohibiting the consumption of beer will do 
nothing to convey the reasons why drinking excessively is bad, and therefore extinguish 
the desire. Society must reason with the individual that drinking excessively is 
unhealthy, undignified, dangerous, and expensive, especially pre-phylloxera Claret. 
Failing that, society can employ more forceful, yet subtle measures, like creating a 
general ethos of uncongeniality towards this sort of behaviour. Society may even go so 
far as to indoctrinate the individual using whatever means available at the time to 
influence the individual’s second-order reasoning about this particular character 
manifestation. Once the individual’s reasoning processes on this matter harmonises with 
society’s, he will be on his way to rationally extinguishing his desire to drink 
excessively. Similarly, if  this person holds the first order belief that racism is bad, 
society would still have an interest in getting the individual to understand why racism is 
bad. Employing all o f the measures previously described, society should make the 
individual understand the irrationality of all prejudice, thereby maintaining the belief 
that racism is bad as a “living truth”.
The final example about the individual committing himself to staying home and 
raising children is a slightly different example. Here, it is not the first-order 
commitment itself which needs to be re-evaluated, but the reasons one has for such a 
commitment. There is nothing inherently good or bad about forgoing a career for the 
sake of raising a family. The crucial element, that which determines whether this
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commitment is an expression of individuality or not, is the reason why one chooses to 
stay at home. If the individual stays at home because it is conventional for him to do so, 
or even worse, the individual has not reflected at all on this commitment, then it is not 
an expression of individuality, and subsequently, not utility maximising. However, if  
the individual confers with his life partner, reflects on the commitment, and then 
decides to stick to it, then it is an expression of individuality. Again, the commitment 
itself is neutral with regards to individuality, it is the reasons why he holds it or not 
which determines the utility of this expression of character. Mill presumes that with the 
help o f society via the sanctioning of very severe penalties individuals will naturally 
converge on a fixed range of conceptions of the good. Despite the range being fixed, 
spontaneous expressions of individuality would ensure indefinitely many manifestations 
of higher pleasures. There is an analogous relationship between one’s knowing the 
grounds for a certain truth, and knowing the grounds for a certain choice. Both involve 
the exercise o f second-order reflection in order to be fully utility-maximising.
The influence exercised by elites in society are not done monolithically. Elites 
may disagree, and indeed as Mill discusses in Chapter II, they must disagree in order to 
facilitate the growth of knowledge. Their disagreement happens at the second-order 
where reasons for holding beliefs are pitted against each other. The best conclusions of 
these debates are then actualised at the first-order. As Mill states in On Liberty, 
acknowledging the fallibility of our beliefs does not deny the legitimacy of acting at all, 
for “there is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the 
purpose of human life.”46 All may participate in the debate, but a natural power 
differential will arise between the experts and the laymen with regard to the ability to 
influence others. Elites will rightly be better at disseminating their conclusions to the 
wider public.
With this interpretation, we can now re-examine some o f the tensions raised 
above between the chapters of On Liberty. As Hamburger points out, Chapter IV is 
where Mill articulates the influence society is to have over individuals, even within the 
self-regarding sphere. Whereas this chapter once seemed in stark contrast to the other 
chapters of On Liberty, we can see now that it is part of a complex theory of individual 
development that attaches weight to the reasons for choice. To use Dworkin’s 
terminology, one must identify with the reasons for procedural independence. Social 
progress will only happen under conditions that entail negative liberty combined with 
second-order influence. The tension that Hamburger fails to address is the
46 Ibid., p. 231.
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proportionality of regenerated people in society. Chapter IV is only coherent if a 
majority if people in society have already adopted higher conceptions of the good, with 
only a few selfish and lowly individuals remaining. Chapter III, on the other hand, 
describes how the natural tendency of human nature is to express its diverse nature, but 
that the homogenising influence of society is forcing a vast majority into a narrow range 
of lowly forms of life. Whichever the case may be, our interpretation needn’t be 
affected. If a majority of society consists of regenerated individuals, then the few 
remaining people yet to change their characters will eventually develop the desire and 
ability to do so, as described above. However, even if during this critical period, 
Victorian and Christian attitudes remain firmly entrenched within a majority of people, 
the Harm Principle still protects the enlightened forms of life of the reformed elites. The 
conforming masses may attempt to assimilate the reformed elites by influencing their 
second-order reasoning via their own severe penalties, but any abandonment of the 
higher pleasures would never have procedural independence and so would not be a 
genuine expression of one’s individuality. Mill is clear in Utilitarianism that the higher 
pleasures are categorically more utility producing, and one would not resign them for 
any amount of the lower.
“no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person 
would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish 
and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the 
rascal is better satisfied with his lot than any of theirs.”47
Mill’s claim is that once one has sufficient experience of the higher pleasures, and 
therefore regenerated their character, one would never choose to return to the selfish 
pursuit of the lower pleasures, regardless of the influence unreformed people may 
attempt to exercise. I don’t deny that this inconsistency exists in On Liberty, I am 
simply pointing out that this interpretation of Mill can accommodate either presumption.
Hamburger is right to draw attention to the various writings by Mill that would 
seem to call into question his inclusion into any familiar variety of liberalism. Chapter 
IV of On Liberty alone demands a re-evaluation of the exact mixture of control and 
liberty Mill’s theory entails. In order to reconcile this control with the unambiguity of 
the Harm Principle, it is necessary to read a hierarchical conception of the self. Mill 
holds the moral and intellectual capacities in high regard, and so demands that 
individuals must exercise such capacities with choosing, and analogously with regards
47 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 211.
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to knowing the grounds of truths. It is for this reason that Comtian-like elites cannot 
command truths, nor can they coerce certain conceptions of the good, hence Mill’s 
argument for the full freedom of thought and the Harm Principle. However, this 
interpretation suggests that the Harm Principle only applies to the lowest level 
reasoning about choices (cum action-taking), or character, and that desires about one’s 
character and reasoning could be influenced explicitly. The final question before ending 
this thesis, is to what extent this influence is a form of coercion, and does it challenge 
the liberal status of Mill’s thought. First, Mill’s notion o f harm must be examined in 
order to determine its full scope. Its application to only first-order action is the first 
limitation; the necessary and sufficient conditions must now be determined.
Harm and the Harm principle
Unlike Bentham, Mill never explicitly defines harm. Instead, commentators are 
forced to tease out his conceptualisation by ascertaining the role and limits of the harm 
principle. A very narrow reading of the applicability of the principle might suggest a 
very narrow conception of harm, thereby allowing a wide range of injurious and hurtful 
activities that any liberal theory should prevent. There is little textual support for such a 
reading, although Mill recognises certain ‘harms’ that do not warrant prohibition by the 
principle. For example, “Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a 
competitive examination...reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted 
exertion and their disappointment.”48 A few lines later Mill explains that it is “by 
common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should 
pursue objects undeterred by this sort of consequences.”49 Unfortunately, these passages 
offer little assistance to our attempt to understand harm. It might be the case that failure 
in the market is not a harm as such, and so not covered by the principle. Such a reading 
would cohere better with most people’s intuitive understanding of harm, but there is 
another possibility. The fact that it is in mankind’s “interest” to disregard such 
“consequences” suggests that Mill does consider such failures in the marketplace as 
harms, but that they are not protected by the principle for utilitarian reasons. I think any 
concept of harm must be sensitive to the potentially debilitating effects o f failure in the 
marketplace. However one may define harm, the decline in mobility, health and access 
to resources that usually accompany economic destitution should, I argue, be subsumed 
by any definition.
48 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 292.
49 Ibid., p. 293.
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It would be difficult to interpret Mill holding such a narrow concept o f harm 
when he was elucidating the arguments in On Liberty, for later on in the essay he 
introduces a third category of acts, actions indirectly “harmful” to others, but directly so 
if  done publicly.50
“Again, there are many acts, which, being directly injurious only to the agents 
themselves... but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and 
coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightly be 
prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency”.51
Scholars have been struggling with this passage for some time. The crucial feature of 
this third category is the fact of publicity. The same actions when performed in private 
are immune to prohibition, and in fact not even indecent. It is difficult to see how this 
policy is the logical extension of the Harm Principle as presented in the first chapter. It 
is not the actions themselves which cause the indirect harm, and/or offence, but their 
mere fact o f publicity. In other words, the knowledge of an offensive action is harmless, 
whereas the visual experience of the action in public spaces is harmful. Publicity, then, 
seems to be a criterion of harm with regards to offensive actions. This is a puzzling 
position to hold, especially in light of Chapter V where Mill specifies that even in a 
country whose majority was Muslim, it would be wrong to ban the eating o f pork, 
despite the widespread offence caused. This passage might suggest that Mill holds a 
wider conception of harm, one that includes [certain] offences against common decency. 
However, if we wish to maintain this linear relationship between harm and the 
legitimacy of coercion, we need to ascertain what it is about indecency that makes it 
‘harmful’ in public but not in private, while the moral offence a Muslim may experience 
or the financial destitution one may experience remain ‘harmless’.
Jonathan Wolff has taken this issue up and attempts to give a utilitarian 
justification of what he calls the “indecency policy”. Wolff does not take society’s 
perspective and tries to explain the harm that certain public offences cause; rather, he 
takes the offensive individual’s perspective and focuses on the “consequences of 
prohibiting the actions which cause offence.”54 Wolff argues that the offence or upset 
caused by private behaviour is always outweighed by the utility loss of prohibiting
50 The first category being actions that don’t concern others and so don’t warrant interference, and second  
being actions that do harm others and could (but not necessarily) be interfered with.
51 Ibid., p. 295.
52 Mill does not specify whether he is referring to the public or private consumption o f  pork.
53 Jonathan W olff, “Mill, Indecency, and the Liberty Principle”,in M ill’s Moral, P olitical and Legal 
Philosophy, C.L.Ten ed., Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 153.
54 W olff, “Mill, Indecency, and the Liberty Principle”, p. 155
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certain experiments in living, and so must be allowed. However, the same acts when 
performed in public are susceptible to prohibition because those same acts could just as 
well be performed in private.55 With regards to eating pork in Muslim countries, Mill 
does not specify that the freedom to eat pork should only cover private consumption, or 
both public and private.56 On this reading, it would be reasonable that Mill would allow 
the prohibition of public consumption.
Wolff adequately provides the utilitarian grounding for the offence policy, but 
then points out that there remains the central problem of inconsistency with the Harm 
Principle. He concludes that there is only one interpretation regarding the content of the 
principle, and only one possible explanation regarding its scope.57 The interpretation 
requires us to deduce a properly, “contoured” concept of harm, one that includes public 
offence, but excludes market failure. Harm then becomes the necessary and sufficient 
condition to legitimately coerce, and the indecency principle is subsumed by the harm 
principle. The explanation (as opposed to interpretation) for the contradiction is that 
Mill had a rough conception of harm, and thought it the necessary and/or sufficient 
condition for legitimate coercion, but recognised that there were exceptions to its 
applicability. Here it is the scope of the principle that needs to be interpreted more so 
than the conception of harm. Wolff attributes this view, “broadly speaking”, to John 
Skorupski.58 Joseph Hamburger argues that Mill holds a very inclusive conception of 
harm, including failure to properly educate one’s children, and seeks to apply the Harm 
Principle extensively.59 Hamburger, however, fails to consider the “harm” of economic 
failure, but in light of his broader thesis regarding the function of On Liberty, I think it 
reasonable to attribute this “selective-applicability” explanation to him as well.
Neither of the ‘solutions’ are convincing alone. The text provides [just enough] 
passages to construct a notion of harm for our purposes, and the logic of the principle 
contains within it the selectivity of its application. To deduce Mill’s conception of harm, 
we must build on a tradition of interpretation within the revisionary treatment o f Mill. 
J.C. Rees is influential in distinguishing between actions that merely affect others, and 
those than affect people’s interests.60 However, one could be said to have an interest in
55 W olff clarifies that the indecency policy only covers those potentially offensive actions that just as well 
could be performed in private. Certain forms o f expression, artistic, protestive, or even educational that by 
their raison d’etat must be performed publicly would not be covered by this policy.
56 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 285.
57 Wolff, “Mill, Indecency, and the Liberty Principle”, p. 161.
58 Ibid., p. 153
59 Hamburger, John Stuart M ill on Liberty and Control, p. 10-12.
60 J. C. Rees, “A Re-Reading o f  Mill On Liberty”, in J. S. M ill On Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G.W. 
Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 174.
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market success just as one could have an interest in not being morally offended. This 
move merely shifts the interpretive burden from one ambiguous term to another, and so 
further clarification is needed. Richard Wollheim rightly perceives Rees’s conception of 
harm as too “conservative” and “relativistic”.61 A Christian might have an interest in 
forgoing all business and leisure activities on Sunday in order to properly observe the 
Sabbath (and, in fact, may have in interest in others doing the same), and could, on 
Rees’s account, claim to be harmed when compelled to engage in some such activity. 
The Muslim example that Mill cites in Chapter V clearly indicates that he was aware of 
such relativism, and wanted to exclude such interests derived from particular moral 
outlooks. Indeed, Wollheim specifically crafts his notion of harm to exclude such 
“morally-dependant-harms”, which is intended to reduce the legitimate sphere of 
interests (with regards to the Harm Principle) to those that are a brute fact of being 
human in society, as opposed to those which are derived from a particular moral or 
political outlook. Is this sufficient? First of all, it should be noted that even if  this is the 
best interpretation the text affords, it remains quite a departure from the classical 
utilitarian framework from which Mill hails. This reading essentially disregards much 
of the ‘harm’ experienced by Christian, Jewish, Hindu and Muslim fundamentalists, so 
prevalent in modem society. Furthermore, it presupposes an “unencumbered se lf’, one 
who can differentiate between those harms that occur from damaged human interest, 
and those that originate from a specific moral belief about the world. Clearly, a more 
refined concept is needed.
John Gray goes further in specifying only two “vital interests” with regards to 
the Harm Principle, namely, security and autonomy.64 Whereas I think he is on firm 
ground in ascribing the former, the latter interest of autonomy seems difficult to 
reconcile with the explicit influence Mill intends regenerated individuals to exercise. To 
begin with, Mill reminds us that the sole derivation of the principles expounded in On 
Liberty are based on “utility in the largest sense, grounded the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being.”65 Individuals surely possess a wide range of different 
interests as members of society, but it is only those interests “which, either by express
61 Richard Wollheim, “The Limits o f  State Action”, in M ill’s Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, 
C.L.Ten ed., (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 96.
62 Wollheim, “The Limits o f  State Action”, p. 102. The term “morally-dependant -harm” comes from Ted 
Honderich, “ ’On Liberty’ and Morality-Dependant Harms”, in M ill’s Moral, Political and Legal 
Philosophy, C.L.Ten ed., (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).
63 For the full utilization o f  the “unencumbered s e lf ’ to critique Rawls, see Michael Sandel, “The 
Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered S e lf’, in Communitarianism and Individualism, Shlomo 
Avineri and Avner de-Shalit eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
64 Gray, John, M ill on Liberty: A Defence, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 52.
65 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 224.
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legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered rights” that are 
properly protected by the Harm Principle.66 Mill is explicit with regards to the central 
importance of security for the pursuit o f utility (in the largest sense), “security no 
human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, 
and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment”.67 The 
concept of autonomy as a purely procedural capacity is slightly harder to ascribe to 
Mill’s thinking. Even if we conclude that security is a vital interest, or o f primary 
importance amongst many interests, it still might not be the case that every instance 
where security is threatened or actually harmed warrants intervention or coercion. For 
even though “the sole end, for which mankind are warranted” is to prevent harm to 
others, this does not necessarily mean that every instance o f harm to others necessarily 
invokes protection by the principle. There is not a direct correlation between harm and 
legitimate coercion as Wolff has argued,68 rather there are three criteria that must be met 
before legitimate power can be exercised. Once the three steps have been articulated, we 
can then make sense of Mill’s supposed selective application o f the harm principle.
The first criterion is that the action must be harmful. Despite using the word 
“harm” only once in Mill’s exposition of this principle, I think we are justified in using 
the word to denote the particular effect Mill has in mind. He writes o f “self-protection” 
(p. 223), “injuring the interests o f ’ (p. 276), “damage, or probability of damage, to the 
interests o f ’ (p. 292), and “actions as are prejudicial to the interests o f ’ (p. 292), so I 
think it reasonable ascribe to Mill a loose notion of harm, as described by the previous 
statements, which seem well-established in the literature.69 This particular effect 
constitutes the first criterion that must be met for the invocation o f the principle. An act 
must firstly be deemed to be harmful to someone’s interest, be it security, or some other 
interest. At this level, we can rule out actions that are merely annoying, or inconvenient, 
whatever might empirically be included in such categories.
The second criterion that must be met is that of the harm being other-regarding. 
That is to say, the interest that is being harmed must belong to someone other than the 
agent. On this level, we can see why with regards to offence, publicity is the crucial 
element to its prohibition. It is not that offensive acts are tolerably harmful, but when 
performed in public makes it so much more harmful as to tip the scales in favour of
66 Ibid., p. 276.
67 Mill, ’’Utilitarianism”, p. 251.
68 Wolff, “Mill, Indecency, and the Liberty Principle”, p. 161.
69 Despite not knowing who first coined the phrase “Harm Principle”, it is used by some synonymously 
with the Principle o f  Liberty. See John Gray and G. W.Smith, “Introduction”, in J. S. M ill On Liberty in 
Focus, John Gray and G. W. Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 2.
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prohibition. Rather, it is that acts done in private -  by definition - cannot be offensive or 
harmful to anyone other than the agent.70 It is for this reason that Alan Ryan can deny
71that the reasoning of the Wolfden Report of 1954 is “Millian”. The Report concludes 
that there should be a private sphere morality that the law need not bother to persecute. 
No matter how ‘wicked’ or ‘immoral’ an act may be, so long as it is not harmful to 
other people, there are no grounds for legal coercion. Ryan argues that because an 
action performed in private is [by definition] harmless [to others], it is completely 
beyond to scope of moral appraisal. Private or self-regarding immorality is not 
tolerable; private anything is simply not morally appraisable at all.
There is one ambiguity that perhaps need not be resolved for our purposes here, 
but is worth noting. The way the second criterion is framed, it might be satisfied by the 
mere introduction of a second person, even if it is a consenting second person. Mill 
does not speak of consent with regards to the Harm Principle, so it is unclear if two (or 
more) people were involved in some mutually self-harmful activity would meet this 
criterion. It would not be difficult to think of a common example of such a case. There 
are lots of people involved in reciprocally harmful emotional relationships. Perhaps 
each person even recognises the harm, but carries on for other reasons. A better example 
would be two people involved in a brawl. It could be argued that the fight was 
consensual, in that both sides persist in aggressing, rather than one on the defensive, or 
even retreat. Of course, it would be easy to employ arguments about secondary harms to 
others, like alarm, but only if done in public. To extend this example, consider one of 
the several underground, bare-knuckled boxing leagues. These are totally private, by 
which I mean they are not open to the public, are well hidden from strays, and the 
people involved are well aware of the dangers involved. Nonetheless, the participants 
consent. Such leagues are currently illegal, however it is difficult to see how Mill would 
view them with regards to the second criterion. There is for sure harm, but can we 
consider it other-regarding when the people involved are all willing participants? It 
remains unclear.
The third and final criterion that must be met in order for legitimate coercion to 
be employed is normative. The other regarding harm must in the end be also wrongful. 
The Harm Principle here cannot alone determine its own scope without appeal to the 
higher Principle o f Utility. As Chapter IV of Utilitarianism spells out, an action is
70 Here, I use the term “private” not merely to mean “behind closed do.ors”, but to imply no effect on 
anyone other than the agent in any way.
71 Alan Ryan, “John Stuart M ill’s Art o f  Living” in J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, John Gray and G. W. 
Smith eds., (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 164.
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wrong if and only if it violates some “right”, as generated by a perfect utilitarian 
obligation to society.72 And of course, such obligations stem from maintaining the 
conditions of everyone’s equal ability to develop their capacities to appreciate the 
higher conceptions of the good. That is to say, the punishment of an offence promotes 
utility in the long-term, progressivist perspective.
Following Comte, Mill is calling for the conditions to facilitate social progress. 
It is only at this level that we can make sense of some o f the more puzzling cases 
discussed above that do and do not warrant protection by the Harm Principle. 
Competition in the market place does produce harm, which is the only way to describe 
the effects of economic destitution. Furthermore, interaction in the market is certainly 
other-regarding. Finally, however, the harm that competition produces cannot be said to 
be wrongful because society maintains no such “right” to be protected from market
7Tharms. Not only is failure (or rather, fear of failure) an important motivator and 
stimulant of the market, but there would also be huge utilitarian costs to protecting such 
a right.74 We can also see why the principle prohibits public indecency, but not the 
eating of pork in Muslim countries. Indecent behaviour in public, whatever that 
behaviour may consist o f (Mill does not prescribe what should be indecent, he simply 
argues from whatever empirically is indecent), causes shock and dismay and can 
constitute a harm. This indecency is also other-regarding because it is done in public. 
Finally, because society has an interest in preventing individuals from experiencing 
shock and dismay as a part of maintaining security, we can conclude that the action is 
therefore wrongful. Now, if the content of the indecent behaviour did (empirically) 
consist of the consumption of pork, then on this formulation of the Harm Principle, we 
would be justified in banning only its public consumption. The passage where Mill 
discusses a Muslim majority society illustrates how even in a country where there was 
near unanimity of disgust and disdain of some activity, like eating pork, we would still 
be unjustified in its outright prohibition.75 The passage is supposed to illustrate the 
sanctity of the self-regarding sphere, no matter how small in practice, and this raises 
another ambiguity on this reading. My interpretation here is sensitive to the harm 
experienced by public acts of indecency, but is necessarily insensitive to the potential 
harm of the mere knowledge of such behaviour being performed in private. Wolff asks
72 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, pp. 246, 259.
73 Although the utilitarian reasons for not maintaining such a right is clear, Mill also refers to the 
“Principle o f  Free Trade”, see “On Liberty”, p. 293.
74 O f course, the welfare system does, in theory, protect a right not to be completely desolate, probably 
for utilitarian reasons.
75 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 284.
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how it is that the source of a harm renders it categorically different.76 A Muslim or 
Jewish person might experience great shock and dismay at the mere thought of her 
neighbours were freely and happily consuming pork. Must we completely disregard the 
harm from thought of others eating pork, as opposed to harm from the sight o f it? On 
the one hand, we could say yes because society has such a strong interest in individuals 
being capable of performing experiments in living, in this case experiments with pork, 
as to always outweigh the disutility of the shocking thought.77 This is roughly the 
conclusion that Wolff comes to in his utilitarian grounding of the indecency policy. On 
the other hand, we could expand the other-regarding sphere to include knowledge-as- 
effect. The thought of someone’s behaviour would then convert the action into an other- 
regarding one, and if it were injurious enough to one’s fragile sensitivities, would 
constitute a harm. This latter interpretation would be more consistent with classical 
utilitarianism, but also potentially shrinks the self-regarding sphere into non-existence. 
Therefore, I would side with Wolff in disregarding the harm from shocking thoughts, 
but for different reasons.
The self-regarding sphere is clearly intended to be the actual spatial-conceptual 
realm wherein one’s actions do not affect anyone else. Some have argued that no such 
sphere can exist because everyone’s actions affect others, even if in remote ways. 
Demarcating some boundary between the self and other regarding spheres would
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basically be arbitrary and without utilitarian support. Against this claim, I maintain 
that it is possible to make a demarcation between actions that affect others and actions 
that do not, precisely at this contentious boundary region of publicity and thought. The 
sight of some action clearly makes it other regarding, and possibly even harmful 
depending on the sensitivities of the witness. However, the mere thought o f some 
offensive action does not render that action other regarding. It is one thing to witness 
some indecent or blasphemous act and to be offended by it, or even harmed; it is quite 
another thing to experience the same level of shock by the mere thought of some act. 
Empirically - although highly unlikely - the pain may be the same, but the causal agent 
of the pain would not be actor, it would be the thinker, thereby making the 
offence/shock/harm self-inflicted. Whereas witnessing an offence is a response to the 
publicity of the action, thinking of an offence is an act initiated by the thinker. Recalling 
the memory of some offensive act would be the product of an other-regarding act, as it
76 W olff, “Mill, Indecency, and the Liberty Principle”, p. 151. W olff is actually citing Jonathan Riley with 
this question. See Riley, Jonathan, ‘One very Simple Principle’, Utilitas Vol. 3, 1991, p. 23.
77 Wolff, “Mill, Indecency, and the Liberty Principle”, p. 155.
78 James fitzjames Stephens, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, R. J. White ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), pp. 137 -  150.
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would be based on an original visual experience, but the mere suspicion of such acts 
would not suffice, provided the people supposedly involved took adequate steps to 
maintain privacy. If the mere thought of some offence was sufficient to render it an 
other-regarding act, then there would be no means by which to differentiate between the 
knowledge of such act, the suspicion of such act, and the fabrication of such act. Any 
notion of security would evaporate as nobody could be certain that somebody was 
taking offence to something they may or may not be doing. This threat would pose a 
particular problem for persecuted minorities, and social elites trying to regenerate 
people’s preferences. The thought of some offensive action, and the subsequent shock, 
can only be considered self-inflicted, and so it would not meet the second criterion of 
the Harm Principle.
Conclusion
Hamburger’s thesis is controversial, but has been a refreshing expansion to the 
secondary literature on Mill’s social and political thought. Although his full thesis that 
Mill endorses coercive strategies in order to morally regenerate individuals is 
unsustainable, he is correct in identifying certain forms of influence and control that 
challenge Mill’s status a paradigmatic liberal. In this chapter I have shown the forms of 
behaviour Mill disapproves of, and how he attempts to demarcate legitimate forms of 
influence. I next showed how the nature o f that influence can be of a second-order type, 
applicable only to individuals’ reflective thoughts and reasons about their characters, or 
their first-order activity. Mill thinks it inexpedient to morally or physically coerce 
people to choose the higher pleasures and conceptions o f the good because it denies 
them the proper exercise of their second-order reflective capacities and deliberation, 
which are generic. It is not enough to simply reflect on one’s first-order activity, one 
must do so correctly. In other words, individuals need to know the grounds and reasons 
for the superiority of higher goods and wilfully assent to them. It is not that there is a 
narrow set of forms of life that Mill endorses, rather there is a range within which there 
might be indefinite possibilities. Individuals are to conduct experiments in living in 
order to discover a manifestation of the higher goods that are an expression of their own 
unique individuality. The Harm Principle ensures the equal opportunity for all to 
conduct their experiments free from interference by those forces hoping to maintain the 
status quo, or worse. Mill’s conception of harm may be an empirical matter, but his 
selective applicability o f the principle only to other-regarding, wrongful harms, and then 
only to first-order activity, or “freedom of action”, enables social elites to influence the
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evaluation of the outcomes of the experiments, via severe penalties, need be. In this way, 
elites assist the masses in developing the appreciation and desire for the higher forms of 
the good, and hence have a crucial role to play in the progressive complexity and 
increase in quantity of utility.
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7. Conclusion:
A very normative liberal-utilitarianism
This reassessment of Mill’s liberalism began by looking at the dominant 
controversy in the secondary literature since the late 1960s. The dispute was mainly 
about whether liberal principles were derived successfully from his utilitarianism 
foundation, and was initiated by Isaiah Berlin who argues that Mill fails in his attempt. 
The debate should have been about Mill’s relationship to liberalism altogether. This 
point is made forcefully by Joseph Hamburger, who argues that Mill’s project was to 
bring about a new Religion of Humanity, an idea he receives from Auguste Comte. To 
that end, the liberties argued for in On Liberty were nothing more than a strategy to 
break down existing Victorian and Christian social norms and beliefs, and to be 
replaced by more secular and altruistic ones. Couched within the arguments for liberty, 
were intimations of how society would encourage certain preferences and discourage 
others. Social elites were to play a key role in reforming the characters of individuals, 
and could even attach “severe penalties” to certain self-regarding behaviour.1 This 
attribution of freedom and high levels of social control challenges Mill’s status as a 
paradigmatic liberal, but also reveals the depth and complexity of his thought. For, even 
though Hamburger is wrong in his attribution of wholly illiberal strategies to Mill’s 
ultimate project, he highlights the influence of Auguste Comte, a thinker not only 
outside of the liberal tradition, but a well-known critic of it as well.
Any attempt to clarify Mill’s position in the liberal lineage needs to take into 
account the influence of Comte, which the literature largely neglects. This influence is 
self-evident, as Mill himself discusses in the Essay entitled, “Auguste Comte and 
Positivism”. After admitting a few beneficial contributions that positivism has made, 
Mill then goes on to criticise not only Comte’s positivism, but also attacks Comte as a 
person. Perhaps this frank admission of the philosophical relationship between Comte 
and Mill has put the issue to rest in the secondary literature. However, a closer 
inspection of their systems reveals more similarities than the literature notes, and even 
Mill admits.
1 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” in Collected Works XVIII, John M. Robson ed. (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 278.
2 Some exceptions are Iris Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Wessel Mueller, John Stuart Mill and French Thought, (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 
1956); Linda C Raeder, John Stuart Mill and the Religion o f  Humanity”, (Columbia, MI: University o f  
Missouri Press), 2002.
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Mill shares with Comte a particular philosophy of history that adds a progressive 
dimension to Mill’s system. Mill also takes on board the notion of the Religion of 
Humanity, but with a key difference. Whereas for Comte, the Religion is an utopian and 
revolutionary stage that is, in a sense, the -end of history, for Mill it is the 
institutionalisation of the conditions for progress, as given by Mill’s particular 
conception of human psychology. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, Mill and 
Comte both employ a mix of freedom and social control in their systems.
For Comte, negative freedom was a necessary condition during the critical 
stages o f history when one dominant ontological and epistemological paradigm 
gradually gives way to another dominant one. Once the Religion of Humanity was 
achieved, freedoms would evaporate, because society - that is, humanity - would be 
organised into an organic whole under the direction of Scientist-Priests (of which, 
Comte would be the High Priest) directing all moral (including educational) and 
political affairs. Like Comte, Mill also recognises the immense influence that could be 
wielded by education and religion. As described in Chapter IV of On Liberty, society is 
to play a key role in shaping the character and behaviour of individuals. Social elites are 
to help individuals reform their tastes and develop an appreciation for the higher 
pleasures. Liberty is essential for individuals to conduct experiments in living in order 
to discover manifestations of the higher pleasures that best suit their individual natures, 
but elites assist in the evaluation of these experiments, even with the sanctioning of very 
severe penalties. Comte’s Religion of Humanity is an authoritarian utopia ritualising 
every minutia of human existence, whereas Mill’s Religion is merely the 
institutionalisation if the conditions of moral reform, which includes both negative 
freedoms and high levels of second order influence. This complex mixture o f liberty 
and control in Mill’s system requires us to reassess his relationship to liberalism, but 
falls short of Comte’s crime of “liberticide”.
These are the most significant differences between Mill and Comte’s systems. 
Although they share some o f the same methodologies, their projects are ultimately very 
different. Comte was not the only non-liberal influence on Mill’s thought, as Mill was 
the godson of Jeremy Bentham. Despite some recent attempts to interpret a liberal 
pattern of distributive justice in his writings, Bentham is best understood to be outside 
of the liberal lineage, defined loosely as a significant commitment to freedom and/or 
equality, however substantiated. Bentham does recognise the utility of equality and 
freedom to individuals, but subordinates both to security, the first necessary condition 
for the pursuit of utility. Bentham’s system is more an example of a classical form of
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utilitarianism. Mill is also advocating a utilitarian doctrine, but one significantly 
different than Bentham’s. Mill may have received the whole utilitarian framework from 
his Godfather, but he radically expands it before its final articulation in On Liberty and 
Utilitarianism.
Firstly, Bentham, like Comte, seeks to arrange society so as to harmonise 
interests, which negates one of the key conditions o f progress for Mill, the conflict of 
ideas. If, according to Bentham, an individual’s interests could be tied to society’s 
interests, then everyone’s could be fulfilled without conflict, and without excessive cost 
to the state. The best example of this reasoning is Bentham’s panpoptic design for poor 
houses and prisons. By means of a special architectural design, prisoners (or workers, 
students, patients, paupers, etc) would never know if  they were simultaneously being 
monitored, thereby causing them to police their own behaviour. The panopticon is an 
ingeniously practical device that is designed to abolish privacy and promote 
homogeneity of prescribed behaviour amongst its inhabitants. Comte employs a more 
brutish approach to harmonising the interests of individuals in society. Comte’s system 
requires that everyone undergo rigorous moral and scientific education from the age of 
14 under the auspices of the Scientist Priests. From then on, through ritual and 
indoctrination, the child is instilled with love for the Great Being, Humanity. Moreover, 
through testing, an individual’s best role in the maintenance of the species would be 
determined and rigidly prescribed. The individual is to selflessly and altruistically 
devote himself to his work, thereby forfeiting any personal interest that does not directly 
benefit the species. Humanity’s interests just are the individual’s interests. This kind of 
homogeneity Mill constantly warns against with his repeated references to “Chinese 
stationariness”.
Secondly, Bentham’s simplistic conception of pleasure fails to capture the 
complexity of the human experience for Mill. Humans are active, creative and naturally 
diverse creatures that need to freely express themselves in order to experience maximal 
utility. Therefore, conceiving of pleasures purely in quantitative terms misrepresents the 
manifold ways in which humans experience it. Mill maintains that pleasures don’t 
merely vary in duration and intensity as Bentham describes, but in quality as well. A 
pleasure is considered higher if an experienced judge prefers it to such an extent that he 
would “not resign it for any amount of the other pleasure”. This incommensurable 
superiority is a problematic expansion to Bentham’s monistic conception of pleasures, 
and so threatens Mill’s ethical hedonism. Put simply, if  according to the Pleasure 
Principle, pleasure is the only thing valuable, then what is it, other than pleasure that
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makes a higher pleasure higher? Why not value this ‘otherness’? It would be one thing 
to posit that the exercise of certain capacities renders an experience more pleasurable 
than one that does not, but it is another thing to say that no amount of the lower could 
ever be preferable to any amount of the higher. Unfortunately, this incoherency remains 
despite the addition of the Comtean progressive dimension that Mill brings to his 
utilitarianism. However, what this progressive dimension does is to enable Mill to 
defend against the liberal critique of Bentham. As Parekh has shown, it is merely an 
empirical matter whether an equal distribution of rights actually does maximise utility, 
or whether some illiberal distribution would do so.3 By appealing to the progressive 
interests of humans, Mill is able to claim that an equal distribution of ‘rights’ will 
eventually maximise utility, even at the short-term utility costs of maintaining such a 
distribution. Mill’s ambitiously empirical claim about human nature enables him to 
defend the long-term expediency of liberal principles, in the face of narrow, short-term 
utilitarian demands to the contrary. In this way, Mill can be considered to be articulating 
a form of liberal-utilitarianism.
Mill borrows generously from Comte, despite his famous essay attacking Comte 
and positivism. Mill also inherits an entire philosophical foundation from Bentham, 
despite heavily amending it. Both doctrines do acknowledge an instrumental role of 
liberty to a certain and limited extent, but neither could be reasonably considered a 
liberal influence. The key element that both of these doctrines lack is a notion of 
individuality. As has been shown, Mill’s conception of human nature is largely a 
Romantic one, taken from von Humboldt. For Comte, egoistic drives are forever present 
in the psyche, but are suppressed through ritualistic expressions of love and altruism. 
The individual’s character is totally irrelevant, as its aptitudes could be determined, and 
the needs of humanity would dictate the most beneficial [to the species] role in society 
with no scope for lateral or hierarchical mobility. Bentham, being more concerned with 
political reform than revolutionary change, recognises homogeneity as a source of 
security and stability. On this view, no more utility is derived from framing a life that 
conforms to one’s unique character, in fact rampant individuality could even threaten 
security. As previously stated, this thesis does not seek to demonstrate the history of the 
genesis of Mill’s moral and political thought, rather to describe the dominant influences 
of it, and give a coherent interpretation of it. It is a testament to the richness and 
complexity o f this thought that two of the main influences of Mill’s doctrine stand 
outside of the liberal tradition, from which he supposedly hails. This being the case, the
3 Bikhu Parekh, “Bentham’s Theory o f  Equality”, Political Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 1970.
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influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt takes on a particular importance, because his 
notion of individuality not only animates Mill’s progressive utilitarianism, but also 
gives it its liberal ethos.
The influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt is widely acknowledged among Mill 
scholars. It would be impossible not to, as Mill begins On Liberty with a quote from von 
Humboldt, and he is the only person cited repeatedly in a favourable light. However, 
there has been little discussion of the actual specifics o f this influence. Mill’s concern 
for individuality that he takes from von Humboldt is what emerges as the key element 
that precludes Mill’s system from being fully illiberal. If individuality is the ultimate 
source o f utility, then its facilitation is the raison d ’etre for any utilitarian doctrine. 
Bentham recognises individuality in a weak sense with his admission that “push-pin is 
as good as poetry”.4 He acknowledges that individuals will have different sources of 
pleasures, and since pleasure is homogeneous, he needn’t be prescriptive. All things 
being equal, any source of pleasure is as good as another, and it is only a case o f finding 
one’s favourite, or most expedient. Similarly, Comte’s system attaches absolutely no 
weight to the notion of individuality, because it is totally irrelevant to the maintenance 
of the species. Humanity is an organic whole, and as such, each individual has a specific 
role to play. In fact, the positivist education is designed specifically to suppress those 
elements of character that are not oriented towards the selfless devotion to the species. 
We can see now how it is the failure to recognise the importance of individuality that 
forms the basis of Mill’s rejection of much of their ideas. What drives this point home, 
is by considering what On Liberty would look like without the endorsement of 
individuality. What we see is that even though the freedoms advocated in the essay 
would remain, they would merely in a formal sense, much like in Bentham’s 
harmonious system. The demand to find a form of life that produces the most utility for 
an individual would eventually lead individuals to converge on a ever-shrinking range 
of options, until a definitive, and Aristotelian-esque hierarchy of lives emerged.
Even though Mill recognises the import of individuality for maximising utility, 
it is a highly socialised process that reveals one’s individualism, which is a bounded 
concept. Von Humboldt, on the other hand, not having a theory of higher pleasures or 
goods, has a much more subjective conception of individuality, which is partly why he 
advocates a form of libertarianism. For him, anyone who “love[s] their labour for its
4 This quote is actually from Mill paraphrasing Bentham. See John Stuart Mill, “Bentham”, in Collected  
Works X, John M. Robson ed., (Toronto: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1969); Jeremy Bentham “Rationale 
o f  Reward”, in The Works o f  Jeremy Bentham Volume II, J. Bowring ed., (Edinburgh: William Tait, 
1843), p. 253.
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own sake” is enjoying the highest level of human flourishing.5 Mill conceives of 
indefinite possibilities for human flourishing, provided that they involve the higher 
pleasures. Individuals need to find those activities in life which excite the moral and 
aesthetic capacities of the mind. Mill, like Comte, considers himself to be writing 
during a critical period in history, when the individuals seeking to develop their 
capacities still encounter substantial pressure to conform to old Victorian and Christian 
social norms and beliefs. Also like Comte, Mill acknowledges the role that social elites 
play in the progress of society. The “experienced judges” o f Utilitarianism are to wield 
considerable influence over the direction of development of individuals wanting to 
reform their tastes and pursuits.
On Liberty describes the complex mixture of influence and freedom individuals 
are to experience as they gradually move from the Victorian outlook to the more 
regenerated one characteristic of Mill’s version of the Religion of Humanity. Mill is 
clear in his statement of the Harm Principle: “That the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, interfering with the liberty o f action o f any of 
their number, is self-protection.”6 However, the point of Chapter IV is to delineate the 
forms of influence that society can rightfully exert over the individual. It would be a 
great misunderstanding o f Mill’s doctrine, “to suppose it is one of selfish indifference,” 
because “human beings owe it to each other to help distinguish the better from the 
worse.”7 Even though Mill goes to some length to differentiate between the two forms 
of interference society may exercise over the individual, his reliance on the reasons for 
the influence rather than on the effect of the influence threatens the integrity of the 
Harm Principle. Therefore, in order to clarify the balance between control and coercion, 
I have employed a hierarchical conception of the self in On Liberty. Such a conception 
enables me to interpret the limits of the control elites are to rightly exercise over the 
individual, while protecting the sphere of negative liberty essential to reforming one’s 
character.
Understood this way, the Harm Principle, protecting the liberty of action of 
individuals only applies to first-order decision making and action-taking. This level of 
mental activity can also be considered character. This is where individuals express their 
desires and beliefs about the world, such as drinking excessively is enjoyable, racism is 
bad, or staying home and raising children is what one will do. This level of expression 
does not take into account the reasons one has for holding their beliefs and desires.
5 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Limits o f  State Action, in J.W. Burrow ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 1969), p. 27.
6 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 223.
7 Ibid., p. 276-7.
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These reasons occur at the second-order level of the self, and this is where elites can 
explicitly influence individuals.
Elites can do everything in their power, short o f coercion, to extinguish the 
desire to drink excessively. This influence can range from reasoning, to ostracising, to 
subtle social conditioning. Similarly, elites cannot prohibit the racist statements, they 
must teach them why such statements are wrong. As Chapter II o f On Liberty makes 
clear, knowing the grounds for truth is as important as knowing the truth itself. More 
interestingly, elites cannot force one to leave the children home with minders or ones’ 
spouse, and return to the work. This last example is different than the previous two, 
because it is not simply that the belief that staying home and rearing the children is bad, 
or wrong, it is the reasons why one chooses to do so that elites should be concerned 
with. It would not be an expression of individuality to stay home and mind the children 
if this were being done merely because it is conventional. This would be an unreflective 
decision, not based on any, or impoverished, second-order reasoning. If, however, one 
deliberated with one’s life-partner and came to a decision in line with, or despite 
convention, then that would be an expression of individuality. In this case, all elites 
could do is influence the reasoning process by initiating deliberation at the second-order, 
i.e. about one’s first-order desires regarding children.
Mill and Autonomy
As described in the previous chapter, Mill employs both a negative and a 
positive conception of freedom in his moral and political thought. The negative is 
straightforward, as the harm principle explicitly protects “liberty o f action” from the 
wrongful interference by others. As G.W. Smith correctly identifies, Mill also considers 
full freedom to include “possession of the capacity to alter one’s character, if  one 
wishes.”8 This capacity is the second-order level of activity previously discussed, and it 
is to be positively induced by elites. It is the grounds one possess for preferences and 
beliefs, and what separates “living truth” from “dead dogma”. Elites cannot simply 
impose their preferences, just as they simply cannot coerce individuals to choose the 
higher pleasures. What they can do is help individuals understand why the higher 
pleasures are superior. The preferences may originate in an external source, but once the 
individual understands why some preferences are better than others and then submits to 
them, they then become expressions of their individuality.
8 G. W. Smith, “Social Liberty and Free Agency”, in J.S.Mill On L iberty in Focus, John Gray and G. W. 
Smith, eds., (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 250.
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Using the hierarchical conception of the self to clarify the extent to which elites 
can influence individuals may reiterate the centrality o f the Harm Principle as one of  
absolute non-interference against other-regarding, wrongful harms o f the first order, and 
therefore confirm Mill’s status as a liberal thinker, but it also reveals a potential 
problem for Mill’s system, one he acknowledges in the introduction to On Liberty. Like 
the German Romantics before him, Mill recognises the tension between the sociability 
of humans and the demands of individuality that they must express. Society “practices a 
social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though 
not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, 
penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”9 
There is the risk that social forces, be they elites as Mill would hope, or the more 
generalised influence of the Zeitgeist, over-determining the individual. In other words, 
elites are meant to help individuals express their individuality, but what they in fact 
might be doing is merely imposing preferences (and their reasons) for the higher goods.
It would be impossible to be human without any social influences as one 
develops as an adult, but there is nonetheless an important difference between 
impressive and repressive forces. Whereas the former contributes to the genuine 
formation of one’s character, the latter is a superimposition of one. The problem for 
Mill is that differentiating between the two might be impossible. Someone might be 
conditioned to prefer the higher pleasures, even though their actual preferences would 
be for the lower ones. If it is impossible to differentiate between genuine individuality 
and conditioned preferences, then it would seem to weaken the concept of individuality 
considerably. And if the concept of individuality is weakened to the point of 
insignificance, then it becomes even harder to assimilate Mill into a recognisable 
tradition of liberalism.
We can see now how Mill’s concept of individuality involves a highly 
normative concept of autonomy. Expressing individuality is not simply a case o f 
discovering one’s deepest or truest desires, and fulfilling them. Mill never explicitly 
refers to essences, or quiddities10, but he does speak o f “inward forces” (p. 263), 
“energy” (p. 263), “Pagan self-assertion” (p. 266), and “personal impulse” (p. 264). 
Individuality is exercising deliberative choice, that is, second-order reasoning, with 
regards to choosing higher pleasures that conform to these internal drives. It is an active
9 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 220.
10 Jonathan Riley, M ill on Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 170.
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and creative process, not one of passive introspection. Charles Guinon puts it best when 
he conceives:
“the imperative ‘be yourself, not as telling you to shape yourself according to 
he requirements of an antecedently given essence, but directing you to 
accept that your creative activity of self-making is the ultimate source o f your 
own being. To be yourself, on this view, is to own up to the task of self-making 
in a way that is truthful to your own genuine feelings at each moment”11
This positive notion of freedom is not just procedural. Reflection of the second-order is 
not merely enough to be considered fully free in Mill’s system. If one were to 
experience a range of pleasures, and then after deliberation chooses to pursue the lower 
ones, Mill would not view this as an expression of individuality, and therefore not being 
fully free. To be fully free one must understand and wilfully submit to the superiority of 
the higher pleasures that conform to one’s “inward forces”. For Mill, it is an empirical 
fact that the higher pleasures yield not just more, but qualitatively better pleasure, and 
that “pagan self-assertion” be tempered with “Christian self-denial”. Since the Pleasure 
Principle says “that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as 
ends”, it would be irrational for anyone capable of appreciating the higher pleasures to 
choose anything else.
The normativity of this conception of autonomy comes from this narrowed range 
of rational options. The preference for a lower pleasure could only be the result of the 
heterogenic influence of the prevailing social ethos o f conformity and conventionality, 
or a defect of character, like being in the immaturity of one’s facilities. The distinctly 
human capacity of choice is generic, but needs to be exercised regularly. The authority 
that the elites have, and the influence they wield over second-order reasoning is 
specifically to overcome these two hindrances to human flourishing. The progressivist 
dimension to Mill’s doctrine makes these constraints and forms of influence actually 
utility maximising. Provided that first-order decision-making and action taking is 
protected from interference, this second-order paternalism promotes human flourishing.
Hamburger is correct to identify high levels o f social control in Mill’s doctrine, 
but he understates the centrality of negative liberty to Mill’s theory of progress. 
Negative liberty is not merely a means to breaking down outmoded social norms, 
eventually to be dispensed with during the next organic period. This sphere o f absolute 
non-interference is the necessary condition for expressing individuality, which entails
11 Charles Guinon, On Being Authentic, (London: Routledge 2004), p. 70, paraphrasing Jean Starobinski 
describing Rousseau.
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developing the correct type of desires (for the higher pleasures) and moral outlook, in 
short, character. The Comtean influence he highlights is a crucial part o f Mill’s doctrine, 
but only part of it. The Romantic departure from Bentham’s conception of human 
flourishing is the other part. And even though Mill’s notion of autonomy underpinning 
individuality is highly normative, and possibly unattractive to contemporary theorists, it 
nonetheless counter balances the influences of Comte and Bentham, both outside of the 
liberal tradition.
Mill and Liberalism
There are two remaining questions for our reassessment of Mill’s moral and 
political thought. Is his system liberal, and if so, how does it relate to other, and perhaps 
less controversial, liberal doctrines? The answer to the first question turns largely on 
one’s conception of freedom, and its relationship to utility. The second question will 
require a brief historical survey of the main strand(s) of liberal thought before Mill, and 
a brief survey of some of the versions of liberalism in contemporary discourse. Despite 
the high levels of social control and its particular nature, Mill does articulate a liberal 
theory that is novel, yet within the liberal parameters. Moreover, it will be shown that 
he prefigures more positivistic liberals, and ultimately some contemporary variants of 
perfectionism.
Before situating Mill in a recognisable liberal tradition, it is necessary to state 
what I mean by liberalism. Many writers go to great lengths to stress the contestability 
of any definition of liberalism. Managing the expectations of the reader, they claim that 
no definition could possibly hope to distil the various types o f liberalism down to an 
essential core of values or ides at work in all variants. Hence Kelly says that “any book 
that sets out to defend liberalism is bound to face the charge that it offers a distortion, 
caricature or incomplete picture, that when looked at from another angle shows 
precisely the opposite of what is depicted.”12 Even critics of liberalism take careful aim 
at their amorphous target before attacking. John Kekes, for example, says “any 
proposed interpretation must keep to the middle between the pitfalls of securing the 
consent of the contending parties by being too vague and of providing a detailed, albeit 
partisan account.” Liberalism is for sure a family of doctrines all bearing a resemblance 
from a macro perspective, but upon closer inspection revealing subtle - but no less 
crucial - differences between them. Despite these precautions, I think it reasonable to 
define liberalism loosely as a commitment to equality and freedom, however each
12 Paul Kelly, Liberalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 2.
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defined, either as ends in themselves, or as constitutive parts of human flourishing, 
again, however defined. Moreover, another element of any version of liberalism I would 
argue is in holding the individual as the irreducible and un-aggregative unit o f moral 
significance. This definition enables us to include thinkers like Nozick and Hayek who 
hold freedom as the sole end of justice, and a commitment to equality that is purely 
formal, as in equality before the law. This definition also makes it easy to exclude 
versions of nationalism and Comte’s positivism because of their commitment to the 
moral significance o f the nation or species. Bentham’s exclusion is a slightly more 
controversial judgement. He does hold the individual as the only unit of moral 
significance, but his holding of liberty, or rather security, and equality as formal ends of 
governance, are merely instrumental to the promotion of utility. Bentham’s conception 
of human nature as simple pleasure seeking does not identify liberty nor equality as 
constitutive elements o f happiness, rather as merely instrumental to it, in most cases. As 
was argued in Chapter Four of this thesis, his commitment to these values turn on their 
empirical ability to maximise happiness, and it does not take a stretch of the imagination 
to envision situations when they would not. Based on this definition, we must now 
determine if Mill can be included in these vague parameters of liberalism.
As described in Chapter Six, there are both negative and positive elements to 
Mill’s conception of freedom, which form part o f a larger thesis about the utility if  
individuality. The Principle of Liberty unambiguously protects a sphere o f non­
interference as the necessary condition for the exercise of individuality. This would 
seem to placate advocates of negative liberty, and confirm Mill’s liberal credentials. 
However, if  one were to consider Hayek’s definition of freedom, then we see that 
potential problems still might remain for Mill’s inclusion in the tradition. Hayek defines 
freedom as lack of coercion, for sure a definition that Mill could agree with. However, 
as Hayek says, this move merely shifts our analysis from one ambiguous term to 
another. He clarifies, “coercion implies, however, that I still choose but my mind is
made someone else’s tool, because the alternatives before me have been so manipulated
1that the conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes the least painful one.” 
This manipulation of circumstances in order to change the incentive structures of certain 
behaviour is exactly what Mill advocates. Provided the manipulators, social elites, do 
not violate the Harm Principle in the process, they are acting within their prerogative, as 
expressions of their own individuality. Their goal is to change the normative status of 
the conduct in question, in order to facilitate moral regeneration. Individuals “who show
13 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960), p. 133.
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rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit -  who cannot live within moderate means -  who 
cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences -  who pursues the animal pleasures at 
the expense of those of feeling and intellect” are to experience “very severe penalties” 
for their self regarding character flaws specifically for the purpose of behaviour 
modification.14 On this interpretation, the second-order influence that individuals 
experience falls into Hayek’s definition of coercion, thereby disqualifying Mill from 
inclusion in the tradition.
Even on Berlin’s account o f negative freedom as non-interference by other 
people, it is unclear as to whether Mill could be included in the liberal family. Again, 
we have a shift from defining the condition [of freedom] to the instruments of its 
modifier, the interference. The absence o f this modifier then defines the condition. 
Unfortunately, Berlin is inconsistent with his conceptualisation o f interference.15 
However, the definition of freedom Berlin attributes to Mill as the ability to do what 
one wishes is straight-forward enough, even if unsatisfactory.16 On this partial and 
incomplete conception of freedom, Mill would seem to be a whole-hearted liberal. The 
Harm Principle protects just that -  what one wishes to do (within the self-regarding 
sphere). Berlin does recognise the positive element of Mills conception of freedom, but 
he denies its logical connection to the negative.17 What Berlin fails to consider, is the 
implication of influencing what exactly one wishes, i.e. influencing people’s second- 
order reasoning. It is therefore unsurprising that he not only considers Mill a liberal, but
1 ftcrowns him - along with Benjamin Constant - the “Father” o f Liberalism.
Any conception of freedom that is purely negative does not take into the 
consideration the quality and meaningfulness of the sphere o f non-interference. Without 
some reference to a normal range of desires, i.e. a positive dimension, such conceptions 
of freedom fail when confronted by the example of the contented slave. To tell the slave 
that he is not really free despite what he says, is to counterfactually refer to some 
normative set of beliefs and desires. As Gray states, “any view of freedom as the non- 
restriction of options is bound to remain radically incomplete...in the absence of an 
account of the nature and powers of the self whose options are opened and closed by 
human action and omission.” 19 On the other hand, a purely positive conception of
14 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 278.
15 David Miller, “Introduction”, in Liberty, David Miller ed., (Oxford: OUP, 1991), p. 13.
16 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts o f  Liberty”, in The Proper Study o f  Mankind, Henry Hardy and Roger 
Hausheer eds., (London: Pimlico, 1998), p. 211.
17 Berlin, “Two Concepts o f  Liberty”, p. 200.
18 Ibid., p. 232.
19 John Gray, “On Negative and Positive Liberty”, in Conceptions o f  L iberty in P olitical Philosophy, 
Zbigniew Pelczynski and John Gray eds., (New York: St Martins Press, 1984), p. 338.
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liberty, that is to be under the direction of the higher, inner, or rational self, is to 
implicitly presuppose one true or correct option among any set. This rational 
commensurability o f options can justify the coercion of individuals into choosing the 
one true option. It would only be because of a failure in deliberation that any other 
option would be preferable. If one were more educated, rational, enlightened, or not 
under the influence of heteronymous forces, then the indisputability of the ‘true’ option 
would be plain. Such an extreme conception of positive freedom has obvious dangers 
because of its authoritarian and paternalistic implications, and so is quite a departure 
from the liberal confines, as it is typically defined.
The hierarchical conception o f the self enables us to clearly see the positive and 
negative elements to Mill’s conception of freedom. The Harm Principle delineates a 
space o f non-interference within which one enjoys liberty o f action. It would be 
impossible to express one’s individuality without such a sphere, and so is a necessary 
condition for human flourishing. Individuality for Mill is not a subjective matter, like 
for von Humboldt. It is the ultimate source of pleasure and is governed by the laws of 
human psychology. Exercising those capacities for refined activities yields not only 
more, but qualitatively better pleasure. Since Mill’s theory of life reads “that pleasure, 
and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as end”, there is an implicit
9ftrationalism, which comprises the positive element to Mill’s conception of freedom. 
Individuals who pursue the lower pleasures, or unreflectively adhere to social norms are 
not self-legislating as they otherwise would do, were they not more educated, rational, 
enlightened, etc. for Mill, expressing individuality simply is what autonomous people 
do, but they require a space of non-interference in order for this to be possible.
Mill’s concept of individuality is more like a positive conception of freedom, 
such as Kant’s. Kant’s equating a free will with a moral will is more than just 
procedural. Maintaining an independence from phenomenal influences and employing 
the dictates o f practical reason are not enough. In order to be free (autonomous), one 
must also conform to moral principles that meet the strict universalisability criterion. 
The content of the choices are at least as important as the exercising of the will. To 
abide by maxims that cannot be universalised is simply to be under the influence of 
heteronymous influences. Similarly, exercising one’s deliberative capacity of choice, as 
described in Chapter Five, is not in itself an expression of one’s individuality. One must 
choose higher pleasures that are expressions of one’s inward forces. Again, the content
20 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in Collected Works X, John M. Robson ed. (Toronto: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul), p. 210.
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o f the choices are at least as important as the experiments in living, and subsequent 
deliberative processes. To choose lower pleasures, or to conform to social conventions 
for the sake of it, is to be under the homogenising influence of outmoded social 
outlooks, like Victorianism. Mill’s individuality contains a highly normative conception 
o f autonomy. Full freedom for Mill then -  although he does not articulate it in this way 
-  is exercising deliberative reasoning about one’s first-order desires, beliefs, and 
opinions, i.e. one’s character, coming to hold the correct character, and non-interference 
to act on one’s character and express individuality.
Mill’s highly normative conception of freedom as it underpins his notion of 
individuality does justify Mill’s inclusion in the liberal family, but not uncontroversially. 
As has been shown, some undisputable liberals such as Hayek would seem to exclude 
Mill, as I interpret him, based on Hayek’s conception of coercion. However, I maintain 
that Mill is a bona fide example of a liberal thinker, because freedom - both positive and 
negative - are constitutive elements of human well being for him. Freedom is not merely 
a hypothetical means to happiness, as for Bentham; because of Mill’s empirically 
derived conception of human nature, it would be impossible to be happy without both 
positive and negative freedom. Moreover, Mill held a formal conception of equality as 
well, applying the Harm Principle equally to all “human beings in the maturity o f their 
faculties.”21 And of course, it goes without saying that the unit of moral significance is 
the individual. Mill may have a highly normative conception of autonomy, but at least 
he has one, and subsequently must be recognised as being within the liberal tradition. 
However, it must not be forgotten that these principles are derived from an anterior 
Principle o f Utility. It is for this reason that Mill can simultaneously be considered both 
a liberal and a utilitarian thinker, or more accurately, a liberal-utilitarian.
This intimate connection between utility and this interpretation of freedom in 
Mill may justify his inclusion in a recognisable lineage of liberal theories, at least 
insofar as Kant remains in that same tradition, but that does not place him beyond 
criticism. The highly normative conception of autonomy at work justifies, and even 
requires second-order influence - by way of elites or experienced judges - in order to 
help individuals free themselves from the homogenising pressures of old social norms, 
and discover the higher pleasures that best conform to their natures. As described above, 
this influence can be pervasive and highly generalised, leaving individuals “fewer 
means of escape”. In other words, Mill wants to liberate individuals from the dominance 
of Victorian social norms, but only so they could be dominated by new ones, namely
21 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 224.
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those of his Religion of Humanity. The notion of autonomy built into his conception of 
individuality is too normative, and the implicit rationalism too strong. To put it another 
way, his conception of human flourishing, embracing the Religion of Humanity, is too 
narrow. There may be indefinite higher pleasures that individuals can experience, but 
human flourishing for Mill still demands that the pleasures be higher. This is akin to 
saying that human flourishing consists of reading books. True, there may be near- 
infinite number of books available, but we would still be confined to reading. A less 
normative notion of autonomy at work, one that retained the procedural dimension but 
dispensed with the substantive one would support much more plural conceptions of 
human flourishing, and preclude the crime Mill risks committing, that o f ‘autonomicide’.
The final question to address is how Mill fits into the lineage of liberal theories. 
Mill is unique in his drawing from disparate strands of European philosophy into a 
largely coherent liberal doctrine. Mill starts with a utilitarian framework, and then over 
the years comes to realise that the ultimate source of utility is to be had by expressing 
one’s individuality. In order to weaken the homogenising influence of Victorian social 
norms, and encourage experiments in living, Mill institutionalises the conditions of 
social progress, which is characterised by the liberal principles articulated in On Liberty. 
These principles are part of a larger perfectionism that Mill introduces into the liberal 
tradition that is carried on by thinkers such as T.H. Green and running up to Joseph Raz.
A full historical review of the dominant strands of liberal thought is not possible 
with the limited time and space here, but even the briefest survey of some of the key 
figures reveals that Mill introduces the Romantic notion of individualism into the main 
of the liberal tradition. John Locke, for example, best known for his defence of private 
property, states that:
“For law , in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction as the 
direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no 
farther than is for the general good of those under the law .. .So that, however it 
may be mistaken, the end o f law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve 
and enlarge freedom’, for in all the states o f created beings capable of laws, 
where there is no law, there is no freedom.'”22
Like Mill, Locke charges the state with the protection of a sphere of non-interference. In 
Locke’s case it is to exercise the natural law that is reason; in Mill, it is to develop the 
capacity to express one’s individuality. Their systems are both liberal insofar as they are 
concerned with maintaining spheres of negative liberty, at least at the first-order level,
22 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Richard H. Cox ed., (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson,
Inc., 1982), p. 34.
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however for Mill his doctrine calls for much more. Locke is trying to re-create the 
conditions o f perfect freedom, governed by natural law, but with protection from the 
arbitrary interference from the less rational, characteristic o f the state of nature. 
Individuals confront each other as either competitors or co-operators in the 
accumulation o f property, governed by the majoritarian laws enforced by the state. For 
Mill, on the other hand, individuals help each other develop their capacities to better 
express their individuality. This pursuit is governed by the state by means of the harm 
principle, but is much less individualistic than in Locke. Locke is interested in 
protecting liberty like Mill, but his legal system lacks the dynamic notion of harm, and 
his conception of human flourishing lacks the notion of “utility in largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interests in man as a progressive being.”23
Benjamin Constant, the other “father” of liberalism according to Berlin, also 
lacks a notion of individuality in his liberal doctrine. Constant differentiates between 
ancient and modem conceptions of liberty, which is analogous to Berlin’s distinction 
between positive and negative conceptions of liberty. The ancient concept is concerned 
with political participation and ability to influence matters o f state and governance. The 
modem is concerned with negative freedoms enjoyed by individuals. His thesis is that 
whereas in the ancient regimes all too often civic freedoms were sacrificed in the name 
of political ones, in modem regimes the opposite is true, individuals are too ready to 
give up access to the political processes and retreat into their sphere of private activity 
and pursuits. Modem citizens need to re-exert the ancient conception o f liberty and 
combine it with the modem one. Only by participating in the political machinery could 
citizens safe-guard the liberties that are so crucial to their modem existences:
“Political liberty, by submitting to all its citizens, without exception, the care 
and assessment of their most sacred interests, enlarges their spirit, ennobles 
their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of intellectual equality 
which forms the glory and power of people.”24
Like Mill, Constant acknowledges the instrumental value of liberty in developing 
certain human faculties and capacities, but his conception of liberty lacks the 
ontological underpinnings that elevates Mill’s conception of liberty beyond mere non­
interference.25 Constant is arguably as eclectic a European thinker as Mill is, but his
23 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 224.
24 Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty o f  the Ancients Compared with that o f  the M odem s”, in Constant 
Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), p. 327.
25 Biancamaria Fontana, “Introduction”, in Constant P olitical Writings, Biancamaria Fontana ed., 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1988), p. 27.
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liberal doctrine, like Locke’s, also lacks the ideals of individuality and progress at its 
heart.
Mill may have been the first to introduce the ideal of individuality into a liberal 
doctrine, but others have taken up his efforts since him. Mill anticipates the broader 
development of British idealism and the New Liberalism of the late 19th century, which 
maintains a more positivistic account o f the state and its role in human flourishing. T. H. 
Green, for example, sees a system of natural or innate rights as necessary in order for 
individuals to perfect themselves as moral beings. Even though these rights are 
essentially individual, they require the recognition of society in order to be effectual.26
Green conceives of freedom as the pursuit of self-perfection, which comprises the
01common good. He nonetheless opposes the paternalistic practices by the state in order
OStto induce this perfection, in order to facilitate the development one’s own capacities. 
Moreover, as Gerald Gaus discusses in his book, The Modem Liberal Theory o f Man, 
the ‘modem liberals’ he identifies, Mill, Green, Bosenquet, Hobhouse, Dewey, and 
Rawls all identify the tension between the demands of individuality and human 
sociability.29 As I have pointed out, this tension can be found also in the writings of the 
early German Romantics, from whom Mill draws his notion of individuality. In fact, 
Gaus claims that his tension appears in most post-Rousseauian political thought, 
including Marx and the anarchist Kropotkin. What makes the writers in question 
“liberal” is the liberal-democratic conclusions they come to in their writings. What 
Gaus doesn’t consider are the ways in which Mill’s formulation and justification of  
liberal principles are similar to the perfectionism of Joseph Raz
Much like this interpretation of Mill, Raz’s perfectionism sits somewhere 
between liberalism and communitarianism. Raz identifies well-being as the successful 
pursuits o f comprehensive goals. Beyond one’s biological needs, the well-being of an 
individual depends on the reasons one has for having those goals and the success one
I
achieves in their pursuits. Rather than remain neutral over the range of options 
available to the public, Raz argues the state is specifically to promote and discourage 
certain conceptions of the good. Whereas justice for Rawls demands the exclusion of 
moral considerations when dealing with individuals, so as not to impose one’s 
conception upon others, for Raz it requires treating individuals with moral dignity:
26 John Roberts, “T. H. Green”, in Conceptions o f  Liberty in Political Philosophy, (Zbigniew Pelczynski 
and John Gray eds., (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 245.
27 Roberts, “T. H. Green”, p. 250.
28 J. W. Burrow, The Crisis o f  Reason, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 129.
29 Gerald Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory o f  Man, (London: Croom Helm, 1983).
30 Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory o f  Man, p. 6.
31 Joseph Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p. 308.
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“Is treating one another with respect if  one treats him in accordance with sound 
moral principles, or does respect for persons require ignoring morality (or parts 
of it) in our relations with others? There can be little doubt that stated in this 
way the question admits of only one answer. One would be showing 
disrespect to another if one ignored moral considerations in treating him.” 
(emphasis added)32
In other words, it is a duty of the state to help individuals pursue valuable activities, 
which contribute to their well-being. Mill makes a similar claim in On Liberty, although 
he generalises the responsibility to all o f humanity, rather than to the state:
“Human beings owe each to other help to distinguish the better from the worse, 
and encourage to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should ever be 
for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise o f their higher 
faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise 
instead of foolish, elevated instead of degrading objects and 
contemplations.”33
Mill does not institutionalise perfectionist ends in the state like Raz does, but they both 
recognise that the achievement of personal goals is ultimately a social endeavour, in that 
fellow individuals, be they agents of the state or social elites, aid in the project. Not only 
is the pursuit of one’s goals a social endeavour, the goals themselves must be based 
upon socially recognised forms, approved or not. The meaningfulness o f an activity is 
only endowed by social recognition, and the goals themselves can only be acquired 
through a process of tacit familiarisation and habituation.34 For Mill, expressions of 
individuality are socially embedded practises, but he does not limit the validity of 
pursuits to socially recognised ones. In fact, Mill’s rationale for arguing for 
individuality is to overcome the conventional and outmoded ways of life, or in order to 
discover more utility-producing pursuits that better conform to one’s inward forces. 
Such pursuits do not require social recognition (and certainly not approval) for 
legitimacy, because this is an empirical matter, and the further away from established 
norms the pursuit is, the greater the potential genius of the new practice.
Perhaps the most important similarity between Mill and Raz is that for both of 
them the well being is a highly normative end, albeit for different reasons. Whereas for 
Mill, it is supposedly an empirical ‘fact’ that the most utility is to be derived from the 
exercise of certain capacities; for Raz, well being consists of autonomously choosing a 
valuable goal, as defined by normative reasons, and achieving it. Autonomy consists in
32 Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom , p. 157.
33 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 277.
34 Raz, The M orality o f  Freedom, p. 311.
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a lack of coercion and manipulation at the hands of others, mental capacities, such as 
“the power to absorb, remember and use information, reasoning abilities, and the like”, 
and range of valuable options from which to choose. Not only must the options 
conform to existing social forms, thereby making for a conservative range of options, 
but the options must be valuable as well. The value of a comprehensive goal is 
determined by the reasons one has for holding such goals, but since both the individual 
and state can be wrong about the reasons for holding a goal, and hence its value, we are 
left only with the goals derived from the existing social forms, with no mechanism to 
critically assess or revise them. Autonomously choosing irrelevant goals, or worse yet, 
immoral ones, does not contribute to well being, despite what the individual or state
'j/ '
might think. Human flourishing for Mill - expressing individuality, implies the highly 
normative conception o f autonomy described above. Because certain activities yield 
more - and higher - pleasure, choosing a life of manual or humble labour, or one that 
does not exercise the higher capacities is evidential of a defect of character.
Despite these key similarities, Mill is not a perfectionist. His Pleasure Principle 
and his empiricist methodology commit him to the position, however questionable, that 
individuals, once properly educated, will prefer the higher pleasures determined by their 
individuality, and it is in fact good that they do so. This position is very similar to Raz’s 
claim that people merely should prefer certain goals over others for reasons totally 
independent of individual preferences. Mill wants to retain a naturalist grounding, but 
his empirical claims about individuals seem too ambitious to be verifiable. His theory 
therefore comes across as entailing a highly normative conception of human flourishing 
like Raz’s conception, despite Mill wanting to remain entirely within a utilitarian 
framework. The good life for Raz contains a narrow range o f socially recognised and 
rationally endorsed forms, from livestock farming to campaigning against the use of 
DDT, in other words pursuits that utilise a range of human capacities. For Mill, on the 
other hand, human flourishing can involve an indefinite range o f activities, provided 
they involve the exercise of specific, higher capacities, because for Mill it is simply a 
fact that these are the ultimate sources of utility.
Mill and Beyond
Mill weaves disparate strands of 18th and 19th century thought into a coherent 
doctrine advocating principles as the best way to promote happiness and social progress.
35 Ibid., p. 408.
36 Ibid., p. 302,408. Raz says that pursuing goals for which one holds bad reasons for may advance one’s 
self-interest, does not contribute to one’s well being, p. 317.
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Mill may be best known for protecting a sphere of negative liberty around individuals to 
order for them to conduct their experiments in living, but this reading is mistaken. There 
are too many passages within On Liberty and in other writings that point to high levels 
of social control and advocacy of the authority of elites. Taking these into consideration, 
and employing a hierarchical conception o f the self, I have attempted to show how 
Mill’s project, as articulated in On Liberty and Utilitarianism, is to create the necessary 
conditions during this critical period in history for individuals to free themselves from 
the homogenising influence of social convention, and learn to express their individuality. 
I have tried to show that read this way, the seemingly contradictory claims that 
Hamburger highlights cohere in a perfectionist version of liberal-utilitarianism. This 
interpretation has taken for granted some elements o f Mill’s thought that warrant further 
study, which I will only suggest now before concluding. Some of these have been 
touched upon in previous chapters. These issues largely come from Mill’s methodology, 
but touches on several key elements of his moral and political doctrine. Future 
psychological and sociological research may force us to re-consider much of Mill’s 
principles.
The first issue that I must point to is Mill’s claim about the inherent desirability 
of the higher pleasures. Mill forcefully asserts that “it is an unquestionable fact that 
those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating both, do 
give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher 
faculties” (emphasis added).37 If we were to challenge this claim, and retort that some 
people may always prefer the lower pleasures, he might come back and say that these 
people really are not capable of appreciating the higher pleasures. It takes more than 
knowing the rules of Chess to be able to appreciate it, just as it takes more than literacy 
to be able to appreciate poetry. However, this defence then raises the possibility that 
there may be no way to actually determine when someone is capable of appreciating 
both pleasures. This objection goes both ways, because a person may eventually 
develop the ability to appreciate the higher pleasures, only to lose the ability to 
appreciate the lower. As discussed in Chapter Four of the thesis, the fool may not be 
able to appreciate the life of Socrates, but neither can Socrates truly appreciate the life 
of the fool, because he is Socrates. The two lives are incommensurable, thereby making 
a first person comparison meaningless. What turns on the potential fallacy o f this 
dubious empirical claim about the inherent superiority o f the higher pleasures is Mill’s
37 Mill, “Utilitarianism”, p. 211.
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conception of human nature and happiness. If pushpins really are as good as poetry, 
then Mill loses his arguments for cultivation of the self, and hence for social progress.
Following from this, the theory for individual self development that this 
interpretation makes may not be the only, or best, way to facilitate character reform. 
First of all, it may not even be the case that the type of self development that Mill 
advocates is even possible. Perhaps individuals’ characters are fixed at an early age, and 
once they become mature in their faculties, their personalities are already beyond 
substantial alteration. This possibility is highly unlikely. Humans can always learn to 
appreciate new art forms and activities even at a late age. However, reforming one’s 
moral character may not be as easy, even despite the high levels of second-order 
influence. Even if this type o f reform is possible, it still might be the case that direct, 
first-order paternalism is the best way to facilitate the reform of individual character. 
Mill agrees with Comte about the overwhelming influence on character that education 
and religion play, but he stops short of advocating the illiberal extent to which Comte 
utilises these institutions. Perhaps Comte is correct, and that the only way to truly 
change people’s moral sentiments is by forced repetition and ritual. Not only would this 
render the Harm Principle inexpedient, but it would also turn any notion of autonomy 
into a hindrance, instead of means to greater utility.
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, Mill’s claims about individuality 
may lose their strength upon rigorous psychological inspection. First of all, individuality 
may not be the wellspring of utility that Mill claims it is. It might be the case that 
individuals in late modem Western civilisation derive more pleasure from conforming 
to local sources of identity, rather than exploring their own unique drives and impulses. 
We needn’t turn to academic psychology to consider this possibility, for this is exactly 
what Mill is arguing against in On Liberty. He attributes it to the hegemony of Victorian 
social forms and thinking, but it may simply be an aspect of human nature that Mill did 
not see, or did not want to recognise. Secondly, and perhaps ironically, it might be the 
case that individuality itself may not even exist. Mill waxes Romantically about 
“inward forces” (p. 263), “energy” (p. 263), “Pagan self-assertion” (p. 266), and 
“personal impulse” (p. 264), but these might merely be the attributes o f a metaphysical 
conception of human nature that Mill has faith in. As described above, individuality 
may be nothing more than the preferences o f social elites imposed upon individuals who 
would otherwise be happy to conform to their peer groups and communal identities. 
Character itself may be nothing more than the sum total of the experiences one has had, 
modulated by present circumstances. Even if  individuality is “self-making in a way that
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is truthful to your own genuine feelings at each moment” as described above, “genuine 
feelings” may be wholly causally determined by one’s surroundings. If individuality is 
hollowed in this way, then it becomes stripped of its status as the ultimate source of 
utility, and Mill will have made no progress over the Benthamite system of implicit 
conformity.
I don’t mean these points to be critical of my interpretation of Mill’s doctrine; I 
merely want to point out those elements that I have chosen not to pursue, and what 
potentially turns on them. Much of what I am suggesting requires scientific research, 
and not philosophical analysis. Like Mill, I believe that in order to articulate how the 
world should be, one should understand firstly how it works. Mill wrote close to 200 
years ago, and so we cannot hold him responsible for the advances in science that have 
been made since his own research. Nonetheless, he has given us principles about how 
best to arrange society that appeal as much to our Romantic sentiments, as to our 
utilitarian and positivistic rationalities. Mill is an eclectic thinker, and his political 
morality exemplifies the synthesis of seemingly incompatible philosophies. His 
statement of liberal principles has become part of the foundation of the contemporary 
public faith in liberal-democratic institutions. Nonetheless, and in the spirit of Mill, it is 
necessary to question the reasons we have for holding Mill in such esteem, and to that 
end, to re-examine the evidence. The last thing Mill would want would be for his “one 
very simple principle” to become yet another piece of “dead dogma”.
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